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PAUL TILLICH'S PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION 
CHAPTER I
ON THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC 
"The boundary is the best place for acquiring knowledge."
Introduction
Once described as a "colossus standing astride the world of con­
temporary theology,"^ Paul Tillich wielded an influence on Western 
twentieth century religious thought rivaled only by Switzerland's Barth 
and Germany's Bultmann. At his death Time hailed his work as one of 
the "religious landmarks" of this age and concluded that "his name is 
better known to laymen than that of any contemporary theologian."^ Life 
magazine remarked, "He made Christian theology as important in the 
thought of his time as Einstein made the equivalence of mass and energy 
important in modern weaponry.
^Ved Mehta, "The New Theologians," The New Yorker, November 13, 
1965, p. 119.
^The opinion of Kenneth Hamilton, "Paul Tillich," Creative Minds 
in Contemporary Theology, ed. by Philip E. Hughes (Grand Rapids:
William Erdmans, 1966), pp. 451=479.
^"Man of Ultimate Concern," Time, October 29, 1965, p. 80.
^"Great Radical Theologian was Apostle to the Skeptics," Life, 
November 5, 1965, p. 40D.
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One partial but widely offered explanation attributed Tillich's 
remarkable success to the cultural comprehensiveness of his thought.
R. M. Brown, for example, suggested that Tillich "engaged in a contin­
uous endeavor to communicate far beyond the pale of those who are 
conventionally labeled 'theologians. ' The New York Times editorial­
ized that "it was the exceptionally broad canvass on which Paul Tillich 
worked that distinguished him from so many modern theologians. This 
patient scholar took as his subject all of life . . . Jerald
Brauer, once Tillich's student and later Dean of the University of 
Chicago Theological school, offered this explanation of Tillich's ef­
forts in this direction.
Whatever is formative of culture and illustrative of the outreach 
of the human spirit is of primary importance and concern to Tillich. 
Because he has long argued that culture is the form of religion he 
remains passionately and deeply interested in all forms of culture 
itself. It is amazing how he can move to the heart of a cultural 
phenomenon, analyze its significance, and see its interrelationship 
with other facets of the cultural situation. It is this wide- 
ranging interest and deeply penetrating analysis of the cultural 
situation which makes Tillich so attractive to the modern intellec­
tual.?
An astonishing array of speaking occasions, articles, books, 
and teaching interests further testified to the cultural breadth of 
Tillich's intellectual horizons. Tillich spoke before such diverse 
groups as commencement audiences at Massachusetts Institute of
^R. M. Brown, "Paul Tillich," Commonweal. January 21, 1966,
p. 471.
®"Paul Johannes Tillich," New York Times. October 27, 1965,
p. 47.
^Jerald C. Brauer, "Preface," The Journal of Religion. XLVI, 
Tillich Supplement (January, 1966), 89-90.
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Technology and the New York School for Social Research, the fortieth 
anniversary dinner for Time and the centennial of the American Institute 
for Architects, the Metaphysical Society of America, and the American
QPsychopathological Association. He delivered major lectures on three
Qcontinents. He discussed theology with Albert Einstein, literature 
with T, S. Eliot, and psychology with Carl R o g e r s . H i s  penetrating 
and analytic mind produced articles for an almost infinite number of 
popular magazines and specialized journals which included, in addition 
to his primary specialties of philosophy and theology, academic areas 
like politics and psychiatry, art and architecture, sociology and his­
tory. He continually added to his cultural horizons throughout his 
life, and one of the last lectures he delivered before his death bore 
the title, "The Effects of Space Exploration on Man's Condition and
®See Paul Tillich, "The Inner Aim," Time, April 21, 1961, p. 57; 
"Conformity," Social Research, XXIV (Fall, 1957), 345-360; "Environment 
and the Individual," Journal of the American Institute of Architects, 
XXVIII (June, 1957), 90-92; "Relation of Metaphysics and Theology,"
The Review of Metaphysics, X (September, 1956), 57-63; "Anxiety-Reducing 
Agencies in Our Culture," Anxiety, eds. Paul H. Hoch and Joseph Zubin 
(New York: Grune and Stratton, 1950), pp. 17-26.
9 The Yale Terry Lectures, the Firth Lecture in Nottingham, 
England, and a lecture tour of Japan. Each of these events produced 
subsequent publications: The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1952); Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1960); and based on his Japanese tour, Christianity and the 
Encounter of World Religions (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963).
^®For instances of the first two see Paul Tillich, The Theology 
of Culture, ed. by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1959), pp. 125-133. For the latter example see "Paul Tillich and 
Carl Rogers: Â Dialogue," Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968),
55-64.
11As representative examples of each of the preceding see Paul 
Tillich: "Marxism and Christian Socialism," Christianity and Society,
S t a t u r e . Nothing better indicates the range of Tillich's interests 
than his seven-year role as "University Professor" at Harvard and a 
previously cited edition of his collected essays entitled. Theology of 
Culture. The virtuosity of Tillich's scholarship prompted his friendly 
"disputant," Reinhold Niebuhr, to call him "the most learned man I 
know," and even his more severe critics, like J. Heywood Thomas acknowl­
edged,
Tillich has a background of amazing erudition in history- philosophy 
and literature. He has shown too how profitable a sympathetic study 
of psychoanalysis can be for the theologian. In short, he is 
distinguished by an unusual Catholicity of scholarship and under­
standing and like the poet considers nothing of human interest to 
be foreign to his field of study.13
A fitting tribute to the multi-dimensional facets of Tillich's thought
occurred when the Society for the Arts, Religion, and Contemporary
Culture established the "Paul Tillich Commemorative Lectureship."1^
Beyond its contributions to the eclectic character of Tillich's
VII (Spring, 1942), 13-18; reprinted in The Protestant Era, trans.
James L. Adams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp.
253-260; "Can Human Nature Change?" (Symposium with Harold Kelman, 
Frederick Weiss and Karen Homey) The American Journal of Psychoanaly­
sis. XII, No. I, 62-69; "Protestantism and the Contemporary Style in 
the Visual Arts," The Christian Scholar, XL (December, 1957), 307-311; 
"The Philosophy of Social Work," Pastoral Psychology, XIV (December,
1963), 27-30; "History as the Problem of Our Period," The Review of 
Religion, III (March, 1939), 255-264.
^^Paul Tillich, The Future of Religions, ed. by Jerald C. Brauer 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 39-52.
^%iebuhr as quoted by Mehta, "The New Theologians," p. 116; and 
"Some Notes on the Theology of Paul Tillich," The Hibbert Journal, LVII 
(April, 1959), 253,
l^George W. Cornell, "Cultural Guidelines Deteriorating, Theolo­
gian Says," The Oklahoma Daily, May 10, 1968, p. 13.
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insights, the sweep of Tillich's thought influenced a wide range of 
disciplines. That influence appears, for instance, in literary criti­
cism. James Livingstone employed concepts borrowed from Tillich to 
interpret Salinger's Franny and Zooey.^^ John Fraser, writing in 
Nineteenth Century Fiction about Wuthering Heights, observed, "But as 
Tillich points out in a book that could be a decided aid in obtaining 
a balanced attitude toward the novel, 'in every act of justice daring 
is necessary and risk is unavoidable.'"^^ History also felt the perva­
sive force of Tillich's ideas. Charles H. Foster utilized categories
17borrowed from Tillich to analyze American culture. Perry Miller used
and praised Tillich's historical concepts in his biography on Jonathan 
18Edwards. John Housley and Norman Young attempted to apply Tillich's
IQthought to education. The journal of Pastoral Psychology recently 
devoted an entire memorial issue to Tillich's contributions to psychol-
onogy and psychotherapy. " Furthermore, a perusal of more than fifty
^^"J. D. Salinger— The Artists' Struggle to Stand on Holy 
Ground." The Drury Review, II (February, 1967), 10-20.
16"The Name of Action: Nelly Dean and Wuthering Heights,"
Nineteenth Century Fiction. XX (December, 1965), 234. The citation 
comes from Tillich's Love. Power.and Justice, p. 56.
^^"I'he Thenonomous Analysis of American Culture," Studies in 
American Culture, ed. by Joseph Kwait and Mary Turpie (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1960), pp. 189-206.
18Jonathan Edwards (New York: William Sloan Associates, 1949),
pp. 314-319.
19"paui Tillich and Christian Education," Religious Education, 
LXII (July-August, 1967), 307-316 and "Some Implications of Tillich's 
Theology for Christian Education," Religious Education, LX (May-June 
1965), 230-237, respectively.
20"Memorial Issue on Paul Tillich," Pastoral Psychology. XIX 
(February, 1968).
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dissertations and theses written from 1940-1968 reveals additional. 
instances in which Tillich's ideas have been Incorporated into,the theo­
retical framework of other fields.
The relevance, however, of Tillich's thought for speech-communi- 
cation theory remains essentially unexplored. Corvln, who brought 
principles of theoretical criticism to bear in his consideration of "The 
Rhetorical Practice of Paul Tillich," stressed that the study he did was 
"not designed primarily as an analysis of his t h e o r y . O n e  other 
work, a projected Master's thesis on the concept of participation with 
illustrations from Tillich's homiletic practice, by John Northwall has 
not been completed. Beyond these, established speech-communication 
theorists such as Thomas Olbricht, Anthony Hillbruner, Floyd Matson, and 
Ashley Montagu exhibit a tentative interest in the communicative impli­
cations of Tillich's thought;but, unfortunately, none has attempted 
a comprehensive survey of those implications.
Tillich's Interest in Communication
A conscious concern with the problems and character of
^^For a complete list of these see the bibliography.
^^William Ray Corvin, "The Rhetorical Practice of Paul Tillich," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Oklahoma, 1968),
p. 10.
OOIbid., 2. Correspondence with the Library of the University 
of Colorado indicated no record of the completion of this thesis as of 
July 10, 1969.
^^See Thomas Olbricht, "Paul Tillich's View of Audience Adapta­
tion and Its Implications for Rhetorical Theory" (Unpublished research 
paper. University of Pennsylvania, n. d.); Anthony Hillbruner, Critical 
Dimensionst The Art of Public Address Criticism, (New York: Random
House, 1966), pp. 128, 147-149; "Introduction: The Unfinished Revolu­
tion," The Human Dialogue: Perspectives on Communication, ed. by
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communication spanned most of Tillich's professional career, permeating
all facets of his life from the eminently practical to the highly
sophisticated. At least as early as World War I when he served as a
chaplain in the German airmy, Tillich experienced the dismay and shock of
trying to speak relevantly to soldiers, who, as he described them, "were
about to die,"^^ Caught up in this traumatic, hemispheric catastrophe,
Tillich later reminisced about the intense effort he expended to find
the best way to communicate under such conditions. He concluded:
If I used Biblical language it meant nothing to them . . . .
I preached sermons, therefore, that never used any of the language 
of the Bible. They were a little mystical, a little poetical, 
and also had a touch of common sense, and they had an effect.
Tillich's return to civilian life plunged him into the chaos of
postwar Germany; he rapidly became an active participant and leader in
27a new movement, the Religious Socialists, which was destined to have
a pan-European intellectual impact but which failed to achieve its
immediate national objectives within Germany. This role, too, thrust
special communication responsibility upon Tillich, as he confided in
recalling the advice he imparted to young men serving this cause.
When young ministers who belonged to our group went to their pul­
pits, I always told them not to preach religious socialism, but to
Floyd W. Matson and Ashley Montagu (New York: The Free Press, 1967),
p. 6.
^^Mehta, "The New Theologians," p. 132.
2*Ibid.
27For Tillich's account of this see On the -Boundary: An Auto­
biographical Sketch. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), pp.
74-80.
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do two things: to preach the principles out of which religious
socialism came— principles of love expressed in the unity of justice 
and power— and to spell out what is against justice here and now, 
the making of men into cogs of a machine, into objects and things.
Similar statements could be cited reflecting Tillich’s involvement with 
communication strategy in his American'careers as a "traveling lec­
turer" and m i n i s t e r b u t  the preceding instances should amply
illustrate Tillich's pragmatic concern which he summed up as covering
31"more than forty years of public speaking."
On a different and perhaps more elevated plateau, communication 
influenced Tillich's life as a critical "shaping" force, adding existen­
tial dynamics to his thought as well as premising the thematic intent 
and direction of his work. Tillich referred to the former connection 
in a lengthy autobiographical sketch written to vivify the way in which 
existential experience embedded itself into the core of his ideas; in 
it he pays tribute to the fact that the bulk of his literary efforts was 
based on "addresses and s p e e c h e s . H e  continued.
Speeches and essays can be like screws, drilling into untouched 
rocks; they try to take a step ahead, perhaps unsuccessfully, per­
haps in vain. My attempts to relate all cultural realms to the 
religious center had to use this method. It provided new
^^Paul Tillich, "Freedom and Ultimate Concern," Religion in 
America, ed. by John Cogley (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 284-
285.
29see Paul Tillich, "On the Boundary Line," The Christian 
Century. December 7, 1960, p. 1437.
^®See Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), Preface.
^^Paul Tillich, My Search for Absolutes (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1967), p. 45.
^^Ibid.. p. 44.
discoveries— new at least for me— and, as the action showed, not 
completely familiar to others.33
In addition, Tillich's theological-philosophical objectives 
contain implicit communication connections. As a cultural synthesizer 
seeking to "overcome the isolation of theology, to relate it to liter­
ature, the humanities, and the social sciences,"34 Tillich indirectly 
included communication both as a tool to accomplish his objective and as 
a discipline within the scope (humanities) of his envisioned synthesis.33 
Likewise, Tillich's avowed acknowledgement that "my whole theological 
work has been directed precisely to the interpretation of religious 
symbols in such a way that the secular man— and we are all secular— can 
understand and be moved by them" implied a communicative barrier and 
his reasoned attack on it.3^
Yet, dwarfing all these interests in communication is the uni­
versal vision which prompted Tillich to insert communication into the 
heart of his philosophic system and to assign it a powerful, formative 
role in man's actualization of his being. Tillich's definitive declara­
tion that "communication is.a matter of participation" 3^ related
Ŝ Ibid.
34”Harvard's Theologian," Newsweek, April 17, 1954, p. 66.
ine assumption here is that rhetoric belongs in the humanities. 
See Everett Lee Hunt, "Rhetoric as a Humane Study," The Quarterly Jour­
nal of Speech, XLI (April, 1955), 114-117; Donald Bryant, "Whither the 
Humanities?" The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLII (December, 1956), 
363-366; and Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1963), pp. 3-19.
Paul Tillich, Ultimate Concern, ed. by D. Mackenzie Brown 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 88-89.
37paul Tillich, Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel," 
Audio-Visual Department, Union Theological Seminary, 1952. All three
10
38communication directly to his ontological structure. The potent 
psychological and ontic implications which Tillich attributed to com­
munication (the "word") nowhere resounded with more force than in a 
paper he read to the American Psychopathological Association.
The word is the first and basic cultural agency; this poses the 
question: How does the word reduce anxiety? The answer is that
the word has power, psychic as well as intellectual. It has power 
and all anxiety springs from lack of power. The word bans chaps, 
the threat of non—being, inside and outside of oneself. The powers 
of chaos as they appear in innumerable forms, from the most primi­
tive myths to the most highly developed religious symbolisms are 
expressions of the basic anxiety which is the destiny of man; for 
we are finite beings and at the same time aware of our finitude.
This source of anxiety cannot be removed because it is we ourselves, 
our very being. But the creative word can keep it in limits and 
make life possible.
Regardless of the seeming ambiguity of the preceding statement, 
one message stands out. Tillich attributed a tremendous cultural power, 
to the "word," i.e., language. Resolving the strange, indeed puzzling, 
ring of Tillich’s words and setting them into a framework which hope­
fully gives them more intelligibility constitutes the purpose of this 
study. Help comes, of course, from Tillich, himself.
One final bond between Tillich and communication remains un­
explored— Tillich’s lectures on communication. Not until January of
articles bear the title "Communicating the Christian Messager A -Ques­
tion to Christian Teachers and Ministers," Union -Seminary Quarterly 
Review. VII (June, 1952), 3-11; Pastoral Psychology. VII (June, 1956), 
10-16; Theology of Culture, pp. 201-213. All four sources were con­
sulted by the author but quotations are based on the tape which 
disagrees in several instances with the published accounts, which all 
agree.
^®See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (3 vols.; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951-63), I, 174-178.
^^Tillich, "Anxiety-Reducing Agencies in Our Culture," Anxiety, 
ed. by Paul Hoch and Joseph Zubin, p. 17.
11
1952 did Tillich deliver a lecture on communication, per se. This 
lecture to a minister's workshop at Union Theological Seminary is avail­
able on tape; it has also been published in at least three different 
s o u r c e s . A g a i n ,  in 1959 Tillich undertook to formulate principles 
which undergird communication.In both these lectures Tillich evinced 
primary concern with the traditional rhetorical interest, public speak­
ing, but the generality of his comments and the sweeping scope of his 
vision give his principles an application to communication in virtually 
all forms.
Moreover, the clues provided by these lectures combine, upon 
careful examination, with the systematic principles of his more compre­
hensive works, the incidental comments in his less specialized writings, 
and the insights into his-own communication experiences to provide the 
data for a complete philosophy of communication. Because Tillich 
labored more diligently than most men to maintain internal consistency 
in his thought (he once confessed that it was.impossible for him to 
think "in other than a systematic way"^^), the task of drawing together 
the various phases of his communicative idea to form a complete, uni­
fied whole is much simpler than it otherwise would be. Yet, up to this 
point no one has attempted to weld these diverse factors into a coherent 
whole which will intelligibly interrelate his lectures, his philosophic
4^See n. 37, p. 10.
4^Paul Tillich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," New 
Christian Advocate, IV (May, 1959), 12-17.
4^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, vii.
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position, and his experiences to each other, much less to communication 
theory. Thus, a vast amount of material silently awaits assimilation 
from a perspective of communication; Tillich's written legacy includes 
more than a score of books and hundreds of articles, with an almost 
equal number having been written about him. If Duhamel's contention 
that rhetoric "cannot be adequately interpreted apart from the ideolo­
gical context in which it occurs"^^ needs a testing ground, Tillich 
represents the ideal figure.
Justification
The fragmentary state of our understanding of Tillich's ideas 
on communication should itself supply sufficient motivation for this 
study; but the innovations of Tillich's philosophic position suggest an 
even more compelling reason for scrutinizing his relevance for communi­
cation. If rhetoricians genuinely want and seriously need new
philosophical presuppositions from which to consider communication,
44as Otis Walter suggested over five years ago, then Tillich demands a 
hearing in the speech-communication field.
Tillich departed from the dominant traditions in American phil­
osophical thought and rhetoric in two significant respects. First, 
Tillich's view of the world is essentially realistic rather than
^^Albert P. Duhamel, "The Function of Rhetoric as Effective 
Expression." Journal of the History of Ideas, X (June, 1949), 344.
^^Otis M. Walter, "On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative 
or Progressive," The Quarterly Journal of Speech. XLIX (December, 1963), 
367-382.
13 .
nominalistic; he labeled himself a "moderate r e a l i s t . T i l l i c h  knew 
at this crucial point he ventured into an area often unfamiliar and un­
congenial to most Americans,
American history started in the period of prevailing nominalism. 
America never experienced the "realistic" thinking and feeling as 
Europe did in its "archaic" period. The assumption that universal 
concepts imply more reality than individual objects can hardly be 
explained to people who have been educated for centuries to the 
conviction that; universals are mere words and that "reality" indi-r 
cates only the realm of empirical objects.
Tillich's realism prompted him to seek the unity of the world in the 
face of its apparent multiplicity and to establish deductive, a priori 
universals which rendered it meaningful; hence, his ambitious under­
taking of the subject "all of life."^? Such a perspective, highly 
reminiscent of Plato (and German idealists g e n e r a l l y ) ,^8 meant that 
Tillich viewed communication in its broadest possible connections with 
reality as a whole and not simply as a specialized function of man 
limited to courts, the legislature, or. the conference room.
A second difference between Tillich and other philosophical 
approaches to communication, closely related to realism, grows from his 
preferential placing of the ancient, pre-Socratic philosophical disci­
pline of ontology (the study of being) ahead of the more generally
^^William L. Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophi­
cal Interrogations, ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome (New York; Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 389.
^^Paul Tillich, "The Social Function of the Churches," Social 
Research. Ill (February, 1936), 92.
^^See n. 6, p. 2,
^®See John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," 
The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. 
Bretall (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1959), pp. 136-141,
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49approved epistemology. Once again Tillich realized how sharply he 
contrasted with prevailing trends but felt that ontology, which he 
called "first philosophy," preceded epistemology temporally and evalua- 
tively.^^ Consequently, he turned from epistemology with its highly 
refined observational techniques and urged a contemplative, experiential 
reflection as the key to an interpretation of man, meaning, and reality.
The uniqueness of Tillich^s philosophic perspective manifests 
itself in a number of the issues and problems raised in this paper. 
Almost frighteningly ominous is the terminological barrier raised by 
terms such as "being," "realism," and "ontology": At times, the mundane
task of defining threatens to overpower the more important consideration 
of exposing new insights and affirming new values.
Tillich's innovative perspective also raises several new and 
different questions: (1) How does speech affect man as man in contrast
to man as a consumer or voter; (2) how does speech affect personrto- 
person relationships not as regards observable persuasive "effects" but 
as terms of the deepening of community ; (3) how does an ontological, per­
spective affect the relationship between ethics and epistemology in 
communication (subsumed under this larger heading are such perplexing 
questions as how communication can achieve change while preserving the 
individual freedom of the listener); (4) how does history affect com­
munication when history is interpreted as "creative time"; (5) what 
should be the proper ends of communication? Tillich's thought, by its
^®Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 163ff.
^^Ibid. and Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 30.
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nature, will contribute little to questions such as whether humor adds 
to the rhetorical effectiveness of a serious speech or whether primacy 
or recency is a greater determinant of rhetorical success. At the same 
time, however, Tillich has the distinct advantage of showing ultimate 
communication objectives which may subsequently affect the character of 
smaller questions by making them superfluous or by revealing them in a 
new light. Mors than anything else, Tillich, supplies a new way of 
thinking about communication and the presuppositions which govern it.
In this capacity Tillich functions more as a Plato than an Aristotle.
If anything, Tillich's questions satisfy an innate human tendency to 
know "why," rather than providing an instrumentally constructed "how."
A third difference introduced by Tillich changes the previous 
relationship which has been envisioned between philosophy and communica­
tion. Fast studies have predominantly focused on specialized overlapping
Cl 52such as logic, semantics, or perception. By beginning with being 
itself or ultimate reality, Tillich extends both the philosophical 
enterprise and communication's relationship to it. Thus, communication 
appears as an intrinsic human activity more central to man's fulfillment
^^See Maurice Matanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (eds.), 
Philosophy, Rhetoric and Argumentation (University Park; Pennsylvania 
State University, 1965); and A. Craig Baird, Rhetoric; A Philosophical 
Inquiry (New York; The Ronald Press, 1965), pp. 20-23.
^^I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1965).
53George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, ed, by Lloyd 
Bitzer and foreward by David Potter, (Carbondale: University of
Southern Illinois Press, 1963).
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of the meaning of life than as a tool refined for a practical objective. 
One result of Tillich's broadened vision Is an evaluation of communica­
tion which transcends Its oft^sounded political contribution to 
democracy and points toward Its ontological contribution to man's.devel­
opment as man. In doing this, Tillich Indirectly reminded rhetoricians 
that to affect human behavior, communication must presuppose some view 
of man as man and what he ought to be. He also Implied that his commun­
ication theory centered more on "people," person-to-person relationships, 
than on "Issues," person-rto-ldea relationships.
One final difference In Tillich's perspective Is his virtual 
absence of acquaintance with past or traditional communication theory.
A careful perusal of his published writings and lectures Indicates no 
cognizance of recognized rhetorical theorists or works, with the single 
exception of the Phaedrus, and his reference to It does not relate to 
communication.^^ Indeed, his solitary use of the term "rhetoric" sets 
It against a pejorative and overly simple backdrop, "Politicians, dic­
tators, and other people who wish to use rhetoric to make an Impression 
on their audience use the term God In this s e n s e . T i l l i c h  thus 
offers a new perspective essentially unaffected by the past history of 
communication theory.
Hopefully the uniqueness of Tillich's philosophical presuppo­
sitions will produce some new Interpretations, but undoubtedly It will 
raise many difficulties even as It offers new Insights. Some of these
^^"Symbols of Eternal Life," Pastoral -Psychology, XVI (April, 
1965), 15.
^^Tllllch, The Courage to Be, p. 182.
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potential problem areas have already been Intimated— the terminological 
barrier and the absence of a rhetorical tradition— while others remain 
as yet unspecified. One of these involves the broader application of 
Tillich's stated concern with communicating in religion. While the 
specificity of the content to be communicated influenced Tillich's 
thought, it exerts no more influence than the forensic interest of clas­
sical rhetoric or the political-business interest of much modern 
rhetoric. In all these cases methodologies and generalizations tran­
scend their specific content; in Tillich's instance, the philosophical 
basis which underlies all his thought guarantees a broad base for his 
communication theory.
Next, any effort to study Tillich may encounter the gallingly 
indifferent "so what?" Some, operating with different premises, dis­
miss his perspective as too "abstract," meaningless; or unverifiable. 
Tillich frequently spoke of and to such attitudes. His normal response 
was to suggest that those who ignored his questions simply substituted 
unconscious answers and decisions for them.^^ Furthermore, instead of 
one's viewing Tillich as antithetical to any position in speech-commun­
ication, a saner judgment recognizes his approach to communication as 
being complementary to other.approaches, or, at the most, simply differ­
ent. Tillich also does something else, previously implied; he offers 
a comprehensively designed response to man's inquisitive desire to know 
simply for the sake of knowing; in this age of specialization, he postu­
lates a universal analysis of reality. If Tillich at times seems out 
of step with the questioning spirit of the modern age, then surely that
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 20.
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same contemporary spirit warns us to proceed cautiously in dismissing 
any serious claim to "truth."
Finally, many of Tillich's supporters who strongly disavowed his 
reliance on "rhetoric" and his own castigation of anything that smacked 
of "mere persuasion" seem on the surface to prevent this u n i o n . C l a r ­
ifying, however, the differences between Tillich's ideas and superficial 
concepts of rhetoric constitutes one of the undertakings of this study, 
as well as interpreting in this way more precisely what Tillich means 
by "mere persuasion."^® Far from mitigating against this study, such 
remarks only enhance its possible value.
Plan of Study
Five substantive chapters aim at innovatively relating communi­
cation and Tillich's philosophy; they move down a constantly descending 
staircase from the ultimate universals of being to the somewhat milder 
abstractions of interpersonal communication. Each chapter employs the 
insights of its predecessor gradually to illumine the whole; yet certain 
earlier sections such as the discussion of symbols.(Chapter III) become 
more meaningful in light of later discussions on existential epistemo­
logy (Chapter V).
Chapter II introduces the overarching theme of the entire study,
S^See in this connection: Wilhelm Fauck, "The Sources of Paul
Tillich's Richness," The Future of Religion, ed. by Jerald C. Brauer, 
p. 24, Walter Leibrecht, "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," Religion 
and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 3; and Edward O'Conner, "Paul
Tillich: An Impression," Tillich in Catholic Thought, ed. by Thomas A.
O'Meara and Celestin K. Weisser (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press,
1964), p. 25.
^®Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 45.
"communication is a matter of participation." A survey of the philo­
sophical background surrounding participation paves the way for its 
eventual definition as "the principle of relatedness." Subsequently, 
three basic forms of participation or relatedness are isolated as having 
special relevance to communication.
The third chapter examines in greater detail the first and most 
important of these categories, essential participation or relatedness.
In it the meaning of being (ontology) is explored and its relation to 
essential participation and communication is explicated. From it comes 
a new conceptualization of the purpose of communication, viz. that com­
munication affirms the being of man through three functions— the 
affirmation of his self-realization, the creation of community, and the 
power of symbolization.
Chapter four moves from ontological relatedness to the dynamic 
stage of life, historical relatedness. This discussion reiterates the 
priority of ontology in Tillich's thought by tracing out its shaping 
character in Tillich's philosophy of history and by reciprocally con­
sidering the changes which time introduces into essential participation 
and the communication functions inherent in it. The consequence of 
time's effect on being Tillich designated as "situation" which has the 
broader definition of "meaninglessness" existing as a constant threat 
to communication. Three basic communication genres arise in an attempt 
to combat meaninglessness and to help man realize through communication 
his sense of being. Perhaps the most important insight developed in 
this chapter is that such oft-repeated, if ill-defined political, 
social, and religious positions as "conservative," "liberal," or "moder­
ate" have their counterpart in communicative systems when they are
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defined In relation to a list of communicative criteria»
The final chapters, five and six, picture the act of communica-r 
tion as it transpires on the person-to-person level. The former . 
chapter explores Tillich's parallel to listening, reception, defined as 
diagnosing, analyzing, or learning about the situation or person with 
whom one wishes to communicate. The latter chapter explores the .act of 
speaking or message formulation as Tillich viewed it from an apologetic 
perspective. Both these chapters maintain Tillich's ontological pre­
suppositions , but now the purposes and ends of communication become...more 
pragmatic and at points even touch on traditional rhetorical concerns 
about how attitudes can best be changed or re-shaped. Chapter five 
revives the old Platonic insight that the "method" and "attitude"! -which 
motivate knowledge accumulation also affect the knower, the content of 
his knowledge, and the known. Chapter six applies Tillich's highly 
stimulating "method of correlation" to communication. The final chapi­
ter, seven, synthesizes the ideas of the preceding chapters and extends 
their implications; Tillich's relevance to theorists such as Plato and 
Burke is also briefly noted.
Summary
Tillich's thought fulfills, at least partially, the call of one 
rhetorician, Otis Walter, for new beginnings in rhetorical theory based 
on new philosophical presuppositions. In this capacity Tillich as an 
"ontologist" and a "humanist" stands outside the mainstream of the 
technological-empirical thrust of the modem study of communication, 
both criticizing and extending its horizons.
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Tillich's special predilection for metaphors like "boundary" 
and "frontier" suggests the thematic combination of old and new en­
visioned in this dissertation.^^ It seeks to draw from the well-rknown 
fabric of Tillich's philosophy a perspective on communication which 
Tillich himself never actualized. It seeks to reunite two ancient 
disciplines, often enemies, bred in the Greek genius, philc»ophy and 
rhetoric, healing some old wounds and encouraging new perspectives. It 
accepts the best of the contemporary but raises again some old questions 
about values, ethics, and ends.
Staying on the boundary is never easy; Tillich conceived it as 
constantly "full of tension and m o v e m e n t . S o m e  speech communlcation- 
ists will see all philosophy and no communication. Some philosophers 
will see all communication and no Tillich. To balance the "tension" 
requires participating on the sides of all the critical fronts in the 
hope that the synthesis will produce something new for each. This is 
the goal— the journey stretches ahead.
59See Tillich, On the Boundary; An Autobiographical Sketch; and 
"Frontiers," The Future of Religions, ed. by Jerald C. Brauer, pp. 52-63.
^®Tillich, "Frontiers," The Future of Religions, ed. by Jerald C, 
Brauer, p. 53.
CHAPTER 2
AN OVERVIEW OF COMMUNICATION AS PARTICIPATION 
"Every relation includes a kind of participation."
Participation; An Ontological Approach to'Communication
Philosophic Origins
Tillich's lectures emphasized the central importance of partici­
pation in the communicative act. In an early lecture Tillich affirmed 
that "communication is a matter of participation. Where there is-no 
participation there is no communication."^ In a later discussion he 
stressed that "real communication has to do with participating . . .
In both instances the nature of Tillich's statements and the strategic 
introductory positions they occupy indicate that Tillich used "partici­
pation" to define the essence of communication as he understood it.
Yet, to most students of communication, Tillich's definition 
itself sounds vague and puzzling; the difficulty stems from the fact 
that Tillich's definition presupposes a different model, system, or 
framework from which to view comunicaticn. Tillich did not draw his 
fundamental image of communication from the Aristotelian formula of
^Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 204.
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"rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic." Similarly» he did not 
utilize the mechanistic models of behaviorism with their emphasis.on
4encoding-decoding In Its several variations. Instead, operating within 
the confines of his own background, he approached the definition and 
elaboration of communication through traditional philosophic categories 
which are often foreign to the modem speech theorist. Consequently, 
any understanding of Tillich's terminology generally and of participa­
tion specifically must begin with an analysis of his primary philosophic 
tradition with Its multiple methodological Implications.
As an aid In clarifying the general sense In which Tillich 
employed such terms as being and participation, the philosophic.back­
ground apparently most relevant to Tillich was suggested by Rowe.^ As 
a beginning point, he developed the nature of Tillich's thought in the 
context of Its realistic as opposed to Its nomlnallstlc tendencies. 
Rowe's approach seems justifiable on several grounds. Tillich clearly 
placed himself In the realistic tradition.^ His early reputation In 
America revolved In large measure around the concept of "belief-rful 
realism."^ Tillich's later thought openly bristled at times with
^Aristotle -Rhetoric I. 1354^1.
^See, for Instance, chapter two, "Models and Speech Communica­
tion" of Gerald R. Miller's Speech Communication (Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merril Company, 1966), pp. 51-81.
%llllam L. Rowe, Religious Symbols and God (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 43-73.
^See notes 46 and 47, p. 13.
^See Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, trans by H. Richard 
Niebuhr (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 11-18.
hostility toward nominalism, particularly in the guise of contemporary 
logical positivism. He castigated it for (1) making hidden and a - priori
Oassumptions about the nature of reality; (2) denying the possibility 
of knowledge by denying the existence of universels;® and (3) obscuring 
the nature of reality by conceiving of being as merely the highest 
abstraction.^® . ......
Rowe'S perceptive discovery, in addition to clarifying xiiiich's 
own philosophic outlook, sparked the vision needed to relate the concept 
of participation with the realistic tradition with which it has been 
associated. Plato's Parmenides is generally cited as the earliest exam­
ple of participation used to describe the relationship between a 
universal (man) and a specific (John Doe); the Platonic strain.is 
obvious in Tillich's usage of the term, although Tillich actually seems 
to have expanded slightly the sense of participation beyond that .of.
Plato. On occasion Tillich employed the term participation as being
13virtually synonymous with the term universal itself; on still other
^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 20.
®Ibid.. 117.
^®Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 10-11.
^^See William F. Lynch, An Approach' to the 'Hetaphysics of Plato 
Through the Parmenides (Georgetown; Georgetown University Press, 1959), 
pp. 149-167.
^^Ihe Platonic element in Tillich has been noted by many obser­
vers. J. Heywood Thomas, for example, contended, "There are times when 
one feels that his outlook is quite simply Platonic (or at least Plotin- 
ean) and he once remarked to me that the trouble with me was that I was 
too Aristotelian in my logic whereas he was more Platonic." "Foreword," 
Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, ed. by Thomas A; O'Meara, and Celes- 
tin D, Weisser, p. vii.
^^See Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 165; and "Whar Is Basic in
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occasions Tillich used the term participation to refer to the relation­
ship or identity which existed between the universal and its particular 
manifestation.^^ Sidney Hook preferred to emphasize the former usage, 
so he asserted that Tillich's "employment of the 'participates' suggests 
that he is treating it as a Platonic universal." The latter perspec­
tive agreed more closely with Lewis Ford's conviction that essential 
participation represented one of the basic forms of participation." 
More plausible than either alternative is the possibility, which later 
investigation confirms, that Tillich found his original impetus for 
using participation in Plato and then fashioned a unique role for it 
within his own thought.
The preceding discussion has already disclosed the fundamental 
issue which divided realists and nominalists— the nature and signifi­
cance of universels. Nominalists in the tradition of Roscelin of 
Compiegne, William of Champeaux, and William of Occam envisioned the 
"really real" as the individual entity (the particular tree, case, or 
incident) accessible to empirical investigation.^^ Universale such 
as treehood, they regarded as no more than "communicative notions" or 
signs. On the other hand, realists in a tradition extending from Plato,
Human Nature," Pastoral Psychology. XIV (February, 1963), 18.
^^Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 88.
^%ook. The Quest for Being (New York; St. Martin's Press, 
1961), p. 157.
16"jhg Three Strands of Tillich's Theory of-Religious Symbols," 
The Journal of Religion, Tillich Supplement, XLVI (January, 1966), 123.
^^See Meyrick H. Carre, Realists and Nominalists (London: Ox­
ford University Press, 1961), pp. 38-42.
Augustine, and medieval realists to Tillich contend that reality has 
the nature of universels.
Rowe further offered three qualities which typically distinguish 
the concept of a "universal" and, hence, realism. In his analysis uni­
versels as contrasted to particulars (1) are predlcable, (2) are
3.8non-temporal and non-spatlal, and (3) possess extra-mental existence.
Ha than citas the statement "Socrates is wise" to provide an illustra­
tion of a universal (wisdom) being employed In a manner quite similar to 
the statement "Communlcatlod-Is participation." In other words, commun­
ication offers a particular Instance of participation, similar but. not 
Identical to the way Socrates represents a particular Instance of wis-̂  
dom; the subtle Implications of differences In these two statements will 
soon manifest themselves.
The realistic perspective Is extremely helpful when contem­
plating any of Tillich's key concepts. A categorical consideration of 
them as unlversals shapes the manner In which one approaches and inter­
prets them. To ask what Is being, or what Is participation, appears 
analogous to asking what Is beauty, what Is goodness, what Is wisdom. 
Attempts to construe these terms too literally distort the thrust and 
Intent of Tillich's thought. In this respect his own suggestion that
participation Is better viewed as a "power" than a material object is 
19well taken. Tillich's thought consistently stays on a plateau of ab­
straction reminiscent of Platonic unlversals; regardless of his peculiar
18Rowe, Religious Symbols and God, p. 44.
19Tillich, The Courage to Be. p. 88.
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point of emphasis the image of universels influences the nature of 
Tillich's philosophic vocabulary.
As previously suggested, however, in a crucial manner, Tillich's 
assertion that "communication is a matter of participation" does not 
conform to the stereotype of a universal reflected in "Socrates is 
wise." Fundamentally and obviously, "communication" lacks the particu­
larity or the specificity of "Socrates." Instead, in the former 
instance, one universal, "participation," is predicated of another, 
"communication," for one might say,"Tom is communicating." Thus, the 
statement "Communication is a matter of participation" looms as infi­
nitely more complex than its counterpart. The statement clearly implies 
a hierarchy of universels in which the nature or character of the lesser 
or lower one, communication, depends on the greater or higher one, par­
ticipation.
Thoroughly grasping the hierarchical difference between the two 
universels— participation and communication-^-means viewing participa.tion 
from within the framework of its ontological relation to being. Parti­
cipation, viewed as an element of being, is a part of everything that
20is. Tillich preferred to say that "everything participates in the
21structure of being." As a part of the ontological description of 
everything that is, participation goes beyond the less comprehensive 
universal or collective to represent the principle or power of univer­
sality, conceptualization, or transcendence. Participation in this 
sense describes the quality of relatedness, whether one depicts the
20Tiiiich, Systematic -Theology. I, 164-166.
^hbid., 168 =
similarity of structure which enables two objects to be labeled as 
trees; or the power of man's mental capacity-to identify and unite sim­
ilarities; or relationships of an environmental nature which involve 
historical, biological, or sociological ties.
The necessary components of any relationship are an individual
entity such as a tree, leaf, idea, or person and something to which the
entity is related such as a forest, trunk, family, belief, or "world"
in g e n e r a l,Hence, "individualization-^-participation" as polar terms
within Tillich’s ontological structure define the "category of rela-r 
23tions." Everything, Tillich contends, has participation or 
relatedness. By this he means that all existence exhibits the quality 
of distinction and sameness, separateness and similarity, the one and 
the many. Individualization, representing the pole of individuality, 
intrinsically produces separation and difference; Participation, rapre-r 
senting the pole of universality or plurality, unites individual 
entities into meaningful aggregations,
When Tillich employed the term.participation, he typically 
thought of it in its ontological generality as designating the principle 
of relationship, of identity, of similarity, of commonality. The pre­
cise nature of this relationship or "sharing"^^ may change, but the 
quality of relatedness through some form of inherent similarity remains.
Hence, Tillich utilized the term participation in a host of
^^The term "world" for Tillich indicated "a structure or a unity 
of manifoldness." See Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 170.
23ibid., 177.
^^Tillich offers "sharing" as an approximate synonym for parti­
cipation in The Courage to Be, p. 88.
29
different settings» acknowledging that the ''concept of participation has 
25many functions." He could talk of participation In a universal
26 27 28 29truth, In past traditions. In agape. In another person, In an
artistic w o r k , o r  a movement like Religious Socialism.''^ Tillich'-s
classic statement occurred In volume one of his Systematic Theology.
A symbol participates In the reality It symbolizes, the knower 
participates In the known, the lover participates In the beloved, 
the existent participates in the essences which make it what it 
Is under the conditions of existence; the Individual participates 
In the New Being as It is manifest In Jesus t h e  C h r i s t . 32
R. M. Smart harshly criticized Tillich's use of participation
In this passage because he felt Tillich applied It Indiscriminately to
logically different ' Items-^-^connotatlve overtones, eplstemologlcal rela-
33tlonshlps, a highly Intensive personal relationship, etc. Yet, one 
should constantly remember that when Tillich thought In ontological 
terms, as he does In the previous citation, he took no single example 
as a norm for defining participation; rather, he tried to find the unity
^^Tllllch, Systematic Theology, I, 177.
^^Tllllch, "Symbols of Eternal Life," pp. 13-20.
27"Theology and Architecture," Architectural Eorum, G U I  (De­
cember, 1955), 132.
23"creatlve Love In Education," World Christian Education, IV 
(Second Quarter, 1949), 27.
2%lllch, "The Philosophy of Social Work," p. 30.
^^Tllllch, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate 
Reality, p. 9.
33-Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interro- 
gatlons, ed. by Sydney Rome and Beatrice Rome, p. 360.
^^Tillich; Systematic Theology, I, 177.
^^"Being and the Bible." The Review of Metaphysics, IX, (June, 
1956), 598-607.
within all these different phases of reality. For him the unity exis­
ted precisely in the idea of some form of relatedness which he expressed 
through the concept of participation. The virtually inexhaustible range 
of applications of the concept of participation confirmed Tillich's 
conviction that it was characteristic of all being. If pressed^ Tillich 
would certainly have acknowledged the differences in these various rela­
tionships and in the principles which governed them but would still 
maintain that within the higher order of his ontological abstraction, 
these were all types of participation.
Isolating more specific, hopefully normative, forms of related­
ness which Tillich intended for participation to :designate when he used 
it in connection with communication stands out as the first real chal­
lenge in discriminating less abstract meanings for-it than pure ontology. 
Certain scholars; such as Rowe, decided that Tillich never criterially 
delimited normative forms for participation. He complained that "the 
fundamental difficulty inherent in Tillich's discussion of participation 
is his failure to explain the many different uses which this term has 
in his s y s t e m . G r a n t e d , disentangling and clarifying these forms is 
difficult but one hopes that it is not impossible, however.
- Types of Participation
Participation has already been defined in its widest possible 
latitude as ■ the principle of relatedness. At this point the process of 
constructing a philosophy of communication has barely begun. Somehow 
the abstract, skeletal, and somewhat unwieldly conception of
^^Rowe, Religious Symbols and God, p. 118,
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"communication as participation" needs substantive fleshing and
illustrating. Unfortunately, Tillich- who ostensibly operated under.the
auspices of his own principle of semantic rationality, undertook,_as one
critic previously noted, no effort to classify or further refine the
35nuances of meanings he attached to participation» Tillich did,...howT
36ever, commend the efforts which Lewis Ford made in this direction.
In connection with this analysis of Tillich's concept of 
religious symbols, Ford studied Tillich's uses of participation. Füve 
sub-categories or dimensions appeared in his analysis; each category 
expressed a form of relatedness occurring with characteristic regularity. 
Typically, however, as Ford found, Tillich had the frustrating and con­
fusing habit of shifting from one category to another with no overt 
warning. At least three of Ford's five categories indicate basic forms 
of relatedness highly relevant for Tillich's interpretation of commun­
ication.
Ford designated the five types of participation he isolated in
Tillich's writings as causal participation or causal relatedness.,
inclusive participation or inclusive relatedness, receptive participa-^
tion or receptive relatedness, environmental participation or
environmental relatedness, and.essential participation or essential re- 
37latedness. Causal participation, according to his analysis,
"signifies the effect's participation in its cause. If B participates
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 55-56.
^^"Rejoinder," The Journal of Religion, Tillich Supplement, XLVI 
(January, 1966), 186.
^^Ford, "Three Strands of Tillich's-Theory of Religious Symbols,” 
pp. 121-123,
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in A causally, then A causes Pure examples of this type of ..parti­
cipation in the writings of Tillich are relatively limited. Tillich's 
affirmation that an "individual leaf participates in the natural struc­
tures and forces which act upon it" reflects one possible way in which
OQthe effect participates in its cause as the result of the cause. It 
also appears in his view that a man participates in his destiny to the 
degree that his actions tend to have later raparcussions upon him.
This facet of participation reduced in traditional communicative 
discussions of communication strictly to.logical.relationships (causes 
effect) received no analogous place in Tillich's thinking on communica­
tion. He clearly believed in logical cohsistency,^^ but he also 
regarded "logical proof" as a superficial manifestation of some more 
fundamental aspect of human existence and not in-itself as a sufficient 
explication of effective communication. Consequently, causal participa­
tion dovetailed in its broader implications into other categories which 
Tillich clearly regarded as bearing more directly on human existence-.
Inclusive participation. Ford's-second category, he defined as 
describing "the relation of a being to that which it includes. Thus man 
participates in the subhuman realm because the physical, chemical, bior- 




^^See "Logical Rationality," -Systematic-Theology. I, 56-rS7.
^ h o T  
hols," p. 122
^Ford, "Three Strands of Tillich's Theory of Religious Sym-
Ford felt that inclusive participation signified "an asymmetrical rela­
tion in which the inferior '..shares in ' the superior. This type of 
participation described the way in whiih "communication" participated 
in "participation;" but, like causal participation, its more signifi­
cant applications appear under other headings.
As a thirr' category Ford develops the previously ; referredrrto 
idea of essential participation. This sub-division of participation 
"explains the relation between the particular and the universal. 
According to its realistic implications, "two things that are.similar 
participate in the same p r o p e r t y . F o r  instance, two individuals, 
John Doe and Hary Smith, participate in the common universal of manhood 
or perhaps wisdom. Or an oak and a pine tree participate in the common 
universal of treehood.
This category of participation asks a supremely important 
question— what essences or universels does communication participate 
in and how do they affect the nature, purpose, or ends of communication. 
This is far from a new question. Plato's Ehaedrus should be studied as 
an attempt to isolate the basic universels affecting communication; 
nonetheless, Tillich's responses constituted a unique set : of answers 
to it. Above all, communication participates in the structure of being; 
this is.its essential relationship, and in this dynamic encounter com­





self-creation, interpersonal communion, and "world" harmonization.
These three interrelated "universels" operate to influence the nature 
and end of all communication» The consideration of them in chapter 
three reveals what Tillich envisioned as "really" happening in.the 
communication act regardless of what the external trappings surrounding 
the act might be.
Â fourth classification of participation discerned in Ford's 
analysis was "environmental participation." This form of participation 
pointed to the "individual's real relatedness to that which surrounds 
him."^^ Both conscious and unconscious forces operated here. The 
individual participates in-past traditions, in sociological structures 
and power groups, in community outlooks, symbols, and linguistic .struc­
tures. Indeed, the variety of factors which is part of the individual's 
"world" or environment is so great that each of them requires highly 
professional expertise.
In order to include them all in some way in his discussion* 
Tillich preferred to refer to the sum total of environmental impact on 
an individual or group as " s i t u a t i o n . W i t h i n  this concept, he 
encompassed the traditional rhetorical concern with such facets of 
communication as audience and occasion. Tillich, however, noticeably 
expanded the boundaries of these restrictive concerns. "Situation" 
consistently carried for him the connotation of historical change.with 
its accompanying call for adaptation. Chapter four provides a more 
complete account of how "situation" affects communication.
^^Ibido
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 3-5.
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Ford labeled the final category of participation ''receptlv,e 
participation.Conceivably it might also be* denominated "epistemic 
participation" because it described the epistemological relationship 
between the knower and the known. Ford believed it "signifies openness 
and sensitivity toward that which is participated in.
Participation sustains several significant relationships to the 
act of knowing. First, it points to the fact that some type of simi­
larity or sameness must exist between two things (person to person, 
person to idea, person to tree) before one can know the other. . Knowl­
edge, Tillich indirectly argued, required an a priori or essential 
structure of relatednessSecond, participation on a polar continuum 
with detachment pointed toward the personal element in epistemology.
Certain types of knowledge require a greater participation, intimacy,
51or depth of relationship between the knower and : the known. Tillich 
envisioned, for instance, scientific knowledge and-technical subjects 
as requiring a minimum of participation. On the other hand, religious, 
aesthetic, axiological, or psychotherapeutic knowledge presupposed a 
maximum of individual participation. While a person can become highly 
involved in experimental research, the depth of his personal relation?- 
ship to the content of his research remains relatively limited.
Ford contended that "in its most intensive form, receptive par­
ticipation passes over into what we might call existential
^®Ford, "Three Strands of Tillich’s Theory of Religious Sym­
bols," p. 122.
^^Ibid.
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 177.
^^Ibid., 94-105.
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participation,. . :. Existential -participation-consequently, implied
for Tillich a peculiar type of human response which transcended ..intel­
lectual insight or instinctual emotional reaction. It crescendoed into 
an act which emerged from.the center of a person's life engaging all 
facets of his personality into a total response.
Communication has traditionally been associated with epistemo­
logy . Every message, visual or vocal, every cue sent from speaker to 
listener, involves or evokes some type of epistemological reaction.
The act of persuasion involves the changing or refashioning of knowl-r 
edge. The study of perception's role in communication reflects 
epistemic overtones. Tillich regarded communication as opening up mr
drawing the individual into a state of participation with the.reality
53which the communicator discusses. Â particular message or symbol acts 
to engender the participation of the listener and the "reality" under 
consideration.
Existential participation also supplied the basis for a dis­
tinction between message types, the dynamic for. a '.'methodology" of 
audience analysis, the model for message structure, the goal of a 
message objective, and.the ethical motivation for communicative re­
straint . The importance of existential participation in constructing 
Tillich's philosophy of communication assumes such importance that two 
chapters, five and six, are devoted to exploring it.
^^Ford, "Three Strands of Tillich's Theory of Religious Sym­
bols," p. 122.
^^Tillich, Theology of-Culture, pp. 5Iff. and "How We Communicate 
the Christian Message," p. 13.-
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Ford's analysis of the five basic types of participation 
developed in Tillich's writings coupled with the overriding idea of par­
ticipation as the principle of relatedness fills an isq>ortant gap in 
explaining Tillich's use of participation. The ensuing four chapters 
rely on the insights and terminology Ford contributed; however, in each 
chapter the particular form of relatedness transcends the limited use 
to which Ford applied it; i.e.; religious symbols. Here the concern is 
communication in general.
Communication Implications of Participation
Tillich's contention that "communication is a matter of partici­
pation" could be paraphrased, then, in light of the preceding discussion 
in several ways. One might say that "communication is a matter of re­
latedness, universality, or multiplicity." Perhaps still better might 
be the translation that"communication is a matter of commonization." 
This last rendering unites Tillich's perspective closely with that sug­
gested by the Latin root of the English term communication, communis.
The precedent for Tillich's linking of communication and participation 
may reside in Parmenides where Plato relates the Greek equivalents of 
the terms "fellowship," "communion" (ÜTo/yt/v / a )  to that of parti­
cipation
By implication, Tillich's conception of communication as common­
ization or participation appears at once extraordinarily penetrating and 
comprehensive; in fact, it may be the most encompassing definition of 
communication ever offered. Communication emerges from it as a basic
5^Harry L. Levy, A Latin Reader for Colleges (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press. 1962), p. 207.
^^Lynch, An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the 
Parmenides. pp. 96-136.
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form of relationships whose guiding principles are analogous to those 
governing every form of relatedness. Any effort to conceptualize about 
the function and scope of communication which neglects this considera­
tion errs. As a consequence of this breadth of vision, Tillich nowhere 
limited his practical discussion of communication to the traditional 
rhetorical genre of public speaking, even though in his published lec­
tures on communication this dimension received the emphasis because he 
spoke to Protestant ministers. Instead, Tillich recognized through the
concept of participation the communicative unity of superficially
56diverse situations. A psychotherapist and his patient, a minister
C 7 C Oand his congregation, an artist and his work, a government and its 
propaganda,a commercial-and the c o n s u m e r s — rail of these serve as 
examples of communication.
But even while Tillich recognized these and other situations 
as communicative acts, he also refused to see them as intrinsic units 
containing within themselves-the dynamic principles which govern comr- 
munication. He went one step beyond them to interpret these instances 
as a part of the general category of relatedness, subject to the prin-r 
ciples which derive from and apply to it as a whole. To Tillich the
^^Tillich, "The Philosophy of Social Work," pp. 27-30,
^^Tillich, "The Relevance of the Ministry in Our Time and Its 
Theological Foundation," Making the Minister Relevant, ed, by Hans 
Hoffman (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), pp. 19-35.
^®Tillich, "Existentialist Aspects of Modem Art," Christianity 
and Existentialist, ed. by Carl Michalson (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1956), pp. 130-135.
^^Tillich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 12.
60ibid.
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study of communication centered on the study of relatedness. There­
fore, Tillich's methodological approach to the study of communication 
did not begin with an observation of communicative situations but 
rather with a philosophic, indeed ontological, analysis of relatedness. 
His whole procedure at this point is inherently deductive. His deduc­
tions, moreover, which have the character of "universels," are 
expressed in deceptively simple key word concepts with multiple un-r 
specified connotations. He established these "unlversals" deductively 
and then applied them a priori to communication. Consequently, he 
ended up with a "genuine philosophy of communication" based not merely 
on a consideration of communication, per se, but on a systematic analy- 
sis of the whole of reality and relatedness as he understood them..
Tillich's perspective and methodology clashed directly with the 
growing tendency of the twentieth century to study empirically and in-r 
ductively more and more microscopic q u e s t i o n s . B y  contrast, he moved 
toward the widest possible latitude of agreement or commonization, 
analyzed it, and moved backward toward the more specific. Whatever 
contributed to the commonization of men as men contributed to commun­
ication. Understand the process of commonization and one understands 
communication. All of Tillich's endeavors to explicate communication 
rested on his view of participation, which in turn depended on his per­
ception of the totality of reality.
While Tillich's definition revealed methodological procedures
°^See, for example, the fifty questions posed by Paul D. 
Holtzman in "Summary; Questions We Should Be Asking,“ The Frontiers in 
Experimental Speech .Communication Research, ed, by Paul E, Ried (Syra­
cuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 89-92.
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implicit in his thinking, he did not intend that it should serve merely 
as a technique-producing formula. Tillich evinced no interest in .sim­
ply producing a list of ten easy steps to the development of effective 
communicationc Tillich certainly sought through his categorizing of 
communication as an act of participation to interpret its inner dynamics 
as being governed by those qualities which most strongly influenced hu­
man relatedness : at the same time his definition presupposed ethical 
restraints. "Participation" always operated in polar fashion with.its 
ontological opposite, "individualization," and even though Tillich 
placed his definitional stress on the participatory end of this contin­
uum, his ontological structure does not permit the neglect of its 
counterpart. Communication's possibility and meaning derive from "xe-r 
latedness" but the communicative act always transpired in creative 
tension with the imperative of maintaining the integrity of the indi­
viduals involved in it.
Thus.communication.for Tillich, as will become increasingly
apparent, is not oriented toward the "discovery of all the available
62means of persuasion" nor is its ultimate objective instrumental, "lo 
influence-TTto.affect with intent, To Tillich communication.achieved 
success if it enhanced or maintained the relationship of the individual 
to himself, his fellow man, and his "world." Tillich never conceived 
of communication as simply an instrumental or means-rcharged act; it. 
was always evaluative or existential. In communication man sought, self- 
affirmation through relating to his "world;" and communication's "bad
^^Aristotle Rhetoric I. 1355^26.
Berio, The Process of Communication: p. 13.
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or good," its "success or failure," could not be measured by votea, 
dollarsj or opinion polls. Its criterial standard became its.contribu­
tive power to the humanness, i.e., meaning, freedom, integrity, sense of 
dignity, of the participants in the communicative experience., In other 
words, Tillich considered, but also looked beyond whether a given com­
municative exchange achieved its immediate goal ("pick up the pencil") 
to ask how every encounter affected the total humanity of both speaker 
and receiver. Is the communication monologue or dialogue? Does .it 
create an "I-Thou" or "I-It" relationship? These are the important 
questions from Tillich's perspective. Assuming that "communication Is 
a matter of participation," Tillich envisioned the fulfillment of its 
task in the degree to which it contributed to participation between and 
among individuals.
In summary, then, three major implications arise from Tillich's 
definition. First, for Tillich communication as participation described 
communication as belonging to the principle or category of relatedness. 
Second, associated with this his definition reveals the philosophic 
background and methodological assumptions of Tillich. Third, it por­
trayed the ultimate objective of communication not as persuasion but as 
communion or the establishment of community.
Summary
In brief retrospect, the preceding pages supplied :an insight 
into the realistic background of Tillich's philosophical outlook and at 
the same time suggested that many of Tillich's key concepts became nore 
meaningful when viewed as universels like "wisdom"' or "beauty." Parti­
cipation. after this pattern, appeared as the "principle of relatedness"
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and Its communicative implications were summarized. At this point the 
definition "communication is a matter of participation" broadened.-iato 
the tripartite forms "communication is a matter of essential related­
ness," "communication is a matter of environmental :relatednees," and 
"communication is a matter of existential relatedness."
Each aspect of these definitions identifies a set of relation­
ships which bear on communication. Furthermore, the principles which 
most relevantly apply to the separate categories of participation derive 
from the nature of the category and are then re-applied to communlcar- 
tion. The dominant considerations, for example, inessential 
participation originate from an analysis of ontology; in environmental 
participation, from history (historical relatedness); and in existential 
participation, from epistemology (epistemic relatedness). In this 
manner three distinct and complex philosophical categories-converge 
through participation; the principle of relatedness, to apply to com­
munication.
From a slightly different perspective, these three categories 
of participation represent a descending hierarchy. :Essential participa­
tion defines the transtemporal principles' part of every communicative 
transaction, regardless of where and when it occurs. Environmental 
participation defines the historical relationship constantly stamping, 
communication with variety, giving it ever new external forms. Existen­
tial participation defines the person-to-person dimension which.gives 
communication its immediate, existential potency as well’as the-weight 
of ethical restraint. Moreover, the three areas merge in two ways.
They all represent forms of participation and the principles formed
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within each area bear the mark of Tillich's ontological ■.vocabulary, and 
Weltanschauung. Hence, essential participation, the subject of the next 
chapter, exercises a decisive influence on Tillich's entire philosophy 
of communication.
CHAPTERS
ESSENTIAL PARTICIPATION /ND COMMUNICATION
"Every being participates in the structure of being, but man alone 
is immediately aware of this structure."
Introduction
The preceding chapter traced the broad outlines of Tillich'a 
conception of "communication as participation.".:Two embryonic ideas 
conceived there fuse'in this chapter'and together receive'more:exten- 
sive examination. They are: first, that communication involves a study
of "commonization" or'the'principle of relatedness} and second, that 
"essential participation" designates a significant area of concentration 
within the broad sphere of "relatedness;" In this instance :the decep­
tively simple adjective-^noun form, "essential participation," cloaks an 
extremely complex set of relationships. In additionÿ the relationships 
incorporated into the definition of participation.are • the'most "essen^ 
tial" in the sense of being the most basicj universal^ and pervasive 
of relationships; They affect all other categories■of participation 
with a pre~determining, conditioning power and for this reason deserve 
the appellation "ontic relationships," just as this chapter could be 
renamed "Ontological Participation and Communication."
The coordinate conjunction "and” serves'a"useful function in
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either chapter heading because it stresses the mutuality or interde= 
pendence which'exists between communication and the ontological 
dimension. Dual issues thus arise; how does ontology, the structure of 
being, affect communication and how does communication affect ontology. 
Neither of these questions, however, can be answered without consider­
ing a third question, presupposed in each of the other questions-^-what 
is being, the structure of being, or ontology. Hence, the three major 
divisions of this chapter become the nature of being, communication and 
being, being and communication. The key to essential relatedness 
resides in ontology, which describes the universal structure or relar, 
tionship common to everything and penetrates directly to the heart of 
Tillich's interpretation of reality with all its implications for com­
munication.
. The Structure of Being
"Paul Tillich," said Columbia's John Herman .Randall, Jr., 
"stands in the classic tradition of western-philosophy, in that long 
line of thinkers stemming from the Greeks who have been concerned with 
the problem of being and wisdom."^ Moreover; according to Sidney Hook, 
Tillich played a vital role in restoring the concept of being to a 
position of prominence and respectability in twentieth century philoso- 
phy.^ Time after time, Tillich asserted.the priority of this concept
Oas the determining element in all spheres of reality. Tillich defined
^Randall, Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich, The Theology of 
Paul Tillich, ed. by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W; Bretall, p. 132.
% o o k , The ■ Quest for Being, p. 156.
^Tillich. Mv Search for Absolutes, on. 81ff.
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philosophy as "the cognitive endeavor in which the question o£ W i n g  is 
a s k e d ."4 His axiomatic assumption that "everything participates in 
being" made it the commonization principle par excellence.^
However, two problems intervene between being'and its applica­
tion to communication: (1) Tillich's own failure to link the twa.in
his lectures on communication; and (2) the ambiguity and sense-of vague 
emptiness most Americans associate with the term being. Tillich's--ex­
clusion of being from his popular discussion of communication.demands 
some type of explanation in view of its general prominence in his 
thought and the use made of it here. -Several plausible explanations 
occur.
The brevity and practicality of Tillich's remarks on these 
occasions may have prohibited his elaboration of a subject as complex 
as ontology. Tillich probably also assumed that his more detailed -com? 
ments on being were available elsewhere and an interested party could 
make the necessary correlations via the category of participation. 
Finally, and perhaps most feasible of'all, Tillich simply presupposed 
his view of being and moved directly to his anthropology. For instance, 
in his earlier lecture, Tillich's initial point raised-the question, 
"where are the people living to whom we are to communicate . . .?"^ He 
responded, "they all participate in human existence. This is a very 
universal answer. But it is by no means a simple answer. In this
p. 5,
Gospel,"
^Tillich,■Biblical-Religion and~ the-Search -for Ultimate Realitys 
^Tillich, Systematic Theology. I. 169,
^Taped lecture by Paul Tillich, "Communicating the Christian
7%bid.
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discussion human nature illustrates the practical human situation ..while 
being, which never directly appears, forms the.construct prompting 
Tillich's analysis.
The second barrier, establishing a-meaning for being, .presents 
a more serious obstacle» Tillich, himself, contended "Being cannot be 
defined. For in every definition being is presupposed » . . .  Being 
can be characterized by concepts which depend on it, but which-point 
to it in a metaphorical way. The most satisfactory method for.resolv­
ing this problem from Tillich's point of view would be a completely 
developed ontology, but such an involved undertaking lies outside-the 
purview of this dissertation. The interest here centers more on conp ■ 
veying a general sense of what Tillich means when he uses terms such as 
being and power of being. Three related approaches to being are at-r. 
tempted, each building on the other to provide a progressively clearer 
picture of how Tillich.employed the concept being. Briefly, the.three 
approaches are: (1) a general overview of Tillich's defense of "being"
and an introduction to the logical structure of being; (2) a presenta­
tion of the question of being and man's key role in the structure.nf 
being; (3) a consideration of "ultimate concern" and "community".as the 
answer to the question of being or as the source of the power of teing.
Tillich's preliminary remarks in the introduction to the second 
volume of his ~ Systematic Theology offer a good beginning point for the 
first method. On this occasion, Tillich responded at'length to nomi­
nalist criticism of his employment of the term being.
OTillich, Love, Power, and-Justice. p. 35.
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The criticism of the nominalists and their positivistic descen­
dants to the present day is based on;the-assumption that the .concept 
of being represents the highest possible abstraction. It is -under­
stood as the genus to which all other genera are subordinated with 
respect to universality and with respect to the degree of abstrac­
tion. If this were the way in which the concept of being is - 
reached, nominalism could interpret it as it interprets all uni- 
versals, namely as communicative notions which point'to particulars 
but have■no reality of their own. Only the completely particular, 
the thing here and now, has reality. Universals are means of com­
munication without any power of being. Being as such, therefore, 
does not designate anything real . . . .
The answer to this argument is that the concept of being does 
not have the character that nominalism attributed to it. It is not 
the highest abstraction, although it demands the ability of radical 
abstraction. It is the expression of the experience of being over 
against non-being. For this reason, the medieval philosophers 
called being the basic.transcendentalj beyond the universal and-the 
particular. In this sense the notion of being was understood alike 
by such people as Parmenides in Greece and Shankara in India. In 
this sense its significance has been rediscovered by contemporary 
existentialists, such as Heidegger and-Marcel. This idea of being 
lies beyond the conflict of nominalism and realism. The same-word 
the emptiest of all concepts when taken as an abstraction, becomes 
the most meaningful of all concepts when it is understood as the 
power of being in everything that has being.
No philosophy can suppress the notion of being in this latter 
sense. It can be hidden under presuppositions and reductive for-r 
mulas, but it nevertheless underlies the basic concepts of 
philosophizing. For "being" remains the content, the mystery, and 
the eternal a priori of thinking.®
Tillich's extremely important statement makes two vital points 
about the term beingf. Negatively it asserts-that being does not result 
from the last and most abstract step in the reasoning process» Being, 
for him, does not describe what is left when one subtracts the differ­
ences in genera until all that finally can be said is that "they have 
being." Indeed, Tillich moves in exactly the opposite direction. 
Positively, he considers being as the place where thought begins. The 
foremost and indispensable element of any phase of reality is its
®Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 10-11.
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existing being. Two of Tillich's key statements stressed this.
It is the expression of the experience of being over against non-; 
being . . . .  The same word, the emptiest of all concepts when 
taken as an abstraction, becomes the most meaningful of all concepts 
when it is understood as the power of being in everything that has
being.10
A better grasp of Tillich's reason for attaching such signifi­
cance to being is obtained by postulating the basic structure of being, 
self—w o r l d . A t  this point, part of the reason for much of the confu-: 
sion frequently associated with "being" suddenly appears; despite .its 
singular form,"being" is not a single thing, entity, or fact; instead, 
being describes a relationship, a duality— a "self” and its "worlds-"
In establishing "self" and "world" as his pivotal deduction with impli­
cations capable of coherently interpreting all of reality, Tillich 
resurrects the familiar philosophic pattern exemplified so famously in 
Descarte's cogito ergo sum. Here is a starting place, a relationship, 
on which all else hangs, and a relationship, it might be added, which 
contains a paradigm of all the functions of communication.
But what does it mean to say "being" assumes the form "self-r 
world?" Simply, if somewhat crudely illustrated, Tillich means that to 
have being you need a "person," a "self," or "man" and "something else" 
— a tree, another person, or event. In other words, preceding any 
botanical science is the relationship tree-man, preceding any psychology 
is the relationship person-to-person, and preceding any history is the 
relationship man-event. Further interpreted, this ontological structure
l°Ibid.
^^illich, Systematic Theology, I, 168-171.
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affirms that before yoa can .describe» analyze, or.dissect anything .you
need a describer, analyzer, or dissector and something which is.descrih-
able, analysable, or dissectable. And, Tillich asserts, this
relationship precedes any statement you can make, any experiment-you.
conduct, or vivisection you perform. Thus being most elementally de-r
picted presupposes an observer (subject) and an observed (object),
which in his vocabulary "are." Consequently, ho wrote, "Everyone
participates in being, and everyone experiences being when he encounters
12beings: persons, things, events, essences."
Furthermore, the pre^supposition, self^world, lends itself to 
additional analysis which still antedates anything one may say biolog­
ically, historically, psychologically, i.e., epistemologically, about 
either side of the structure of being. Tillich delimited six elements 
divisible into three polarities (individualisation-participation, 
dynamics-form^ and freedom-^destiny) which further defined the nature of 
traditional philosophical categories (time; space, causality, and.sub-r 
stance) which he feels impregnate any description of the self-world 
structure.
This brief analysis of being,^Tillich's ultimate deduction, 
provides at best a logical description of being; but in fulfilling this 
function, it opens the door for a second avenue by which being can be 
conceived. Something precedes in time'this logically deducted formula
l^Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality.
p. 61.
l^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 174-186. 
l^lbid.. 192-198.
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which, ââ Kelsey expressed it,
is the fact that Tillich begins ontological analysis with an anal-r 
yses of human experience. The experience of being over .against 
non-being is a human experience. A man:realizes in shock that he 
is persistently threatened by biological extinction, cognitive 
skepticism, and moral n i h i l i s m . 15
Tillich symbolizes man's dawning awareness of the experience of being, 
his dependency on a structure or world outside of himself, by the 
question— "why is there something, why not nothing.”"  This query, or 
some form of it, implies a number of possibilities to Tillich; it rep­
resents the power of man to conceptualize or to question ("Man is the 
being who asks the question of b e i n g . i t  also suggests that man 
is not only subject or observer, Man is an "object," who, particularly 
in relation to other selves, finds his own self. Towering above these
indications, however, this query, which one writer proclaimed a"uni-r
18versai ouch" more than a request for information, suggests that 
everything in man's encounters with being constantly borders on the
•^David H. Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 60. A similar point is made
by Don Browning, "Analogy, Symbol, and Pastoral Psychology in Tillich's 
Thought," Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 46-48.
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 163; and Tillich, Biblical 
Religions and the Search for Ultimate-Reality, pp. 9ff.
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 17; and Tillich, Biblical 
Religions, p. 11. What Tillich is really interested in when.he cites 
this ques tion is man's power to ask questions. He once :remarked in 
this connection, "I suggest that you sit down some day and do nothing 
but sit and think— not even read anything— ? just think, perhaps for as 
long as a whole hour, of what it means that there are beings called 
"man," who are able to ask questions. In this simple phenomenon a 
whole world is implied and a demonstration is given of the interdepen­
dence of subject and object in every cognitive approach." Mv Search for 
Absolutes » p. 70.
^®Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's-Theology, p. 61,
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verge of dissolutiono This negative experience, this threat of possible 
disintegration between a self and his world, Tillich labeled the "shock" 
or threat of non-being.
Ar an experience, the "shock of non-being" internally affects
the "self" side of the basic structure of being. This threat strikes
man in the form of anxieties, which Tillich defined as "the state in
w h i c h  a being is aware of its possible non—being" or as "finitude ex
perienced as one's own finitude." Three basic forms of anxiety or
threats to man's self-affirmation appear: the anxiety of death; the
21anxiety of meaninglessness; and the anxiety of guilt. The experience 
of non-being does not mean merely the theoretical recognition of one's 
biological extinction but rather the existential awareness that one 
must die, that it is a part of his very existence. In this connection 
Tillich distinguished sharply his view of ontological "anxiety" from 
neurotic fear, or anxiety. Neurotic fear is localized anxiety; it is 
objectified in relation to specific objects, events, or situations 
Objectifying fear is one way to deal successfully with anxiety, because
once identified with a definite object or situation, fear seems more
manageable. Pathological and neurotic anxiety reflect the basic struc­
ture of ontological "anxiety" but are not identical with it.
^^See Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 163; and Tillich, The 
Courage to Be, pp. 40-41ff.




But non-being is not "self" contained;-It affects both the indi­
vidual and his perceived world. Its effects spill over into "world" at 
two primary and critical points— in relations with fellow human beings 
(rejection or non-acceptance) and in relation to the totality or whole 
of one's world. This latter point, which admittedly seems ambiguous, 
has additional light shed on it by the third and last method of viewing 
being, ultimate concern, which received a more explicit place in 
Tillich's thought than the former idea.
Man's power to face these ontological threats to his being and
affirm self and world in their presence constitutes the experience of 
the "power of being." In other places, Tillich described this exper­
ience as "the courage to be." "We have defined courage as the 
self-affirmation of being which is effective in every act of courage."23 
The concept of "ultimate concern" identifies man's major experience.of 
the power of being with regard to his world. Tillich contended:
Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or not-? 
being. . . . Nothing can be of ultimate concern for us which does
not have the power of threatening and saving our being. The term
"being" in this context does not designate existence in time and 
space. Existence is continuously threatened and saved by things 
and events which have no ultimate concern for us. But the term 
"being" means the whole of human reality, the structure, the 
meaning, and the aim of existence. All this is threatened; it can 
be lost or saved. Man is ultimately concerned about his being and 
meaning. "To be or not to be" in this sense is a matter of ulti­
mate, unconditional, total, and infinite concern.^4
In this excerpt Tillich employed "ultimate concern" in two 
different but related senses. In the latter portion of the statement
23lbid.. p. 172.
^^Tiiiich, Systematic Theology, I, 14.
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he used It to refer to man's anxiety about his own being. Thus one is 
ultimately concerned about the meaning, significance, or purpose.of his 
life. The source of man's anxiety about his being was the threat.of 
non-being, the loss of self and world. Secondly, in response to this 
"ultimate concern" accrued the additional meaning of "commitment" to 
something which seemed to possess the power to reduce the threat of 
non—being. Whatever object man identified with this power became his 
"ultimate concern."
A wide range of factors qualified as potential objects or sym­
bols of ultimate concern. In the Dynamics of Faith, Tillich enumerated 
some items and their function frequently found in this category.
Man, like every living being, is concerned about many things, above 
all about those which condition his very existence, such as food 
and shelter. But man, in contrast to other living beings, has 
spiritual concerns— cognitive, aesthetic, social, political. Some 
of them are urgent, often extremely urgent, and each of them as well 
as the vital concerns can claim ultimacy for a human life or the 
life of a social group. If it claims ultimacy it demands the.total 
surrender of him who accepts this claim, and it promises total ful­
fillment even if all other claims have to be subjected to it or 
rejected in its name. If a national group makes the life and growth 
of the nation its ultimate concern, it demands that all other con­
cerns, economic well-being, health and life, family, aesthetic and 
cognitive truth, justice and humanity be sacrificed. The extreme 
nationalisms of our century are laboratories for the study of what 
ultimate concern means in all aspects of human existence, including 
the smallest concern of one's daily life. Everything is centered 
in the only god, the nation— a god who certainly proves to be a 
demon, but who shows clearly the unconditional character of an ul­
timate concern. . . .  —
•  • • e e e e o « o o e o o e a o o a o e 9 0 0 0 * e e o * * 0 4 «
Another example— almost a counter-example, yet nevertheless equally 
revealing— is the ultimate concern with "success" and with social 
standing and economic power. It is the god of many people in the 
highly competitive Western culture and it does what every ultimate 
concern must do: It demands unconditional surrender to its laws
even if the price is the sacrifice of genuine human relations, per-; 
sonal convictions, and creative eros. Its threat is social and 
economic defeat, and its promise— indefinite as all such promises—
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the fulfillment of one's being.^5
Being, viewed as "ultimate concern," points toward the basic
underpinning in one's life. One's ultimate concern was never a single
value but the all-conditioning value in one's entire psychic and world
structure. In this sense Tillich universalized ultimate concern and
applied its dynamics to superficially diverse forms— religion, poli-r
tics, finances, etc. Thus ultimate concern and human existence became
inseparable for Tillich; destroy a man's "ultimate concern" and you
destroy the man; control it and you control the man. The basic thesis
of this characterization of being is that man continually searches for
a power, a reality, or an "ultimate concern" which will strengthen his
own sense of being, meaning, or purpose. ......
In addition to ultimate concern man finds the power of courage
to be through person-to-person encounter, although Tillich did not as
specifically develop community as a source of the power of being.as he
did ultimate concern. The theoretical basis for community's power lay
in the role person-to-person (here "person" as "object" defines the .
nature of "world") relationships exercised in the creation of man's
basic humanity and self-awareness. Tillich conjectured:
When individualization reaches the perfect form which we call 
a "person," participation reaches the perfect form which we call 
"communion." Man participates in all levels of life, but he par­
ticipates fully only in that level of life which he is himself-r- 
he has communion only with persons. Communion is participation in 
another completely centered and completely individual self. In 
this sense communion is not something an individual might or might 
not have. Participation is essential for the individual, not acci­
dental. No individual exists without participation, and no.personal 
being exists without communal being. The person as the fully
^^Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, World Perspectives, Vol. X, 
Harper Torchbcoks (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 1-2.
30 . .
developed Individual self Is Impossible without other fully devel­
oped selves.ZG .
Tillich contended here that the "self-world" structure of being comes 
Into being only through personal relatedness; he developed the practi­
cal Implications of this relationship when he exclaimed, "Even a 
minister who Is a poor preacher can make his message relevant through 
the liturgy and through his b e i n g . T i l l i c h  put the theoretical and 
practical Into focus, aptly summarizing their affect on being, when 
he observed:
One cannot become a person without encountering another person .and 
discovering the limit of one's own claim In the claim of the other 
one. We cannot develop healthily unless we find the power of being 
which we lack In the power of being of others who have It, and 
whom we can let participate In our power of being. This encounter 
can be In words and It can be In silence. Silent communication Is 
often more Important than communication In words.28
Communication and the Structure of Being
Tillich's Inference about participating In the "power of being" 
of another person through communication hinted at the potential role 
communication exercised In the structure of being. In a previously 
cited speech which he delivered before the American Psychological 
Association, Tillich brought this Idea to actual fruition, employing 
"word" as a synonym for man's capacity to communicate. Tillich con­
tended that
^^Tiiiich, Systematic Theology, I, 176.
2?Tllllch, "The Relevance of the Ministry In Our Time and Its 
Theological Foundation," Making the Ministry Relevant, ed. by Hans 
Hoffman, p. 20. ....
28"The Theology of Pastoral Care," Pastoral Psychology, X 
(October, 1959), 21.
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the word has power, psychic as well as intellectual. It has power, 
and all anxiety springs from lack of power. The word bans chaos, 
the threat of non-being, inside and outside of oneself.29
Tillich does not merely re-echo the old argument that speech 
raises man above the level of animals. Instead, he points toward the 
fundamental fact that communication creates and constantly reinforces 
the humanity, meaning, and being of man as man. Communication func­
tions through meanings, and it activates and fulfills meaning as.the 
teleogical realization of what it is to be. Tillich's instinctive 
grasp of this led him to regard the "word" as the basic element of man's 
culture, i.e. world.
The discovery that being was relationship and not a "thing'! 
also implied the presence of communication suggesting the logic of 
following the same three-step plan used in approaching being to mould 
Tillich's random comments on communication and being into a cohesive 
unit. First, then, communication sustains a relationship to the logi­
cal, self-world structure of being. In fact, it creates the structure! 
Language, which for Tillich frequently represented man's communicative 
capacity,gives to the "self" its "world."
Language, as the power of universals, is the basic expression of 
man's transcending his environment, of having a world. The ego- 
self is that self which can speak and which by speaking trespasses 
the boundaries of any given situation.30
Language presupposed what Tillich regarded as man's most.unique, 
and realistic, quality— "the power of abstraction, the power to create
^^Tillich, "Anxiety-Reducing Agencies in our Culture," Anxiety, 
ed. by Paul Hoch and Joseph Zubin, p. 17.
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology. I, 170-171; see also Tillich,
My Search for Absolutes, pp. 70-74.
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universals in terms of language." Language, in other words, reflects 
shared substance and perception and can therefore facilitate percept 
tion of shared substance. In at least three of his major works, Tillich 
described language with some approximation of the idea of language as 
"the power of universals."31 Tillich used "universal" and "partici­
pation" interchangeably on occasion;3^ if that substitution is made in 
this quotation, then it would read, "Language is the power of partici­
pation." Tillich himself approached this definition when he commented, 
"In language, communication becomes mutual participation in a universe
of meanings."33
The power of man and hence the power of language to project 
beyond the individual or the particular generates the defining charac­
teristic of language liberation "from the here and n o w . "34 Thus, 
through language man adds to or transcends the actual physical substance 
of his "environment" and creates a world, "a structured whole."35 
Language thus signifies man's capacity to create meaning, order, and 
purpose even as it simultaneously contributes to their realization. 
Tillich, therefore, parallels "linguistic" and "technical" ability.
Both transcend the "physically given" and both are expressions of each
3^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 170; III, 62; Tillich, My 
Search for Absolutes, p. 72; and Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 91.
32For instances of this interchange see, "What is Basic in 
Human Nature," Pastoral Psychology, XIV. (February, 1963), 17; and 
Tillich, Systematic Theology. I, 165.
33Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 58.
34Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Inter­
rogation, ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 389.
35Tillich, Systematic Theology, I. 170.
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other, "speaking and using tools belong together.
While language operates to give man a "world," it contributes 
(and this is its major impact) at the same time to bringing man to self- 
awareness or self-relatedness and thus toward fulfillment of his 
essential humanity, as Helen Keller so impressively demonstrated. Com­
munication as a means of self-affirmation or self-expression stimulates 
and deepens the individual's awareness of his own being. It reassures 
him of the reality of his own existence and serves as the vehicle 
through which he shapes and identifies the form of his own existence. 
Tillich once described this function as an aspect of "existential. 
truth," by which he meant "a truth which lives in the immediate self- 
expression of an experience."37 Tillich developed the practical 
implications of this idea when he confessed that speaking, from his 
first to his last address, gave him "the greatest anxiety and greatest 
happiness."38 Communicating stimulates awareness of being and the in­
finite potentiality of the human being.
Tillich typically submerged this ontological communicative 
function into the thought that "man is the being who asks the question 
of being." Hence, language which brought man the power to organize^ 
conjecture, and create a world also bequeathed to him anxiety; the 
knowledge that liberated from particularity also prompted the realiza­
tion of a past preceding man and of a future succeeding him. Thus man's
36Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 58.
^^Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, pp. 45-46.
38ibid.
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grasp of the universal aroused in him the question of being, i.e. the _ 
threat of non-being and awareness of finitude, even as it conveyed self- 
relatedness .
Next, and in conjunction with its production of the shock ..of 
non-being, language or communication functions to alleviate man's 
anxieties. Speaking a common language, for instance, presupposed.a form 
of community between man^ for "language," in Tillich's words, "is 
communal, not individual.Language depended on "social relatedness" 
which in cyclical reciprocity it engendered. Thus language, or a non­
verbal substitute for it, creates the potential of activating the power 
of being in the person-to-person encounter. Language as shared sub­
stance becomes the vehicle through which men strive to overcome the 
subject-object barrier between them and reunite with each other, affect­
ing a sense of harmony, unity, or love (which Tillich defined as the 
"drive toward the reunion of the separated"^®). In this capacity 
communication ontically created being by giving man ontologically the 
ability to know his fellowman and, thus, through community to know 
himself.
Of transcendent significance, however, Tillich envisioned com­
munication as actualizing the experience of the power of being through 
its symbolic relation to ultimate concern. "Man's ultimate concern 
must be expressed symbolically," Tillich conjectured, "because symbolic 
language alone is able to express the u l t i m a t e . B y  this he meant
J^Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 81
^^Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 33.
^^Tillich; Dynamics of Faith, p. 41.
that no one finite thing, phrase, object, or word literally summarized 
all that man experienced as "world," (i.e., "the whole of human reality, 
the structure, meaning, and aim of existence."42). Subsequently, .a .man 
selects certain phrases, objects, wordsj or things from his environment 
and perceives them as identical with his relation to his entire world 
so that a threat to them attacks the foundations of his own existence. 
Positively, the symbols elevated to this level assume ultimacy and.con­
vey to those who accept them in this sense "the power or courage to be." 
In symbols, Tillich reflected, a group acknowledged its "own being."^3 
Tillich's favorite example to illustrate this principle was the ."flag" 
which demonstrated how a symbolic object generated "ultimate concern" 
and how people who interpreted it in this role were affected by it.
The flag participates in the power and dignity of the nation for 
which it stands. Therefore, it cannot be replaced except after an 
historic catastrophe that changes the reality of the nation which 
it symbolizes. An attack on the flag is felt as an attack on the 
majesty of the group in which it is acknowledged. Such an attack 
is considered b l a s p h e m y .44
At this point an insight of some consequence begins to dawn 
about the relation between "ultimate concern" and Tillich's entire sym­
bolic theory, viz. that a full cognizance of Tillich's general symbolic 
theory requires an ontological perspective. Only after Tillich's theory 
of symbols is set against this primary framework can implications be 
drawn from it for less universal levels. The image of being premises
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 14.
43"Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God," The Christian 
Scholar. XXXVIII (September, 1955), 192.
44,Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 42.
Tillich's discussiop on symbols, but it surfaces directly only in.rare, 
occasional comments. He implied it when he suggested that a symbol 
"radiates the power of being and meaning of that for which it stands"^^ 
or when he talked of groups acknowledging their "own being" in symbols^^ 
or when he discussed the imperative of ultimate concern, that "which 
determines our being or non-being," being expressed in s y m b o l s l o r d  
and Rowe, however, who undertook probably the most detailed analysis of 
Tillich's theory of symbols omit the ontological perspective as.a direct 
force in interpreting Tillich and, subsequently, they reject as useless 
the most valuable and critical criterion for understanding Tillich's 
ideas on symbols, participation.Thus, a brief survey of Tillich's, 
theory of symbols undertaken from the ontic standpoint of "essential 
participation" will clarify further the role of communication in the 
structure of being and also aid theologians and philosophers seeking to 
interpret Tillich on this point.
Every individual characteristic Tillich enumerated for symbols 
found its starting point in being, and the inner dynamics of each char­
acteristic become clear only from this perspective. Tillich's own 
words, often overlooked because of their offhanded nature, explicitly
^^Tillich, "The Meaning-and Justification of Religious Symbols," 
Religious Experience and Truth, ed. by Sidney Hook (New York: New York
University Press, 1961), p. 4.
^^Tillich, "Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God," p. 192.
^^Tillich, Dynamics of Paith, p. 41.
48see Rowe, Religious Symbols and God, p. 125 and Ford, "Three 
Strands of Tillich's Theory of Religious Symbols," pp. 124-127.
say this. Note carefully the sentence following the previously cited 
statement from Tillich.
Man's ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically, because 
symbolic language alone Is able to express the ultimate. This 
statement demands explanation In several respects.49
Tillich then proceeded to amplify "these several respects" by a dis­
cussion of the Individual characteristics of symbols.
Even though the vocabulary Tillich employed to describe the 
Individual characteristics of symbols remained fluid, three basic func­
tions constantly reappear: participation, perceptibility, and
collective response. When these three functions are Interpreted from 
an ontological framework, their basic meaning for Tillich emerges more 
distinctly. The concept of "essential or ontlc participation" aids 
first In elucidating the difference which Tillich envisioned between 
the only two communicative forms he devised, signs and symbols.
Typically, Tillich compared and contrasted symbols and signs by 
dividing his analysis Into two steps; (1) joint function of signs and 
symbols; (2) participation as the primary difference between signs and 
symbols. "Symbols are similar to signs In one decisive respect," 
according to Tillich. They both "point beyond themselves to something 
else."50 By "pointing to" Tillich apparently meant something similar- 
to "refer," "denote," or "signify." It Is a more formal statement of 
his conception of language as liberating men from the "here-and^now." 
k  "red light," for Instance, points to the necessity of cars stopping.
4^Tllllch, Dynamics of Faith, p. 41.
SOTllllch, "Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God," p. 189.
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The letters "D E S K" point to something on which we might lay paper 
and write.51 A crucifix points to Golgotha, which in turn points to 
"god" or that which might concern one u l t i m a t e l y .5^ Fundamentally, 
signs and symbols both denote and through this function make possible 
man's "world and culture." Their nature is not distinguished on this 
basis.
Tillich prefers to emphasize the contrast between signs and sym­
bols as a special point. On a theoretical level he contended that "the 
difference, which is a fundamental difference between them is that signs 
do not participate in any way in the reality and power of that to which 
they point." Hence, he concluded, "signs can be replaced for reasons 
of expediency or convention,"5^ but symbols cannot because they "parti-? 
cipate" in the reality they represent. At this point most interpreters 
commit an egregious error. They try to take one of Tillich's examples 
of participation— the flag, a king, a diplomat— and through it establish 
the norm by which to understand participation, when in actuality behind 
every instance lurks the concept of essential or ontic participation. 
Symbols participate ontically in both sides of the ontic structure; to 
man they assume the position of ultimacy via their power to interpret 
and give cohesiveness to the whole of his world. This meaning of '!par- 
ticipation" does not exclude other senses in which Tillich employs
Sllbid.. pp. 189-190,
5^Paul Tillich, "The Religious Symbol," Journal of Liberal 
Religion. I (Summer, 1940), 13.
S^Tillich, "Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God," p. 189.
5^Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 42.
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"participation" (such as the traditional Platonic concept of particle 
pation as the similarity shared by two things); but it underlies them.
It originates in association with the idea that language creates man's 
"world" and subsequently aids man in formulating expressions which he 
identifies with the power of his world as a whole.
The second function Tillich attributed to symbols, perceptibil­
ity ; also demonstrates affinity with the ontological dimension. ."Every 
symbol," Tillich contends, "is two-edged. It opens up reality and.it 
opens up the soul."55 Clearly derivative from the self world, ontolog­
ical structure symbols do something special to the structure: they give
it depth, profoundness, or special vision. Tillich generally illus^ 
trates this symbolic aspect with aesthetic examples— art, poetry, drama, 
music5^— but all of these depend on man's capacity to abstract ultimacy 
in terms of one's whole world. While none of these examples are neces­
sarily identical with ultimate concern, in their unique ways they 
partake of its nature as experienced in various human dimensions, par­
ticularly in the sense of giving "meaning" to existence.
Finally, symbols reflect their social basis— the "collective 
unconscious."57 Several points associated with ontology cluster here. 
One is that symbols meet man's instinctive, unconscious need for some
55Tillich, "Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God," p. 191.
56see Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, pp. 42-43; Tillich, "The Mean-r 
ing and Justification of Religious Symbols," Religious Experience and 
Faith, ed. by Sidney Hook, pp. 4-5. Tillich, "Religious Symbols and Our 
Knowledge of God," p. 191;-Tillich, "The Religious Symbol," p. 15.
^^This particular phrase occurs in "Religious Symbols and Our 
Knowledge of God," p. 192.
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power of be i n g .58 Symbol "cannot be produced intentionally," Tillich 
ch arged,59 by which he did not mean that a person might not deliberately 
conceive and plan a "symbolic" type occurrence but rather that the "un­
conscious" of group life must accept the occurrence as a symbol: the
criterial factor here is the group's need for the power of being.
Tillich implied that symbols come into existence, like language, only 
through personal encounter; symbols are not private. In community they 
endure, are shared, and give continuity to social life.
Hence it is not correct to say that a thing is first a symbol and 
then gains acceptance; the process of becoming a symbol and the 
acceptance of it as a symbol belong together. The act by which 
a symbol is created Is a social act, even though it first springs 
forth in an individual. The individual can devise signs for his 
own private needs; he cannot make symbols. If something becomes 
a symbol for him, it is always so in relation to the community 
which in turn can recognize itself in it.&O
Generally, in fact, education or initiation into a group or culture
consists of indoctrination into a group. Symbols thus generate "being"
by conveying ultimate concern and through their offer of community.
Tillich clearly recognized that not every symbol was carried by 
men to the extreme of "ultimate concern" or cultural community. His 
discussion referred to other symbol categories: history, art, politics
and religion; his examples come from many of these a r e a s . Y e t ,  each 
area depends on; participates in, or shares a relationship with the 
ultimate dimension. Historical events are remembered because of their
59lbid.
^^Tillich, "The Religious Symbol," p. 14.
GlSee Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, trans. by 
N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1936)* pp. 89, 98; Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 43j Tillich, "The 
Meaning and Justification of Religious Experience," Religious Experience 
and Truth, ed. by Sidney Hook, p. 3.
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relation to and effect on communal life. Aesthetic experiences sensi­
tize man to man, to his world, to the experience of being (Tillich 
closely correlates the aesthetic, the religious, and the ’'ultimate."®^). 
But it clearly is a mistake to invert the process for interpreting sym­
bols by looking at their individual qualities apart from their primary 
relation to ontology.
To this point it has been argued that communication, above and 
beyond any specific referential or denotative function, has signifi­
cance simply in its effect on the total being of man. It does this 
through its self-relating power, through its power to establish communi­
ty, and finally through its ability to orient man toward the whole of 
his reality or world through symbolization. However, communication also 
participates in non-being, as man's persistent effort to master commun­
ication and its breakdown demonstrates.
On the assumption that communication exercises a vital role in 
man's being, one would also assume it has a powerful negative role. 
Tillich's address to the American Fsychopathological Association also 
implied this.
We know the anxiety of not finding the right word, the anxiety of 
having to speak and not being able to do so, while realizing that 
the wrong word spells destruction for our souls and our world. This 
is one root of shyness, self-seclusion, concealment, flight into 
conventional talk and action, flight to authorities who are supposed 
to know the right word.°^
Communication's role in non-being parallels its role in being.
^^Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interro­
gation. ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 407.
^^Tillich, "Anxiety-Reducing Agencies in Our Culture," Anxiety, 
ed. by Paul H. Hock and Joseph Zubin, p. 18.
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All communication barriers derive from communication's participation in 
non-being as well as being. First, there is non-being in communication 
through the "ambiguity of language;" language, although indispensable 
for the creation of "world," "also separates the meaning from the real­
ity toward which it r e f e r s . This phenomenon, which Tillich called 
the "gap" between the object grasped and the meaning of the word, opens 
language to infinite manipulations and distortions.^^
Next, communication creates anxiety in the individual about his 
own being; this is exemplified in the experience of "stagefright" and is 
reflected in many less obvious ways, as Tillich's preceding observations 
suggested. Communication also partakes of non-being in personal rela­
tionships.
In every act of participation there is an element of holding one's 
self back and an element of giving one's self. In the attempts to 
know the other one, self-seclusion expresses itself in the projec­
tion of images of the other's being which disguise his real being 
and are only projections of the one who attempts to know. The 
screen of images between persons makes every knowing participation 
between persons profoundly ambiguous. . . .66
Finally, communication participates in non-being through "demon­
ic" symbols which wield negative, destructive personal and social 
consequences such as restlessness, depression, anxiety, or fanaticism. 
Tillich explained this thought by contending:
But here also are disintegrating possibilities as in some political 
symbols such as the Führer and the swastika, or in religious symbols
G^Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 69.
GSlbid.
66ibid.. 76-77.
G^Tillich, "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols," 
Religious Experience and Truth, ed. by Sidney Hook, p. 4.
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such as the Moloch type of gods, human sacrifices, doctrinal symbols 
producing a split consciousness, etc. This characteristic of sym­
bols, shows their tremendous power of creation and destruction. By 
no means are they harmless semantic e x p r e s s i o n s .68
Being and Communicative Functions
Only one of the original three questions posited in the begin­
ning of this chapter remains unanswered: interpreting the influence
which being exerts on communicative functions or ends. The basic cate­
gories (or ways of talking about being) reappear in response to this 
question to provide a new definition of communication as the means by 
which man relates to himself, his fellowman, and the cosmos. Bred into 
these closely linked functions are new evaluative criteria by which the 
"effectiveness" or value of communication is determined. Communica­
tion's dependency on being, or essential participation, is obvious in 
every instance; the structure of being not only identifies the nature of 
the functions, but it also shapes the vocabulary used to frame and exam­
ine them. The categories themselves (self-relatedness, other-related- 
ness, and world-relatedness) which appeared in the preceding section 
now receive a more explicit adaptation to communication.
Communication evaluated from the standpoint of self-relatedness 
has one overriding criterion— -how does communication affect man as man^ 
and not as he fulfills a specific role. All communication theory should 
recognize ̂  la Tillich that it has a shaping power on man's view of him­
self. Communication with its orientation to specialized functions such 
as politics, business, and the ministry, always tends to see man in
68ibid.. pp. 4-5.
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accord with the narrowed vision of its own limited objectives, thus dis­
torting his humanity and contributing to the demonic force of non-being.
Numerous forms of communication can be interpreted as man's at­
tempt to affirm his own sense of selfhood. The "babbling of a baby" and 
the solitary play of children fall into this category. Even in the 
adult world many communicative occurrences demonstrate this tendency; 
viz., expletives released in moments of intense emotion, internal shadow 
debates or conversations, a jibe in the mirror, and many unseen creative 
acts such as the unpublished poem, diary, or a destroyed painting. And 
even when communication has obvious repercussions beyond the individual, 
a strong element of self-affirmation remains, particularly in aesthetic 
fields such as "art," which Tillich saw as "the highest form of play" 
or as a way in which man interpreted h i m s e l f T h e  catharsis element 
of drama and literature might also overlap into self-affirmation 
through purification.
In a negative sense, this purely concentrated self-centered 
function of communication partially explains the fascination which 
communication as a discipline has held for many. The later sophist and 
the elocutionist represent in this connection the power which communi­
cation as communication holds, even when it is entirely removed from 
relevancy to the outside "world." Surrogate, self-indulgent communi­
cation has power for those who participate eVen when they mistakenly 
confuse the "word" and the "reality" it helps to create.
Man needs speech to be man. Therefore, "freedom of speech," 
which underscores the requirement of a proper or best type of
^^Tillich, "Existentialist Aspects of Modem Art," Christianity 
and Existentialist, ed. by Carl Michalson, p. 16.
communicative situation, looms as more than a political, social, or 
pragmatic reality. It appears as an ontological demand. The individual 
who has politically, psychologically, or otherwise (perhaps through 
"techniques of persuasion") lost his "freedom" or power of speech, and 
its consequent, free decision, has had his sense of identity, dignity, 
or personhood reduced.
Because "self" always stands in polarity with "world," all com­
munication, whether explicitly "self" directed or hurled at one's world, 
has a "self" impact. Throughout the greater portion of this disserta­
tion, the emphasis resides on the "world" side of being, but even when 
attention does not overtly focus on the "self," the ultimate "self" 
destination of all communication should not be forgotten.
The second major communication function uncovered by Tillich's 
analysis is fellowship i k o  t'tru/'ir/o.) or communion; The basic criterion 
here asks how does a given communicative exchange relate man to man.
The classic example of communication utilized in this role is love or 
courtship; Tillich made this principle paramount in all aspects of 
human relations— education, parent-child, analyst-patient, etc.^O The 
agape relationship is reduplicated in all these areas through the con­
cept of love as reunion and communication as the vehicle through which 
the barriers are overcome, at least partially, between men who func­
tion as both subject and "object" in communication. As men communicate 
ideally they achieve oneness, the spirit of comradeship. Hence, Tillich 
stated his preference for dialogue as the ideal circumstance
^®See Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 85; "Creative Love 
in Education," pp. 27, 34,
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for communicating
Communicative acts which relate man to man frequently engender 
a highly esoteric communication, which is often referred to as "in 
jokes" or the intuitive reading of reactions between intimates. Much 
of this communication which appears as meaningless and "wastebasket 
truth" especially in group discussion or "teas" at peace conferences, 
serves the vital role or awakening and deepening this sense of community 
described by such words as "truth," "confidence," and "love," or "like." 
Many traditional language forms such as greetings, expressions of con­
dolence or congratulations reflect this tendency institutionalized. The 
ultimate consummation that some impassioned orators experience in the 
exhilaration of holding audiences spellbound also expresses this qual­
ity on a person-"mass" level.
Despite the potential for "good" latent in every person-to- 
person encounter, danger also belongs in such meetings and the communi­
cation which brings them into being.
In any encounter of man with man, power is active, the power of 
personal radiation, expressed in language and gesture, in the glance 
of the eye and the sound of the voice, in face and figure and move­
ment, expressed in what one is personally and what one represents 
socially. Every encounter, whether friendly or hostile, whether 
benevolent or indifferent, is in some way, unconsciously or con­
sciously, a struggle of power with power.
It is this "power struggle" which produces the ethical challenge of
communication. At its best, every act of communication should enhance
the "power of being" and the sense of community of all the parties
^^illich. My Search for Absolutes, p. 45.
^^Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 87.
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Involved in the communicative exchange. This cannot occur when any 
participant in the exchange diminishes the "power of being" of another. 
In effect, the individual who does this has, through the principle of 
participation, harmed himself, because he derives less meaning, less 
power, from his own participation or communion with that person.
Several practical implications derive from Tillich's ethical 
theory. One, forcing decisions, even through consummate rhetorical 
skill, from another delimits his personhood, his power of being; Tillich
70emphatically denounced it. Ethical communication must consider and 
strive to permit the full individuality of the person addressed. "The 
moral imperative," Tillich wrote, "demands that oneself participate in 
the center of the other self and consequently accept his peculiarities 
even if there is no convergence between the two individuals as individ­
uals."^^
In addition to its ethical import, the power of being generated 
by community (or encounter) gives added impetus to what speech has 
traditionally called "ethos" or "source credibility." Tillich does not 
deny that "what a man is" has a bearing on the communication relation­
ship,^5 but ultimately he finds that the fact he is a man, a person, is 
a sufficient basis for acknowledging his power of being. "Man" is the 
most potent ("persuasive") factor involved in the encounter; the most 
forceful of communicative encounters are person-to-person.^^ Whether
^^Taped lecture,"Communicating the Gospel."
^^Tillieh, Systematic Theology, III, 45.
^^Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 45.
^^Henry Nelson Wieman has an interesting development of a thesis 
close to Tillich's ideas under the concept of "creative interchange,"
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they end in the extremes of love or murder, they most intensely embody 
the power of being.
The final communicative function implicit in ontology involves 
the symbolic task of relating finite man to infinite cosmos. Symbols 
unquestionably occupy the highest throne in Tillich's communicative 
hierarchy because they represent the form through which man experiences 
his infinite cosmos. Holding the ontological position paralleling ul- 
timacy, they make the individual's world "meaningful" by giving him 
universal security about his power of being. Underlying and making 
possible this function is man's capacity to evaluate and abstract, his 
power to create community through shared perception, and his acceptance 
of certain "concrete" symbolic forms as expressions of ultimacy. This 
latter quality, above all, bestows a power on symbolic communication 
which defies empirical analysis because symbols as expressions of man's 
perceived power of being are never completely explainable in denotative 
terms, which inherently change the relationship of the observer and his 
symbol. Subsequently, communication of and about symbols assumes the 
form of urgency and ultimacy, and attacks on symbols meet a righteous ; 
indignation b o m  from the perilous threat of an infinite loss of mean­
ing. Moreover the same word ("God") or object ("love") may have sign 
value for one group and for another the symbolic force of ultimate or 
cosmic threat or fulfillment.
The key to communication from the ontic perspective becomes the 
ability to empathize with symbolic content by correctly assessing the
see "Speech in the Existential Situation," The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech. XLVII (February, 1961), 150-157,
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symbolic power embodied in the words, acts, or objects of a given com­
munity, Subsequently, the message produced as a result of such 
assessment reflects the shared sense of community and experienced being. 
The speaker's communication assumes depth significance only to the 
degree it partakes of the ultimate cosmic significance of a group's ac­
cepted symbols. Individual messages may never directly mention a 
recognized symbol but may merely arouse traditional responses associated 
with the symbol and in this way appropriate or maintain its power.
Symbolic communication also works through the tacit understand­
ing shared by a given group of people who accept a common set of 
symbols; their assumed symbolic agreement contributes a measure of im­
plicit understanding to even the lightest conversation. From this type 
of function, symbolic communication adds to its effect of direct self­
world harmonization the indirect benefit of sustaining being through 
sustaining community; Tillich sees symbols as lying at the heart of 
group life and continuity. Education, formal or informal, aims at en­
gendering felt appreciation and empathy for the esoteric symbolic acts, 
concepts, or words which embody ultimacy for a given group, although in 
all likelihood the group itself will not interpret its activities in 
ontological terms. The alternative to group life through symbols is 
disintegration of community, loss of meaning, i.e. ultimacy and chaos 
in all aspects of a society including communication effectiveness,^^
^^Tillich places the loss of political, philosophical, and re­
ligious symbols in the center of the cultural collapse of prewar 
Germany and postwar Western life in general. See The Protestant Era,
pp. 222-260.
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Symbolic communication thus either conveys ultimacy, the power 
of being, or creates the bases for communication within community; but 
it also st»awns indigenous forms of communication such as Independence 
Day speeches or, in a crude way, fan magazines reflect the sheer poten­
cy and fascination of symbolically perceived acts and people. Almost 
all ritual reflects formalized symbolic ultimacy, and the utopian rhe­
toric of revolutionaries captures the flavor of new ultimacy. In fact, 
basic symbol areas such as "politics," "aesthetics," "success," or reli­
gion, develop whole sets of symbols clustering around pivotal symbols. 
Tillich arranged these into a hierarchy which he ranked: (1) tran­
scendent— level of primary concepts such as God, Hamlet, freedom; (2) 
immanent— the level of myth or personification where symbols take on 
human qualities; and (3) sign-symbols— the level where a given factor 
such as the statue of justice blindfolded denotes not only a building, 
the courthouse, but symbolizes as well the "justice" of the American, 
judicial s y s t e m . E a c h  level of symbols evokes certain degrees of 
response cast into certain forms, sharing, however, a tie to the broader 
base of "ultimacy." In addition, the various areas of symbolic activity 
receive a subtle, ofcen unconscious rank so that the area elevated to 
primary ultimacy subsumes the preceding hierarchy and also develops a 
relationship to other symbol areas which may include ultimate rejection, 
say, of religion. Yet, for Tillich "symbols" can be rejected only in 
the name of other symbols.
^^Tillich enumerated these levels in "Religious Symbols and Our 
Knowledge of God," pp. 195-196.
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The effectiveness of symbolic communication on the self-world, 
self-other relationship, along with the system of communication it con­
ceives, depends on two factors— cohesiveness and authenticity. The 
former quality described the social impact symbols had on the community 
identified with it, and the latter, the adequacy of the symbol to rep­
resent the power of being in a given historical period.
Symbols claim primacy because they represent value, individually 
and collectively. They reflect on an ultimate level connotative power 
defining the way man sees and interprets his world and the individual 
entities in it. They underlie community, create symbolic forms, and 
give potency to the individual messages which participate in them.
Summary
The preceding discussion focused on three primary issues: the
nature of being, the role of communication on the structure of being, 
and being's impact on the nature of communication. Examining each issue 
revealed the close interdependence between the areas. The first issue 
produced the insight that being was a relationship (self-world) and 
developed the implications of this idea. The definition of being^s a 
structural relationship presupposed communication and led to the discov­
ery that communication actualized being through language, creation of 
community, and the concept of ultimate concern. These aspects of.com­
munication as influenced by ontology, in turn, unmasked the basic 
functions of communication as self-relatedness, person-to-person relat­
edness, and the symbolic creation of ultimate concern.
The ontological framework which undergirded this entire analysis 
inevitably cast the subject of communication into a new perspective and
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new vocabulary. When Tillich focused on the power of being as the depth 
dimension of life consequently shaping facets and forms of communication 
he raised new ethical considerations about persuasion and new evaluative 
questions about how the "success" of a given communication Is deter­
mined. In addition, Tillich's ontic deductive premise affirmed the oft 
neglected principle that models and methodologies of communication which 
ignore questions about purpose, function, or values implicitly pass 
judgments on such questions. These functions which form the foundation 
for his philosophy thus contained a strong element of "oughtness" In 
what he depicted as "Is." Tillich's communicative functions seemed to 
Ignore highly specific and Important pragmatic questions about communi­
cation and Its social or political effects. Such an omission Innately 
colored Tillich's procedure, which would reduce a given message or the 
total expressions of a movement to a symbol of ultimate concern. Yet,
In the final judgment, Tillich only tries to lay bare presuppositions 
which determine the ways practical decisions are sought and the judg­
ments made about their "success" or "failure." His emphasis ever 
reminded us that decisions and consequences associated with communica­
tion have Importance not In themselves but only as they affect man and 
his world.
Moreover, Tillich's perspective provided a systematic framework 
which Included many forms of communication not typically considered; he 
deepened the concept of ethos and broadened the meaning of a"symbol." 
He also turned every communicative encounter between people Into a sig­
nificant occasion never to be taken lightly. The linking of 
communication to ontology also provided the basis for acknowledging the
/?
universality of communication. Those who deny communication its inde­
pendent validity as a discipline must use it. Furthermore, in actuality 
they object only to its negative, "non-being," manifestations which no 
given system or philosophy of communication can overcome.
Finally, Tillich revealed that the unity necessary for effective 
communication involved self, community, and world; if any one of the 
three is perverted, communication on each level suffers. Man, a self, 
when threatened, develops neurotic communal and world relationships in- . 
financing the whole tone of his communication. Breakdowns in 
communicative barriers on all levels, and a loss of "world" orientation 
leads to the demise of desire to communicate or the judgment that com­
munication is impossible (existentialist). Further chapters will reveal 
and amplify many of the themes introduced here. The relationship be­
tween symbols, ultimate concern, and community constitutes the primary 
focus on the ensuing chapter, while the person-to-person, community 
dimension of communication forms the substantive theme of chapters five 
and six.
CHAPTER 4
ENVIRONMENTAL PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNICATION 
"Nobody who uses language is outside history."
Introduction
Environmental participation carries the concept of "communica­
tion as a matter of participation" into yet a new phase of relatedness. 
Under Ford’s guidance it had previously suggested "the individual’s 
real relatedness to that which surrounds him." But applied to communi­
cation, environmental participation expands its significance, 
designating the interdependence or relatedness which exists between 
communication and the diversified, relative, and ever-changing cultural 
milieu which surrounds it. A collage of factors— such as physical cir­
cumstance, biological conditions, and racial, social, economic, and 
national attitudes— all mold a complicated environmental complex against, 
in, and through which all communication transpires. In Tillich’s terms 
"environment" and communication become "polar" forces reciprocally 
interacting to shape and influence each other.
Tillich frankly acknowledged the personal limitations facing any 
individual seeking to digest and explain these complex environmental 
influences. When he contemplated the subsequent task of relating en­
vironment to communication, Tillich confessed: "There is one
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consolation. None of us is asked to speak to everybody,in all places 
and in all periods. . . . Our participation is inevitably limited."^ 
Yet, Tillich did utilize historical analysis as the best possible method 
for reducing environment to a working hypothesis with meaningful impli­
cations for communication.
But again, as with ontology, Tillich did not explicitly develop 
a philosophy of history in his popular discussions of communication| he 
merely voiced in these discussions the surface indications of his more 
complicated principles. Tillich subtly hinted at the presence of 
historical dynamics in the allusions which dot his discussions of com­
munication impediments— "people of our time," "today's world," "present 
civilization," and "modern mind." He made this connection even clearer 
when he asked questions such as how can the message "be focused for the
people of our time" and then retorts that "in other words, we are con­
cerned here with the question: How can the Gospel be communicated?"^
On another occasion he queried, "Do we have to change the traditional
theological language in order to be able to communicate in today’s 
world?"3 Once he announced history’s decisive force in communication.
History shuts and opens doors. It is history which has created 
the problem of the irrelevance of the minister and not the inevita­
ble deficiencies and failures of the ministers, theologians, and 
Church authorities. And it is history that gives the opportunity
to restore the relevance of the ministry.4
4aped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel,"
Zibid.
^Tillich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 12,
^Tillich, "The Relevance of the Ministry in Our Times and Its
Theological Foundation," Making the Ministry Relevant, ed. by Hans 
Hoffman, n. 26.
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Tillich selected history as the key to environmental analysis because 
he felt its structure applied with equal validity to all cultural dimen­
sions. "History," he conjectured, "has given to everyone the physical, 
social, and spiritual conditions of his existence.
The historical principles, hovrever, which govern Tillich's 
probing inquiry of environment and link it to communication must be dis­
cerned from his philosophical discussions of history and then reapplied 
to communication. Tillich's basic historical methodology belongs in 
the "typological" category.& Consequently, he constructed an ideal 
pattern of historical movement which is never fully actualized but which 
has the advantage of applying with equal validity to such abstract cul­
tural entities as "Western Civilization," a subgroup within this larger 
framework, or to the life of an individual. Secure in his conviction 
that the broader historical trends in time shaped all they encountered, 
Tillich normally focused his energies only on the more abstract cultural 
entities.
The decision to follow Tillich's own policy and consider history 
as the key to environmental participation resolves a portion of the 
problem posed by this chapter. Two other vital issues remain: (1) an
inquiry into the relationship which history or environmental participa­
tion shares with essential participation or ontology; and (2) a 
determination of the relationship which history exercises on being and 
subsequently on communication.
^Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 346. 
^Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 103.
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First, history as the domain of conscious life becomes the plane 
where man experiences or actualizes his being.^ Invoking the classical 
philosophical distinction between potentiality and actuality, Tillich's 
conception simply contends that self-affirmation, community, and world 
harmonization transpire within an actual, concrete historical setting; 
they occur somewhere In time and space and do not exist merely as meta-
o
physical creations of a mind generating a "world behind the world.""
Tillich roundly condemned the modern age because Its historians saw only
"time and place" to the total exclusion of being. He complained that
the dynamic-moving spirit of historical reality has come to prevail 
to an Increasing degree. The meaning of history seems more Impor­
tant to the mind than does the meaning of being. The metaphysical 
Interpretation of history has become an urgent and practical con- 
concern.9
History and being converge for Tillich In the concept of ultimate 
concern. Every consciously articulated history presupposes an ultimate 
answer to the meaning of e x i s t e n c e . T h u s  history :1s opened to onto­
logical analysis and Tillich can commandlngly speak of "the necessity 
of a metaphysical Interpretation of h i s t o r y . H e n c e ,  an ontological
^See Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 27, 186 and Systematic 
Theology, II, 4.
^Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality,
p. 7.
^Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 81. Tillich viewed meta­
physics and ontology as synonyms, but In almost all of his American 
works he used only the latter term. See Systematic Theology, I, 163. 
Tillich did not finalize his "metaphysics" of history until Systematic 
Theology, III, 297-426.
^^Systematlc Theology, III, 350.
llTllllch, The Religious Situation, pp. 82, 83. Ontology Is 
clearly reflected In the headings which preface the earlier portion of 
Tillich's work: "Man (self) and History (world)"; Tillich, "History and
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sub-structure guided his analysis of history. The first section of this 
chapter clarifies the role this essential structure, including the com­
municative functions contained in it, has on Tillich's philosophy of 
history.
Moreover, history, ontologically reduced to "creative or dynamic 
time," has a profound effect on the environment in which communication 
occurs. The second section traces cut the character of this influence 
through the concept of "situation," which in itself summarized Tillich's 
analysis of the circumstances surrounding communication in the late 
twentieth century. History subsequently conditions both the way man 
fulfills his ontological needs and the role of communication in their 
attainment.
Finally, section three details the primary communicative respon­
ses possible in view of the dynamic nature of "situation." The three 
basic categories which emerge— traditional, apologetic, and revolution­
ary— 'represent different approaches to the same goal, the actualization 
of man's being. Their triple character results from the thrust of time 
and the communicative options it creates.
Twin objectives evolve from this threefold division; (1) sur­
veying the interdependence of history and being to define Tillich's 
philosophy of history in ontological terms and also to suggest communi­
cation's role in the historical process; (2) surveying the interdepen­
dence of history and communication to explain the communicative 
"situation" produced by history and to explicate the triparte
the Categories of Being": "The Dynamics of History." See Tillich, 
Systematic Theology, III, 300-338.
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communicative systems engendered by it. The former objective relies 
on the vocabulary and structure developed in chapter three, while the 
latter one provides a new perspective on how communication relates to 
man's fulfillment of being in history.
An Ontological Interpretation of History
Tillich's scholarly interest in history spanned more than forty 
years. His active involvement in the political, social, and religious 
movements which sprang up in Germany as the aftermath of World War I 
spawned his initial interest. The crusading fires of political 
controversy burned intently in his early works from this era: The
Interpretation of History, The Religious Situation, and a number of re­
printed periodical articles in The Protestant Era. In them he bristled 
with antagonism toward capitalism and proclaimed the coming of a new 
epoch in the name of kairos. His last major historical work. Systematic 
Theology, volume III, lacked the social urgency and reforming resolve of 
these earlier works, but it bore the polished hue of his more sensitive, 
mature reflection.
Tillich's formally stated philosophy of history did not slavish­
ly adhere to the threefold pattern laid down in the preceding chapter 
as a method for approaching being, but the general features of this 
pattern (the logical structure of being, man and the question of being, 
ultimate concern and community as the power of being), permeate his 
thought. Thus the pattern possesses sufficient validity to serve as an 
organizing structure embracing the major features of his philosophy of 
history.
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An additional fourth step must be added to these three to com­
plete the picture of history, viz. time. This concept, implicit in the 
ontological structure, via the concept of non-being, assumes such a 
prominent role in an ontological interpretation of history that it 
justifiably received special attention. Furthermore, the ensuing anal­
ysis will reveal that all four points Interrelate with each other, as 
well as reveal the appearance of communication as a basic factor In 
history.
Self-world, as the basic ontological relationship, embedded
itself into the heart of Tillich’s working definition of history.
According to him history
is always a union of objective and subjective elements. An "event" 
is a syndrome (i.e., a running-together) of facts and interpreta­
tion. . . . There is no history without factual occurrences and 
there is no history without the reception and interpretation of 
factual occurrences by historical consciousness.
Tillich detected this subject-object ontic theme in the etymology of
the word history.
The well-known fact that the Greek word historia means primarily 
inquiry, information, report, and only secondarily the events 
inquired about and reported is a case in point. It shows that for 
those who originally used the word "history" the subjective side 
preceded the objective side.13
By stressing self-awareness, here translated "historical con­
sciousness," Tillich underscored the subjective side in history and 
opened the door to the second ontological factor in history— man and 
the question of being.
l^Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 302.
ISlbid., 300.
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History, as the product of a unique form of self-awareness which 
Implies man's dependent connection on occurrences outside himself, be­
gins only when man developed the linguistic capacity to ask and aüswer 
the question of being. He wrote, "For If that being which eventually 
will produce history Is called 'man,' he must have language and univer­
sels. . . "Language and universels" signified to Tillich the power
of abstraction, and history for him rested on such a foundation. Only 
when man could turn back toward the past to remember and only when he 
could anticipate the future to plan could man have history and face a 
situation which produced the question of being. Language, history, and 
time thus assume a closely knit Interdependence. Language, or man's 
capacity to communicate In expressive forms, reflected what Tillich 
called "the substance of his tradition" or past.^^ Language gives man 
a memory. Including a vocabulary which binds him to a certaza community. 
Language also reflects the tensions of the contemporary moment when the 
history and tradition of a given group come under attack. The birth of 
the twin disciplines, rhetoric and history In the same society, as well 
as the excessive reliance of the earliest history on speeches, testifies 
to the close communion which binds language and history together as 
expressions of man's self-awareness.
Third, history Involved the concept of community. "History," 
Tillich once observed, "Is the history of g r o u p s " o r ,  as he otherwise
^^Ibldo, 306,
l^Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Inter­
rogations , ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 373.
l^Tllllch, Systematic Theology, III, 312.
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expressed it, "the group is the bearer of h i s t o r y . B y  this Tillich 
meant that a meaningfully remembered past and a goal-oriented future 
belong only to the power of group life. Physically the continuing pre­
sence of group members and its organized group life contribute to this 
power by allowing person-to-person encounters. Closely tied to these 
encounters, the group maintained a common language. Beyond this the 
group also preserved an ontological dimension of meaning by providing a 
purposeful orientation about the worthwhileness of life.
Associated with this latter function, which phased at points 
into ultimate concern, was the ontological-symbol correspondence which 
gives the group cohesiveness and history a valuation, direction, or 
viewpoint. Tillich believed that "one cannot escape the destiny of be­
longing to a tradition in which the answer to the question of the
meaning of life in all its dimensions, including the historical, is
18given in symbols which influence every encounter with reality." His­
torically, this meant that certain occurrences will be transformed 
"into symbols of the life of a historical group." Yet, the choice of 
which events to elevate and what value to assign to them reflects an 
already existing current of meaning or purpose. Tillich had a special 
name for the formal expression of this fundamental, overriding sense of 
value or purpose. He labeled the overt manifestation of this symbol 
bearing function "vocational consciousness."^^ The group's vocational 





symbols as well as the projection of itself into the future as a 
valued, productive institution. Education into the group basically 
meant emphatic understanding and identification with the symbols of the 
group. It was the ontological embodiment of meaning in these symbols 
which made deviation from the group norm so perilous for the group and 
traumatic for the individual who must subsequently find a new basis 
of meaning for his life.
Thus far the connection between environmental and essential 
participation emphasizes Tillich's basic ontic structure. The princi­
ples and characteristics developed to explain being have required only 
a minimal adaptation for explicating history. In addition, communica­
tion's basic functions affecting being, e.g., self-affirmation, 
language, community, and symbols, easily translate into ontic formula­
tions about the nature of history, man's environment. In turning to 
time, however, the character of history begins to assert its individual­
ity, and its unique environmental influence on communication becomes 
clearer. Furthermore, the effect of time on environment and communica­
tion is neither neutral nor constructive, but destructive. Time as the 
reflection of non-being brings an element of threat or meaninglessness 
into the environment and subsequently into communication. The follow­
ing survey of time at all levels amplifies its nature and the negative 
potential accompanying it.
Tillich identified time's unifying element in all levels of 
existence— inorganic, historical, psychological— as the quality of 
"after-each-other-ness,"^® or more simply temporal progression or ‘
ZOlbld.: 313ff=
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maturation. Elsewhere he confessed that this historical conception and
the ontology underlying it excluded "a circular interpretation of the 
21temporal." Time's unity as "after-each-other-ness" did not reside in 
mere temporal, i.e. chronological progression, but even more in concepts 
associated with it, such as change, process, or transition. "Time, so 
to speak, runs ahead toizard the new, the unique, the n o v e l , a n d  
creative neïjness, by definition, suggests a corresponding quality of 
disruption and destruction. Consequently, time culminates in a "tran­
scendent" drive in which time as creative newness results in an ultimate 
fulfillment and the cessation of time or change. Tillich offered this 
explanation of "transcendent time."
History transcends every creative act horizontally. History is the 
place of all creative acts and characterizes each of them as un­
fulfilled in spite of their relative fulfillment. It drives beyond 
all of them toward a fulfillment which is not relative and which 
does not need another temporality for its fulfillment.
Time, interpreted generically as the "embodiment of the new"
and the "destruction of the old," generates a powerful influence on 
being and thus necessarily affects communication and man's realization 
of the power of being. Traces of its influence appear on every level
of ontology. Temporally, man relates to his world in three basic forms:
past, present, and future. Historically, the development of chronology 
and periodization reflect attempts to relate to man's past world, while 
planning and anticipation reflect its future v i s i o n . ^4 Yet, man in
^^Tillich; Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Real­
ity, p. 76.
Z^Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 319.
23lbid. 24ibid., 330.
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actuality knows his world only as "now." Thus the present holds center 
stage in Tillich's dramatic confrontation of past and future. "The 
present," he conjectured, "is the past,"^^ and again "the present is 
the future."26 Its pivotal character gives it a denouement role in 
Tillich's entire discussion of time.
Man's self-affirmation in the "now" moment is constantly 
threatened by the gift of abstraction— his Realization of a before him­
self and an after-himself. The ultimate loss of selfhood, identity, or 
unity thus appeared as a total disorientation toward the past (amnesia) 
or the thrust into an unknown future where all relationships undergo 
traumatic unrecognizable transformations. Yet, as long as the self can 
sustain a meaningful relation to its "today," it can synthesize past 
and future to give its being temporal actuality.
Time also affected man's sense of community and ultimate con­
cern; the "new" ever threatened community as potential disruption. Each 
new birth represented the intrusion of possible distortion into the com­
munity— the generation gap. Strenuous group pressure always built at 
every opportunity to bring the young and uninitiated into the symbolic 
life of new community. But even in societies where the creative poten­
tial of new meaning appeared effectively checked for long periods, the 
danger of deviation persisted as possibility; eventually, it entered 
either from without or within, but even in the former case the new could 
not enter unless the propensity for it already existed in the group.
Time also affected the depth dimension of ultimacy and the
Z^Tillich, The Religious Situation, p. 32,
26ibid.. p. 33.
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symbols associated with it. Tillich envisioned every historical act as 
aimed "at something," but each individually meaningful act rested on 
the foundation of "ultimacy" or transcendent meaning which weaves the 
lesser acts into an intelligible whole. The outward form this "tran­
scendent meaning" assumed was the symbolic, and ti,me had a pronounced 
influence here.
"Adequacy" of expression means the power of expressing an ultimate 
concern in such a way that it creates reply, action, communication. 
Symbols which are able to do this are alive. But the life of sym­
bols is limited. The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes 
change. Contents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by 
others.
The passage of time, "after-each-other-ness," produced the 
"death" of some symbols and the conception of others. This process 
could be sudden, as in a catastrophic historical event which through 
revolution might change a nation's reality and its symbolic forms such 
as the flag.28 Or, on the other hand, symbols might change gradually 
through a more nebulous process wherein they simply lost their situa­
tional relevance.
Like living beings, the symbols grow and die. They grow when the 
situation is ripe for them, and they die when the situation changes. 
The symbol of the "king" grew in a special period of history, and 
it died in most parts of the world in our period. Symbols do not 
grow because people are longing for them, and they do not die be­
cause of scientific or practical criticism. They die because they 
no longer produce response in the group where they originally found
expression.29
Every act of communication as an occurrence in time or history
27Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 96. 
28lbid.. p. 42.
29ibid., p 1 43.
93
faces the challenge of relevancy and contemporary meaningfulness. Words 
change their meaning or become obsolete, old slogans ring with empti­
ness, once viable groups and coalitions lose their unity, etc. Thus 
ontologically summarized, time threatens man's realization of the basic 
functions of communication— self-affirmation, community, and the symbol­
ic. The clearest and most forceful expression of time's intrusion into 
environment and communication arises from an examination of Tillich's 
concept of situation which encompassed temporal progression, and mean­
ing within a given historical framework.
Situation as Zeitgeist 
Tillich assigned the concept of situation a flexible role in 
his books, lectures, and articles. He commented on the varied roles 
situation could play when he observed, "It can appear on a family, 
tribal, national, or international basis^ It can be restricted to a 
particular history-rbearing group; it can be enlarged to a combination 
of such groups ; it can embrace continents."^® Tillich normally employed 
"situation" to refer to the broadest possible cultural ties. Hence he 
asserted, "the present about which we speak is the life of our Western 
Society."31 On this level "situation" synthesized man's perception of 
his actualized being under the temporal forcti of a given historical 
period; therefore it represented the final product created by the union 
of essential and environmental participation or of ontology and history.
3®Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 325. 
llTillich, The Religious Situation, p. 40.
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Time and meaning assume a uniquely important function in the
present situation and consequently, it looms as more significant than
either the past or future. Tillich specifically employed situation in
the present sense in the introduction to volumes I and III of his 
09Systematic. After subtitling the first division of his introduction 
to volume I "Message and Situation," Tillich proceeded to define "situa­
tion" as "the scientific and artistic, the economic, political, and 
ethical forms in which they Men/ express their interpretation of exis­
t e n c e .  "33 Later in volume III he returned to the situation concept as 
the contemporary union of time and meaning when he contended that a 
message which did not comprehend the present situation was "a-Kairos—  
missing the demand of the historical m o m e n t . "34
"Situation" as the present historical moment comprised both a 
compilation of major events sharing an approximate chronological con­
tinuity (object) and the temporal meaning these events had for their 
human interpreters (subject). Tillich illustrated this by referring to 
the political split between East and West and noting that "situation" 
did not describe the split per se, but the "political interpretations 
of s p l i t ."33 Hence, meaning, the subjective side of situation, subtly 
began its triumph oyer time, as mere physical occurrence, shaping it 
with a definitive character— as examples of "situation" taken from
32see Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 3-5; III, 3-7.
33Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 3-4.
34iillich, Systematic Theology, III, 6.
33Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 4.
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Tillich's lectures to ministers demonstrate.
In former centuries of Christian history, the authorities formulated 
as the Biblical message, often unconsciously, those points which 
gave answers to the temporal and spatial situation of their people, 
including themselves. They formulated as the Biblical message that 
which could be communicated to themselves as well as to masses.
In the early Greek church it was the anxiety about death and 
doubt which prompted the double idea we find in all the early Greek 
fathers, namely, that "Life" and "light" is the message of Chris­
tianity. In the Greek Orthodox Church this is still decisive today. 
Easter is by far the most important festival of the Russian church. 
In the medieval church, it was the anxiety resulting from the social 
and spiritual chaos following the breakup of the Roman Empire which 
produced the transcendent-sacramental foundation of a hierarchical 
system to guide society and individuals. In the Reformation it was 
the anxiety of guilt and the message of justification which was de­
cisive for every formula of the R e f o r m e r s .36
Situation as the composite of contemporaneity and value or 
"meaning" penetrated beneath the surface of most activities. The for­
mative cultural principles of a given era lend unity to the period by 
reflecting its fundamental values, goals, and transcendent mea* ig, or 
lack of it. These sub-surface meanings manifest themselves in "Zeit­
geist" fashion in the cultural forms to which Tillich previously 
referred ("scientific and artistic, the economic, political, and ethi­
cal"). Yet, language, more clearly than any other single cultural 
phenomenon, reflected the " s i t u a t i o n ."3? its usages and connotations 
mirror the problems and anxieties (the question of being) inherent in 
each era.
Moreover, this "depth" meaning expressed in various cultural 
forms and language cannot be gleaned from a "literal," i.e. semantic- 
positivist, interpretation of these cultural and linguistic forms,
36iaped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 7.
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because they reflect ontlc or ultimate meaning; these forms symbolize 
the inner significance of the period. They embody in their substances 
the manner in which man perceived his meaning or being in terms of self, 
community, and world; what Tillich called man's "creative self-interpre­
tation in a special period."38 As a result, the individual who wishes 
to communicate with his "situation" must ascertain the power which 
"time" and "meaning" as "situation" have exercised on the communication 
objectives of self-affirmation, community, and world-harmonization.
Borrowing extensively from existential analysis as he detected 
its basic motifs in art, literature, psychology, drama, and philoso­
phy ,39 Tillich telescoped his characterization of the present situation 
into a single dominant theme laden with communication implications—  
meaninglessness. In keeping with the communication objectives of essen­
tial participation, "meaninglessness" in the modern situation would 
include a loss of symbols, a breakdown in community, and a loss of self-
identity. Tillich's writings repeated these themes over and over, but
no one statement better summarized the three jointly than the following 
excerpt written during the early stages of World War II, In it Tillich 
expressed his conviction that the "disintegration of our day consists 
in the loss of an ultimate meaning of life by the people of Western civ­
ilization. And with the loss of the meaning of life, they have lost 
personality and community.
38ibid., 4.
39see Tillich, The Courage to Be. pp. 139-154.
40Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 262. Examples of the loss of
traditional symbols can be found in Tillich's Theology of Culture,
97
Much later, employing slightly different language but echoing the same 
theme he wrote:
It is not an exaggeration to say that today man experiences 
his present situation in terms of disruption, conflict, self-* 
destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life.
This experience is expressed in the arts and in literature, concep­
tualized in existential philosophy, actualized in political 
cleavages of all kinds, and analyzed in the psychology of the un­
conscious .
The loss of essential, ontlc meaning was intimately involved 
with the unintelligibility of a single word or expression. Tillich 
considered the breakdown of symbols, community, and self-affirmation 
the major causes of communicative difficulties; he never discussed 
specific communication problems in his lectures until he had described 
the ontic and historical background which produced verbal, grammatical, 
or semantic distortion. Tillich explicitly related ontic, historical, 
and verbal meaning in an incisive statement.
In every meaning, however, lies the silent presupposition of 
the meaningfulness of the whole, the unity of all possible meanings, 
i.e. faith in the meaning of life itself. If we want to define 
this more exactly, we must say: In our every act of meaning, theo-r
retical as well as practical, a definite concrete meaning is before 
us, and at the same time, as the object of a silent belief, there 
is the absolute meaning or the meaningfulness of the whole. That 
this is so, becomes especially clear at moments when all meaning 
threatens to be lost, and the world sinks down into an abyss of 
nothingness, a meaningless void. The single meaning which is ex­
perienced and accomplished always bears a relationship to others;
otherwise it would be a meaningless aphorism. Meaning is always
a system of meanings.42
p. 152; The Courage to Be. p. 175, 189; Ultimate Concern, p. 88; of the 
loss of community in The Protestant Era, 262, 263; Theology of Culture, 
p. 104; and of the loss of self-affirmation in The Protestant Era, 202,
and The Courage to Be, pp. 151-154.
4^illich, Systematic Theology, I, 49.
42Tillich, The Interpretation of History, p. 221.
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Tillich did not reject semantic^^ or grammatical meaning as irrelevant 
to communication; he simply subordinated it to the ontological. Subse­
quently, when he envisioned communicative problems he thought of the 
breakdown of symbols which embodied ultimacy, community, and self- 
affirmation. Hence, he set as his own primary communication objective 
the maintenance, the reinterpretation, or the creation of symbols and 
the strengthening of community. The paradox of modern "meaninglessness" 
is that increased scientific and technological advances have not stemmed 
the increasing breakdown in communication between individuals, groups, 
or nations. Tillich, therefore, envisioned the solution to this pre­
dicament not through improved technique but in the restoration of 
symbols capable of sustaining genuine community and not simply "solidar­
ity." As the next major section will demonstrate, Tillich's position 
as an apologetically oriented communicator grew from his preceding 
evaluation of the nature of meaning.
The position suggested for symbols by essential participation 
receives further confirmation in the important role sÿmbols exercise in 
environment defined as time. Within history the general function of 
symbols, viz. overcoming non-being present via the inherent dynamic of 
history, assumes a concrete form. The threat of meaninglessness has 
become acute in the modern era, because the disintegration of symbolic 
meaning in this period implies total breakdown of ontological communi­
cation objectives and reinforces the demand for symbols and community. 
Moreover, since communication always occurs in time, the possibility
43see Tillich's concept of "semantic rationality," Systematic 
Theology. I, 54-56.
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of meaninglessness persists as a constant threat. Subsequently, three 
communicative systems (arising from man's temporal environment) attempt 
to combat the threat.
Communication and History
"Meaninglessness," dramatically active in the present situation, 
also describes a constant chaotic potential inherently present in com­
munication via time's "after-each-other-ness" character. Many familiar 
communication problems (the index, generation gap, slang) spring from 
the ceaseless drive in which "history runs ahead toward the ever new and 
the ultimately new." Time reserves its most serious blow, however, for 
man's symbolic expression of ultimate concern. When an individual no 
longer perceives his being as affirmed in an inherited set of symbols, 
a profound change occurs in his entire life involving his language and 
basic group loyalties.
Problems, crises, and communicative breakdowns produced by his­
torical movement, or creative time, generate three primary communication 
systems; each system provides a way for man to sustain his power of be­
ing in the midst of environmental flux. The categorical names of the 
three— apologetic, traditional, and revolutionary— strongly imply the 
time distinctions which form the basis of their differentiations, 
although ontically interpreted the three aim at the same basic ends.
As genre descriptions, "apologetic," "ritual," and "revolutionary," 
can characterize a word, sentence, speech, movement, or institutional 
purpose; however, more broadly interpreted, they define life styles and 
the communication elements which permeate them. Interpreting ëach
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system by comparing and contrasting its features on the following five- 
point checklist reveals the typical nature of each system; (1) time or 
"situation" orientation; (2) self-world emphasis (closely related to 
community vs. individual emphasis); (3) language style; (4) community 
vs. individual continuum; (5) attitude toward symbols.
Apologetic
Apologetic communication originated from a present-past time 
continuum. Its primary time valuation is the present situation and in 
its depth resides the potential for the affirmation of being. "Answer 
and questions," Tillich determined, "must come out of current situa­
tions .
Meaning belonged to the present, the here and now; the persua­
sive force of any message derived from its immediate verification in 
the life of the individual. Whatever cannot be supported "experien- 
tially" conveys no real m e a n i n g . Y e t ,  "every experience in one's 
life," Tillich believed, "can have the effect of opening up the human 
mind so that it is ready for existential participation."^6 The princi­
ple of support through immediate verification became the basis of 
Tillich's homiletics, as he clearly announced in the introduction to 
the first published volume of his sermons.
^^Cited by Arthur Wehrwein, "Right Question Pleases Tillich," 
New York Times, May 5, 1963, p. 69.
45see Tillich, "Truth and Verification," Systematic Theology, I,
100-105.
^^Tillich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 13.
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There is, however, a more important reason for the publication of 
this volume. A large part of the congregation at the Sunday ser­
vices came from outside the Christian circle in the most radical 
sense of the phrase. For them a sermon in the traditional Biblical 
terms would have no meaning. Therefore I was obliged to seek a 
language which expresses in other terms the human experience to 
which the Biblical and ecclesiastical terminology point. In this 
situation an "apologetic" type of sermon has been developed. And, 
since I believe that this is generally the situation in which the 
Christian message has to be pronounced today. I; hope that the pub­
lication of some attempts to meet this situation may not be 
useless.
Apologetic communication, however, mediated the past to the 
present. It assumed a shared connection between past and present which 
was momentarily unrecognized. Breaking sharply in this conception with 
radical existentialism which emphasized only the "now," Tillich, the 
realistic essentialist, sought common ground to unite past and present. 
He found his common ground in the uniting power of "essences," i.e., 
language which was preserved and shaped by historical experience, and 
in the "shared ground of human experience," the need for being.
Tillich did not deny that human nature can change in history, but he did 
detect an abiding element of existential unity— man's ontic search for 
meaning and being. Change occurred primarily in the communicative forms 
through which man expressed and realized this search.
Next, apologetic communication emphasized the "subjective"
(self) side of communication as opposed to the objective (world) side.
As anticipated in the preceding idea of "experiential proof," apologetic 
communication sought to accomplish self-world correlation by shaping
^^Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, Preface.
^®Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."
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the attitudes of the individual toward his world. Apologetic communi­
cation does not seek decisions which change the world but seeks rather 
to clarify or make the individual's relationship to his "world" clear 
or more intelligible; as a communicator, the apologist removed barriers 
which threatened this structure by pointing toward already held agree- 
ment and perspective.
Third, apologetic eotumuiiieation relied on the language of the 
present to mediate the past into the jumbled matrix of the "now," Its 
language and thought forms belong to the now. Apologetic communication 
draws upon these forms because they possess living, environmental power 
and convey experiential force. Believing that a word or concept gains 
its primary connotations from the events and associations which surround 
it, the apologist searches for those contemporary expressions which re­
flect connotations similar to the forms which previous generations 
employed to express being and power; he then works to equate these.
Fourth, apologetic communication seeks to achieve community 
without the coercion of group pressure or the force of tradition exerted 
merely for the sake of t r a d i t i o n .^0 It aims at community based on gen­
uine acceptance of the individuals who constitute the community. 
Apologetic communication wants only genuine decision accompanied by 
living acceptance of symbols and of one's fellowman.
Finally, apologetic communication takes the symbols of the past 
and seeks their contemporary reinterpretation. Frequently depicting
49lbid.
^^Tillich labeled these other forms of community, "Solidarity," 
Theology of Culture, p. 104.
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himself as an apologist, Tillich explained in a seminar discussion 
shortly before his death what this entailed.
How this situation can be overcome without a fundamental refor­
mation of the way in which Christianity expresses its symbols, 
preaches them, and interprets them, I really do not know, although 
my whole theological work has been directed precisely to the inter­
pretation of religious symbols in such a way that the secular man—  
and we are all secular— can understand and be moved by them. On 
this basis (which is a small confession to you about my work), I 
believe it may be possible to reinterpret the great symbols of the
p o 5  u  ju l l  S  Wây u i i o  L. ÎT 0 5  uOlT c 5  m c o t l j L l l g  u G  w iiG u l *
The apologist, regardless of his field of endeavor, reverenced the 
symbols of the past as valid representations of man's ultimate con­
cern; but he formulated their contemporary relevance through their 
vivid restatement.
This capsule summary of apologetic communication provides the 
guidelines for the next two chapters which spell out their implications 
in greater detail. Chapter five develops these implications from the 
listening side and six from the speaking side of communication.
Traditional Communication
Unlike apologetic communication, traditional communication 
locates the source and ideal for the power of being in past occurrences 
and events. It then "speaks" to the present "from a situation of the 
p a s t . "52 Such a communication system exalts tradition as authority; 
and accordingly, that which tradition does not sanction, at least 
implicitly, does not deserve acceptance.
^^Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 88.
S^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 3.
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Traditional and apologetic communication both value the past and 
its meaning-producing events. Tillich, the ingrained apologist, fre­
quently confessed his own romantic affection for the past.
My love for church buildings and their mystic atmosphere, for lit­
urgy and music and sermons, and for the great Christian festivals 
that molded the life of the town for days and even weeks of the 
year left an indelible feeling in me for the ecclesiastical and 
the sacramental.53
He also noted a general absence of the power of the past in general
American thinking.
To grow up in towns in which every stone is witness of a period 
many centuries past produces a feeling for history, not as a matter 
of knowledge but as a living reality in which the past participates 
in the present. I appreciated that distinction more fully when I 
came to America. In lectures, seminars, homes I visited, and per­
sonal conversation with American students I found that an immediate 
emotional identification with the reality of the past was lacking. 
Many of the students here had an excellent knowledge of historical 
facts, but these facts did not seem to concern them p r o f o u n d l y .54
Yet, despite some similarity, a sharp difference appears between 
apologetic and traditional communication over the question of how the 
past connects to the present. Traditional communication brings the past 
into the present as past, without adaptation, maintaining a direction 
of past-present.
Next, traditional communication stresses the "world" side of the 
structure of being. World, however, does not designate the literal 
physical-spatial environment but rather the evaluation placed upon the 
world by the group in which the individual participates. Hence the 
individual formulates his basic life orientation or cosmology from a
S^Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 59.
54iiiiich, "Autobiographical Reflections," The Theology of Paul 
Tillich, ed. by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, p. 5.
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particular group (community), which having predetermined a weltanr- 
schauung, then mediates its conclusions to the individual.
Neglecting contemporary adaptation, traditional communication 
employed yesterday’s language and thought forms. Accuracy of.expression 
assumed a position of prominence vital to the continuing power of mean­
ing in a changing environment. When the validity of these expressive 
forms is challenged, blame for their inadequacy shifts from the expres­
sion to the individual who fails to pay the past homage.
Traditional communication retains old symbols. Its emphasis 
falls on continuity, reaffirmation, and relearning rather than reinter­
pretation. Consequently, it either rejects environmental influences as 
irrelevant or minimizes them to the greatest possible extent. In majes­
tic splendor it clings to its past, denying the dynamic, creative thrust 
of history.
Through its rigorous symbol system and allegiance to the past, 
traditional communication achieves a strong sense of community and 
thereby imparts being to the individual through its promise of certain­
ty and the balm of group acceptance. Hence, it mediates being or 
ontological meaning to the present not by message adaptation but by the 
living power of group dynamics which, as in the military, will sacrifice 
the individual to maintain traditional institutional integrity. New 
meaning comes through continually recreating the group heritage and 
through esoteric indoctrination into the group traditions; these tra­
ditions determine the "being of the individual" and he exists as 
"being a part."55




Revolutionary communication looks toward the future, emphasiz­
ing a future-present continuum. Its power drive lays hold of the 
transcendent ideal toward which time always moves. Its character thus 
bears the indelible marks of utopianism, erecting its meaning-being 
center not on what "was" or "is" but on what "will be." To affirm what 
will be necessitates advocating what should be, and, consequently, rev­
olutionary communication operates from a high ethical imperative, 
combined with a spirit of crusading zeal which denounces past and pre­
sent alike.
Like traditional communication, revolutionary communication 
elevates "world" over "individuality." It announces, however, as its 
objective the radical transformation of the present environment, guided 
by a future ideal. On the basis of a restructured world, the individual 
self will find his own being. Thus revolutionary communication does 
not correlate self-world through message adaptation or group dynamics 
but by the promise of world or environmental adaptation. Consequently, 
its power drive meets greatest acceptance among those disenchanted in­
dividuals and groups who view the present environment as intolerable; 
times of crisis may enlarge the membership in this category.
In conceiving its language and thought forms, revolutionary 
communication bears the marks of the new and the utopian, although these 
expressions rapidly become present and soon past. While the passage of 
time may subdue their novelty, it does not immediately or inevitably 
tarnish the future potency which undergirds them; nor will it necessar­
ily reduce the absolutes which resound through revolutionary 
communication.
Also after the manner of traditional communication, revolution­
ary communication demands strong group support. Threatened from all 
sides it can exist only through a devoted community which tolerated 
minimal individualism. Loyalty to the group tends to determine the 
character of the individual's existence.
The greatest task facing the revolutionary is the creation of 
new symbols of ultimate concern.Believing that "symbols could only 
be overcome by other symbols,revolutionary communication has to 
provide new, widely accepted symbols to displace older ones. Then, too, 
it must overcome the fears aroused by new symbols with their latent 
challenge to the established order. As his nearest brush with revolu­
tionary communication, Tillich, the religious socialist, undertook the
personal challenge of producing new political-historical symbols; un­
cofortunately, reactionary fascism emerged triumphant in this struggle.
Summary
Environmental participation as developed in this chapter de­
scribed the relationship which Tillich envisioned between communication 
and the multifaceted circumstances surrounding its occurrence. Tillich 
unraveled this complex relationship by turning to history, which gave 
"to everyone the physical, social, and spiritual conditions of his
^^Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interro­
gation. ed, by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 406.
^^Paul Tillich, "Existential Analyses and Religious Symbols," 
Four Existentialist Theologians, ed. by Will Herberg (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. 291,
C O
See Tillich, "Kairos," The Protestant Era, pp. 30-54.
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existence." Yet, a historical perspective only confirms the priority 
of ontology and its communication objectives; even here the ontological 
structure reappears, structuring the character of Tillich's philosophy 
of history— subject-object, language, community, and vocational con­
sciousness or transcendent meaning.
Moreover, with the addition of time, the actualization of being 
became a dynamic process continually propelled forward by an "after- 
each-other-ness" quality. Time, creative newness, exercised a formative 
influence shaping the way man perceives his being and meaning. It adds 
the potential of meaninglessness to every communicative situation. As 
a result, man finds genuine or existential meaning only in the here 
and now; past and future become irrelevant if they do not collate with 
it.
In keeping with his existentially determined historical 
analysis, Tillich characterized the present cultural situation as "mean­
inglessness." Thus it provides a vivid representation of the chaos 
which time potentially introduces into every situation. Correcting 
this situation demanded a restoration of ultimate concern, community, 
and self-identity; but these objectives require a common acceptance of 
symbols and the creation of genuine community premised on acceptance. 
Only where these qualities predominate can intelligibility and meaning 
exist, creating the best possible circumstance for communication.
Time, however, cast the realization of these objectives with 
their consequent meaning into three idealized types— the apologetic, 
traditional, and revolutionary. These three primary genres reflect 
environmental thrust as it introduces new meaning and value into life.
The communication systems which time engenders share affinities with 
basic life styles, since they are affected by the five criteria which 
give each system its uniqueness. Tillich clearly preferred the 
apologetic system over the other two alternatives. Indeed, from one 
standpoint, chapters five and six represent a further refinement of 
the apologetic ideal.
CHAPTER 5
EXISTENTIAL PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNICATION; LISTENING 
"The knower participates in the known."
Introduction
Ford termed the ideas developed in these next two chapters "re­
ceptive participation," which he defined as "openness and sensitivity 
toward that which is participated in" or as "the act of knowing.
Once he had established the formula that receptive participation equals 
epistemology, Ford further narrowed his consideration of the act of 
knowing to "existential participation," which he felt identified the 
most penetrating and intense form of knowing.^ Consequently, just as 
chapter three moved from a partial philosophical analysis of being to 
communication and chapter four from a partial philosophical analysis of 
history to communication, so chapters five and six proceed from an exis­
tential inquiry into knowing to communication.
Against this backdrop, existential participation explicates 
Tillich's dictum that "communication is a matter of participation" by 
looking at the primary epistemological relationships affecting communi­
cation. Under existential participation the act of communicating is
p. 122.




examined from both sides, reception of knowledge and transmission of 
knowledge. In this case Tillich assumes a perspective analogous to 
modern speech theorists who divide communication dlchotomously— speak­
ing-listening, encoding-decoding, or perhaps, transmlsslon-receptlon. 
With them Tillich asks how does one know when he fills the role of 
listener and how does one "teach" or instill knowledge when he fills 
the role of speaker. Tillich envisioned an existential type of listen­
ing when he urged "participation means participation in their existence, 
out of which the questions come to which we are supposed to give the
O
answer." Similarly Tillich contemplated an existential type of speak­
ing when he theorized: "We who communicate . . . must understand the
others, we must somehow participate In their situation so that their 
rejection means partly an ejection, a throwing it out in the moment in 
which it starts to take root in them."^
Yet, Tillich's existential treatment of listening-receiving and 
speaking-shaping obviously transcends the normal explanations of these 
dualities; he does not, for example, view the communicative exchange 
descriptively or psychologically but philosophically. Tillich postu-r 
lates a universal picture or structure of listening and speaking heavily 
Influenced by ontology and permeated with ethical restraints which he 
felt should characterize all listening and speaking. Furthermore, 
because Tillich's epistemology grew out of his ontology, it does not 
concentrate on message content, whether sent or received, as an end in
Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."
4lbid.
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itself but instead focuses on the person-to-person and person-to-symbol 
relationships presupposed in every cognitive endeavor. As a result, his 
primary emphasis falls not on the circuitous route a message travels be­
tween its origin and its intended destination but on the view one holds 
of the person, the human being, with whom one communicates, regardless 
of whether he listens to him or speaks to him. Moreover, by relying on 
the single concept of existential participation to describe both recep­
tion and sending, Tillich affirms that these complementary acts grow out 
of a common epistemological attitude; if one listens, learns, or ana­
lyzes in order to control or coerce people he will speak out of the same 
motivation.
Since the key to chapters five and six is the existential atti­
tude, the first section of this chapter clarifies the meaning and 
significance Tillich attached to it, The following two sections explore 
the implications of the existential attitude for epistemology generally 
and for communication specifically. The concluding section concentrates 
on listening as interpreted from an existential perspective. Chapter 
six extends themes developed here by developing speaking or "shaping" 
goals compatible with an existential attitude and by evolving a format 
capable of achieving those objectives.
The Existential Attitude
Either blank stares or intuitively nodding heads-^these respon­
ses typify most reactions greeting the term existential. Maligned, 
abused, overused, and unquestionably ambiguous, the concept existential 
participation, nonetheless, frames Tillich's picture of what transpires, 
or should transpire, in communication. As a further complication.
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Tillich's own position with regard to existentialism was itself somewhat 
controversial; on occasion he was called an existentialist and praised 
for it,^ while others criticized his slighting of existential concerns.^ 
Careful study, however, provides a clearer statement of his relationship 
to existentialism and the meaning he assigned to the concept.
Tillich personally eschewed the full implications of the exis­
tentialism of Kierkegaard or Heidigger,^ which he labeled radical 
existentialism, "existentialism as a content," or "existentialism as a 
philosophy."® Tillich rejected the extreme of "radical existentialism" 
for three basic reasons. Ontologically he disputed radical existen­
tialismes denial of the basic ontological structure, self-world. He 
lamented that "the self, cut off from participation in its world, is an
g
empty shell, a mere possibility." Radical existentialism, by beginning 
with man as man alone, left the individual without relatedness. This 
led to Tillich's historic rejection of radical existentialism because it 
denied man historicity, i.e., a meaningful connection with the past,
^See Will Herberg, "General Introduction," Four Existentialist 
Theologians. pp. 2-3; Bernard Martin, The Existentialist Theology of 
Paul Tillich (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963); and Arthur Cochrane,
The Existentialists and God (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963).
®See William Hamilton, The System and the Gospel (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1963).
^See Tillich, "On the Boundary Line," p. 1437 and Reese, "Inter­
rogation of Paul Tillich, Philosophical Interrogations, ed. by Sydney 
and Beatrice Rome, pp. 360-361.
®See Tillich, The Courage to Be, pp. 123-154.
^Ibid.. 151.
with community, and hence with language.^®
Tillich's most serious criticisms of radical existentialism 
began from this communication base. According to his interpretation 
radical existentialism discerned no structure greater than the individ­
ual and in this sense was identical with nominalism. So, radical 
existentialism faced a "calamity" of expression; "non-objective thinking 
and its expression— this is the calamity of the existential thinker. 
Because the existential thinker cannot directly communicate the ideas 
he wishes without diverting attention, at least partially, away from 
the personal experience he has in mind, he must create special forms of 
expression intended to "indirectly communicate." In Tillich's opin­
ion, the existential thinker "can only create in his pupil by indirect
communication that 'existential state' or personal experience out of
13which the pupil may think and act." Moreover, radical existential-
14ists, as illustrated by Max Stimer, always bordered on solipsism.
But even as he separated himself from certain forms of exis­
tentialism, Tillich also found himself attracted by much it said. He 
expressed his affinities with the existential movement either through 
the concept"existential attitude"^^ or by the simple "existential"
^^Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interro­
gations , ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 373.
^^Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 91.
l^Ibid.. p. 90.
l̂ Ibid.
^^Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 136.
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 25-26 and The Courage to Be, 
pp. 123-126,
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which he felt referred "to a human a t t i t u d e . W h e n  he diagnosed the 
ailments of the modern situation as meaninglessness, Tillich reflected 
an existential a t t i t u d e ; w h e n  he repeatedly warned of the grave dan­
ger of making "the other person into an object, into a thing"^® he also 
expressed the existential attitude, and when he talked of "an existen­
tial understanding of a symbol by participation in its revealing power" 
Tillich reiterated the same t h e m e . S t i l l ,  none of these examples pro­
vides a coherent, direct grasp of the existential attitude.
In two fundamental, closely related statements Tillich unveiled 
the heart of the existential attitude as he understood it: A knowledge 
centering around man and his symbolic concerns arises only through exis­
tential participation. Tillich explained:
Nevertheless, a cognitive attitude in which the element of involve­
ment is dominant is called "existential."^®
The existential attitude is one of involvement in contrast to a 
merely theoretical or detached attitude. "Existential" in this 
sense can be defined as participating in a situation, especially 
a cognitive situation, with the whole of one’s existence.
Presupposed in th^se statements are a number of existential 
themes : (1) a protest against ah easy rationalism which claims to
understand reality objectively; (2) a protest against any attempt to
^®Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 26.
^^See Chapter 4, pp. 98-99.
l®Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."
^^Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Inter­
rogations . ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 385.
2®Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 26.
^^Tillich; The Courage to Be, pp. 123-124.
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reduce man to the level of an object, studying him as if he were a thing; 
and (3) an emphasis on the different types of knowledge involved in. 
"knowing about" something and being passionately involved with someone. 
While these themes receive more extensive treatment in the next section, 
Tillich's "existential attitude" itself cautions against a simplified, 
objective grasp of existential participation. Such a position would in 
itself distort the meaning of the existential attitude. Existential 
participation belongs to that realm of life or existence better known 
through involvement than explanation.
The Existential Attitude and Epistemology
Metaphorically describing knowledge as a "union" involving sub- 
ject and object, Tillich envisioned the process of knowing after a 
pattern which might be compared to the fusive possibilities of two 
interlocking circles, one representing the subject and the other the 
object. Three basic connections are plausible: "detachment," with only
the exterior tangential sides adjoining; "participation," a coincidence 
as exact as possible of one circle with the other; and "understanding," 
a precisely indeterminable midpoint somewhere between the extremes.
Any epistemological exertion ("one plus one," "in 1492 Columbus sailed 
the ocean blue," the diagnosis "schizophrenic," or "your husband is 
dead") merges the knower and the known after one of these patterned 
arrangements. Moreover, regardless of which extreme dominates, an ele- 
ment of its opposite always remains.^
Z^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 94ff.
23lbid.. II, 26.
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Decisions about which pattern best applies In a given situation 
are governed by the nature of the object being considered, because 
Tillich wrote "knowledge depends on Its o b j e c t . K n o w l e d g e  predomi­
nantly determined by the "detached" pattern Tillich labeled "controlling 
knowledge"; It expressed the realm of knowledge accessible to technical 
reason's grasp and exploitation. He explained: "It unites subject and
object for the sake of the control of the object by the subject. It 
transforms the object Into a completely conditioned and calculable 
'thing.' It deprives It of any subjective quality."
Controlling knowledge has a large, legitimate sphere of Influ­
ence which Tillich never seeks to diminish, but In his judgment It 
unfortunately has usurped the throne room, claiming "control of every 
level of reality."26 Tillich believed that "man" should be exempt from 
Its sphere of control; In keeping with the existential attitude, he did 
not want man reduced to the level of a machine, an objectified robot 
subjected to programmed manipulation. "A self which has become a matter 
of calculation and management has ceased to be a self. It has become a 
thing. You must participate In a self In order to know what It Is."27
As a result Tillich assigned man, human nature, to a different 
level of knowledge, "receiving knowledge," which yields only to existen­
tial participation. "Receiving knowledge," following the pattern of
2^Tllllch, The Courage to Be, p. 124.
26Tiiiich, Systematic Theology, I, 97.
26ibld,. 99.
27Tllllch, The Courage to Be, p. 124.
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participation, concentrated on taking the object Into Itself. In the
sweep of receiving knowledge are concerns suggested by such topics as
"life, spirit, personality, community, meaning, values, and ultimate
concern."28 Such concerns, Tillich explained,
have the character of totality, spontaneity, and Individuality. 
Experiments presuppose Isolation, regularity, generality. There­
fore, only separable elements of llfe?processes are open to 
experimental verification, while the processes themselves must be 
received In a creative union In order to be known.29
Knowledge determined by detachment eventuates In control.
Knowledge amenable to participation creates communion. In the act of
participating with another person, both parties are changed and enriched
through therapeutic acceptance.^0 The best examples of this dynamic
knowledge Include both the successful psychoanalytic patlent-doctor
relationship and the forming of f r i e n d s h i p s . I n  addition, control-
32ling knowledge underscores the Identity In the two. Finally, 
detachment and technical reason emphasize "means"; participation and 
existential reason underscore "ends."
Standing somewhere midway between these extremes floats "under­
standing." It Implies the presence of both detachment and participation. 
Describing It, Tillich observed,
28Tllllch, Systematic Theology, I, 99.
2*Ibld.. 103.
^°Ibid.. 95-96.
8^Paul Tillich, "The Philosophy of Social Work," Pastoral Psy­
chology, XIV (December, 1963), 28-29.
32Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 94-95.
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The unity of union and detachment is precisely described by the 
term "understanding." Its literal meaning, to stand under the place 
where the object of knowledge stands, implies intimate participa­
tion. In ordinary use it points to the ability to grasp the logical 
meaning of something. Understanding another person or a historical 
figure, the life of an animal or a religious text, involves an amal­
gamation of controlling and receiving knowledge, of union and 
detachment, of participation and analysis.33
On one occasion Tillich cited scholarship as a form of understanding.
While describing the effects of the loss of symbols he commented
this can lead to a point where an existential understanding (by par­
ticipation) has become impossible and a scholarly approach— which 
still requires some empathy of understanding— is necessary if mem­
bers of one group want to understand the symbols of the other 
group.34
While Tillich clearly recognized a middle stance between the 
polarities of participation and detachment, he generally talked only in 
positive-negative terms, particularly with regard to the act of listen­
ing. He seemingly assigned a stronger role to analysis in transmission 
and formulation than in receiving. In other words, listening as an act 
of existential participation approaches intuition, but the conscious . 
attempt to formulate and express this knowledge involves analysis and 
reflection, i.e., a self-detâching from the experience. Tillich's en­
tire discussion would have gained inestimably from a greater 
clarification of "understanding." In dny case the extremes remain 
relatively fixed, and Tillich unequivocally advocates existential par­
ticipation as the experiential doorway to knowing man. He vividly 
paraphrased these contrasting epistemological approaches when he com­
mented :
33lbid.. 98.
^^Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Inter­
rogations , ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 385.
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But there are two different ways of knowing. We may distinguish 
them as our knowledge of the other one as a thing, and our knowledge 
of the Other one as a person. The first is the cognition of exter­
nal facts about somebody. The second is the participation in his 
inner self— as far as any human being is able to participate in 
another one. The first is done in detachment, through an empirical 
approach; the second is done through participation in the inner 
self of the other one. The first is unavoidable, but never enough 
in human relations. The second gives the real knowledge, but it is 
a gift given alone to the intuition of love.^S
The Existential Attitude and Eplstcmology in Couuuu&lcatioA
The modern epistemological revolution, as Tillich depicted it. 
stamped its form into virtually every major cultural endeavor. "In psy­
chology and sociology, in medicine and philosophy," Tillich complained, 
"man has been dissolved into elements out of which he is composed and 
which determine him."^^ If Tillich correctly analyzed the fragmenta-: 
tion process working in the contemporary situation, then the influential 
thrust of controlling knowledge should also exhibit itself in the speech 
communication field. Â positive confirmation of his diagnosis rests on 
the answers to two pivotal questions: (1) what motivation underlies
most contemporary research in speech-communication theory; and (2) what 
image of man underlies most research in speech-communication writings.
Previous analysis would suggest that technical reason focuses 
on control, objectification, and means. The pragmatic "means" support­
ing communication function emerges clearly in the sharp cleavage Berio 
draws between "instrumental" and "consummatory" communication.^^
^^Tillich, "The Philosophy of Social Work," p. 29.
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 99.
37Berio, The Process of Communication, pp. 17-20; Berio's con­
cept of "empathy" also has some affinities with Tillich's idea of
existential participation, see pp. 117-122.
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Instrumentally conceived communication asks one basic question, "How can
I gain the advantage?" It measures success by the "effect" criterion,.
translatable wherever possible into concrete behavioral descriptions.
This mood in communication, aptly announced over forty years ago by
Wichelns ("It is not concerned with permanence, nor yet with beauty. It
is concerned with effect."3^), reaches a powerful culmination in the
technically perfected communication control in Wiener's cybernetics.
When I give an order to a machine, the situation is not essentially 
different from that which arises when I give an order to a person.
In other words, as far as my consciousness goes I am aware of the 
order that has gone out and of the signal compliance that has come 
back. To me, personally, the fact that the signal in its inter­
mediate stages has gone through a machine rather than through a 
person is irrelevant and does not in any case greatly change my 
relation to the signal. Thus the theory of control in engineering, 
whether human or animal or mechanical, is a chapter in the theory 
of messages. . . . Communication and control belong to the essence 
of man's inner life, even as they belong to his life in s o c i e t y ^39
The rivalry over the best motivational objective for communica­
tion— control versus communion— did not begin in the twentieth century; 
Plato's stringent criticism of rhetoric involved this issue and its 
ethical corollary, "Can that which controls be exempted from the ques­
tion of ultimate ends." Yet, the increasing use of empirical research 
has magnified the potential dangers of control and accentuated the rift 
between control and communion by its depersonalized presentation of man 
and his communication. Cognitive detachment constantly threatens, if 
not actually dominates, in this situation. Man appears in a variety of
^®Herbert Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of.Oratory," Rhe­
torical Idiom, ed. by Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca, New York; Cornell 
University Press, 1958), p. 35.
qoNorbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), p. 16.
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roles— consumer, voter, group member, etc.--but man as man is invisible; 
even provocative-sounding titles like Speech and Man devote chapters to 
"Control Speech."40 Language, man's primary communication vehicle, 
suffers reduction to the "physical" denotative level. Mechanistic mod­
els of communication transform communication from interpersonal activity 
into a key punch computerized diagram.
Concerned voices, shaped by a strong humanitarian tradition and 
an existentialist perspective on man, have denounced recent trends in 
speech-communication theory. Floyd Matson and Ashley Montagu, for in­
stance, enunciate a position extraordinarily compatible with Tillich's, 
whose name they mention along with several others as having influenced 
their observation that
one distinctive service of the religious existentialist is to have 
repudiated the technological model of communication as an inexhaust­
ible monologue, addressed to everyone and no one in the form of mass 
communication. These writers have made us aware that human com-; 
munication, wherever it is genuine, is always a person-to-person 
call— never a transcribed message from an anonymous answering ser­
vice to whomever it may concern.41
A similar point is scored by Richard Weaver in a strongly worded para­
graph.
Rhetoric speaks to man in his whole being and out of his whole past 
and with reference to values which only a human being can intuit.
The semanticists have in view only a denatured speech to suit a 
denatured man. Theirs is a major intellectual error, committed by 
supposing that they were going to help man by bringing language 
under the surveillance of s c ience.42
^^Charles T. Brown and Charles Van Riper, Speech and Man, (En­
glewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 77-98.
41"Introduction: The Unfinished Revolution," The Human Dia- 
logue: Perspectives on Communication, ed. by Floyd W. Matson and
Ashley Montagu (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 6.
^^Richard M. Weaver, Visions of Order (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1964), p. 77.
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Fitting "dramatism" against "scienticism,"^^ Kenneth Burke develops re­
lated motifs in the battle he waged, through numerous works, over the 
best way to understand man and his communication. William Rueckert 
summarizes Burke's basic thrust.
Burke's general conclusion is that certain fundamental human needs 
of man are denied realization by the present scientific rational, 
technological, mechanistic, capitalistic orientation. These per­
manent, fundamental needs— what Burke calls "norms"— are denied 
realization because the "technological psychosis" is negativist-ic, 
dissociative, dehumanized, destructive, combative, deterministic, 
and selfish; anti-ethical, anti-magical, anti-poetical, and anti- 
religious. This orientation advocates and actually establishes 
a conception of self and purpose which leads not toward the better 
life, but away from it. . . .44
Tillich's voice, scarcely known and heard in the communication 
field, also challenged the prevailing tendency to emphasize methods over 
man, detachment over participation. Tillich assumed that the first 
great decision made by the one who enters a communicative situation as 
listener or speaker involves a view of man as man; his epistemological 
emphasis demands an addition to, if not a revision of, prior methodolog­
ical approaches to audience analysis and feedback (man) and the 
réévaluation of persuasive effect to include impact on man's total 
being. Never one to condemn discovery, per se, or even the scientific 
investigation of man ("Treasures of empirical knowledge have been pro­
duced in this way, and new research projects augment those treasures 
daily."45), Tillich, nonetheless, delimited the value of detached
4^See Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1961), pp. 38ff.
^^illiam H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Re­
lations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 35.
45Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 99.
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analysis of man constantly underscoring its negative potential.
In spite of its possible success with man as voter, consumer, 
and worker, Tillich specifically faulted "controlling knowledge" on at 
least four counts. First, he finds empirically, statistically oriented 
analysis helpful primarily at the most general level of interpersonal 
relation— the mass audience.Implicit within this orientation is the
^  V b j r  # w w àw w & aw y t » t« a w  «»&& o a j . o
tial element must inevitably at some point inject itself into the
creation, assimilation, or application of even controlling knowledge.
Third, he found that detachment methods could not change or even under­
gostand opinion on the crucial issues of human existence. Fourth, he
envisioned the entire detached approach as accentuating the "objective,"
meaningless character of modern man by depersonalizing his primary
49avenue of reaching his fellowman— language. In other words, instru­
mental and detached methodologies contribute to the dehumanization of 
man.
The Existential Attitude and Listening 
Against objective, detached conceptualizations of man, Tillich 
asserted an alternate methodology conditioned by an existential attitude.
4&See Tillich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 12.
^^See Tillich, "What Is Basic in Human Nature," Pastoral Psy­
chology . XIV (February, 1963), 15-16. ....
^®Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 98 and The Interpretation of 
History, p. 150.
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 54-55.
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Serious difficulties inhere in any effort to present this methodology 
or apply it to listening or speaking because translation of existential 
qualities into objective statements unavoidably stultifies the dynamic 
experience they involve. Tillich indirectly discussed this problem 
when he described the difficulty the existentialist had in communica­
ting; he did not escape the same problem. Consequently, an 
existentialist appraisal of listening does not emerge systematically, 
but instead assumes a form more comparable to an intense personal en­
counter whose implications transcend any factual account of the meeting. 
More simply expressed, existential participation as a description of 
decoding resembles a love story more than a schematic diagram.
Because Tillich's emphasis falls on the persons who communicate 
rather than on the content of what is said, respect for and acceptance 
of the "other" in spite of his lack of status constitutes a fundamental 
principle of existential participation as reception. Tillich coined 
the phrase "listening love" to describe this attitude of acceptance "in 
spite o f " L i s t e n i n g  love" through acceptance of the "other" gener­
ated the dynamic of ontological meaningfulness by giving to the 
communicator the sense of worthwhileness and being that is necessary for 
personhood. Tillich promoted "listening love" as the existential ideal 
for listening when he said:
No human relation, especially no intimate one, is possible without 
mutual listening. . . . All things and all men, so to speak, call 
on us with small or loud voices. They want us to understand their 
intrinsic claims, . . . Listening love is the first step to justice 
in person-to-person encounters.
^^Tillich, "The Philosophy of Social Work," p. 28.
S^Tillich, Love. Power. and Justice, pp. 84-85.
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"Listening love" is a listening to and looking at the concrete 
situation in all its concreteness which includes the deepest motives 
of the other pe r s o n .5%
As listening love substitutes community, i.e., being as the 
dynamic of "being a part of the other," for monopolistic control, it 
functions to facilitate the linguistic and purposive meaning which un­
derlies communication. Although "listening love" assumes appropriate 
communication forms to signal its presence, as a primary motivating 
force and as a dynamic quality conditioning the entire encounter, it 
represents a creative level of sensed community never completely expres­
sible.
Coordinate with creative acceptance exists a parallel 
determinant of existential participation as reception— respect and sen­
sitive response to man as a unified whole. Presupposed within the 
concept of "listening love," the idea of respecting man's totality and 
uniqueness provides additional insight into the nature of man— further­
ing, strengthening the need for his acceptance as a man. Respecting 
man's wholeness implies to Tillich protecting his freedom.
Freedom, I believe, should be described as the reaction of a 
centered self to a stimulus in such a way that the center, and not 
a part or a partial process within the whole determines the reac­
tion. The center is the point in which all motives, drives, 
impressions, insights, and emotions converge without any one of them 
determining the center. We experience the center in every deliber­
ation, in every decision, in every act of self-awareness, of 
self-rejection, of self-acceptance.^3
To judge man by any one realm ("temporal, spatial, historical, psycho^
logical, sociological, biological")reduces one's knowledge to the
S^Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 109.
^^Tillich, "What is Basic in Human Nature," pp. 16-17.
54Tiiiich, The Courage to Be, p. 124.
level of detachment and could result in an objective rdlation only to 
man-in-a-role and not to man himself. Moreover, the individual cast . 
into a special restricted mold may well find his range of options 
limited and his freedom "to be" subsequently restricted.
If man's unity is interpreted as the freedom of his full func­
tioning self, it also implies man's uniqueness. Tillich regarded the 
"uniqueness of every individual and every situation" as an absolute.
To view man otherwise is to judge him mechanically by predetermined 
patterns which make it difficult to know man, yet easy to control him. 
Fully cognizant that comparisons with other people and their accumula­
ted experience are inescapable and invaluable, Tillich does not 
recommend their disuse; he opts only for the possibility that the lis^ 
tener always remain open for the incomparable and the unusual arising 
out of each new situation confronting him. He thus "listens sensitive­
ly and reacts spontaneously," not mechanically.^^
As the end objective of "acceptance" was "communion," so the end 
objective of "freedom" is "individuality." Independent decision stands 
in Tillich's value system as a greater good than success. Preferring a 
mature, totally considered "no" to a "coerced" yes, Tillich believes 
communication should merely "make possible a genuine decision" and not 
be judged by the content of the d e c i s i o n . W h y ?  Because in this way
S^Tillich, "The Philosophy of Social Work," pp. 27-28.
SGlbid.. p. 28.
S^Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."
the full humanity of man as the freest possible determining being re­
mains unimpaired.
Existential participation implies acceptance of man and respect 
for his uniqueness. These qualities represent prerequisite attitudes 
conditioning the manner in which one.listens and the purpose to which 
one applies his knowledge. But existential participation as "reception" 
also includes the nature of the communication formats. As an organizing 
principle, existential participation seeks to maximize opportunities for 
communication and to develop communication opportunities which engender 
participation as opposed to detachment; dialogue situations typically 
promote this objective best. While a dialogue format (discussion, con­
versation, question and answer, forum, etc.) increases possibilities for 
all participants to both listen and talk more, any method can be a mere 
tool exploited for control or propaganda purposes if not guided by the 
motives of acceptance and freedom previously discussed.
Existential participation not only favors certain communicative 
forms, per se; it prefers these forms because they encourage personal 
encounter. Hence, spoken communication always claims preference over, 
written communication, direct negotiation over mediation. Dialogue sit­
uations of genuine encounter affirm man's being, encouraging greater 
self-expression and allowing for communion. Moreover, dialogue situa­
tions of genuine encounter provide new epistemological insight for the 
"receiver" on personal, historical, and cultural levels. Tillich's 
writings offer numerous illustrations of his assessment of existential 
participation in each of these areas, but no statement better amplifies 
his intentions than his description of listening on the cultural level.
izy . .
Perhaps the most significant experience In this respect was my 
visit to Japan from May to July of this year. Although the trip 
took place at the end of the ten-year period about which I have 
been asked to write, the picture would be Incomplete If I did not 
mention It. The encounter served to bring to full awareness ele­
ments of thought which had been present for a long time. A friend 
of mine In whose political judgment I have an almost unlimited con­
fidence asked me years ago, "Why don't you take the Eastern world 
Into consideration within your rellglous-polltlcal thought?" This 
concern has been a thorn In my Intellectual flesh ever since; I 
expressed It In some of my addresses In Japan as the desire to 
overcome Western provincialism. I cannot judge at this moment to 
what degree I have succeeded In overcoming It, but 1 have felt an 
Immense enrichment of substance ever since my trip. "Substance"
In this context means more than new Insights and certainly more 
than a better knowledge of another section of the world. It means 
being somehow transformed through participation.58
Any number of communication problems Tillich mentions— geograph­
ic Isolation, Ignorance,and lack of historical Involvement— center 
In the concept of the need for Increased physical, personal encounter. 
Communication motivated by and growing out of existential participation 
supplies knowledge by Intuition.
Numerous facets of Tillich's own personality Illustrated the 
principles of listening he expounded. Haunted by the thought that he 
might treat a person as an object, Tillich's own communicative behavior 
emboldens the meaning of the existential attitude defined as listening . 
love. While Interviewing Tillich, Ved Mehta observed the startling 
fact that Tillich never allowed another party, even his personal secre­
tary, to answer the phone for him because he did not want anyone to come
between him and the person calling.Tillich's conviction that he
^^Tlllich, "On the Boundary Line," p. 1435.
S^Tllllch, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 13. 
°°Ibld.
^^Mahta, "The New Theologians," p. 122.
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should seek the maximum association with those with whom he was commun^ 
icating made the dialogue situation his favorite communication format. 
"Looking back at more than forty years of public speaking," Tillich 
confessed that
from the first to the last address this activity gave me the great­
est anxiety and the greatest happiness. I have always walked up 
to a desk or pulpit with fear and trembling, but the contact with 
the audience gave me a pervasive sense of joy, the joy of creative 
communion, of giving and taking, even if the auuience was not vocal. 
But when it becomes vocal, in periods of questions or discussions, 
this exchange was for me the most inspiring part of the occasion. 
Question and answer, Yes and No in actual disputation— this original 
form of all dialectics is the most adequate form of my own think­
ing.*2
Arthur Wehrwein discovered that Tillich introduced discussion classes 
into the University of Berlin in the 1920's . C h a r l e s  Kegley conjec­
tured that Tillich was.possibly the most accessible of all contemporary 
theologians, a man who "relishes direct confrontation and scrutiny. 
According to Jerald Brauer, his students perceived these same qualities 
in him.
It was because Tillich needed students for his own completion 
that they accepted him so gladly; they were wanted and needed not 
to build a man's ego but to participate in a process of learning 
that can only be complete where teacher and student genuinely need 
each other and contribute to each other. Teaching was for him a 
process of love, and so he received love.^^
Wilhelm Fauck, Tillich's colleague and close friend reflected:
G^Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 45.
^%ehrwein, "Right Question Pleases Tillich," p. 69.
G^Charles Kegley, "Tillich Talks," The Christian Century, 
August 18, 1965, p. 1012.
65"PaulTillich's Impact on America," The Future of Religiohs, 
ed. by Jerald C. Brauer, p. 17.
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He loved to be with and among people and to discuss with them 
almost.any question that happened to be brought up. Throughout 
his life, from the days of youth until the years of his old age, 
he learned more from conversations, discussions and debates than 
from books, although having said this I must hasten to add that 
he diligently sought and industriously read many b o o k s . ^6
Existential participation as "attitude" unites two pivotal 
areas, ethics and epistemology, into a single concern. In keeping with 
Tillich's dictates, the way we know and formulate our knowledge either 
jeopardizes or promotes the welfare of those with whom we deal. Exis­
tential participation seeks to protect human existence with its 
intrinsic qualities of freedom, uniqueness, and dignity. But existen­
tial participation manifests a "self" as well as "other" direction; in 
seeking maximum opportunities for communication and in respecting the 
full humanity of those involved in the communication process, the exis­
tential participant affirms his own being. His oft-neglected, untapped 
power source is the being of the other person now revealed in a sensi­
tive encounter.
Existential participation, even interpreted as "listening love," 
contains an element of detachment (reflection, analysis); on occasion 
Tillich referred to this as "critical love."^^ This element protects 
existential reception from naivety, solipsism, or unthinking pliability. 
"Critical love" may judge, analyze, evaluate, or aim at eventual trans­
formation, but it does so within the established boundaries of 
"listening love." Tillich viewed critical love as a necessity from
66"The Sources of Paul Tillich's Richness," The future of Re­
ligions , ed. by Jerald C. Brauer, p. 30.
^^Tillich, "The Philosophy of Social Work," p. 29.
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many standpoints and especially recommends It to ministers who constant­
ly riin the danger of participating culturally to the point of conformity. 
To them he suggested, "Ministers need withdrawal and retirement from 
those Influences beating upon us every minute."^®
Summary
Tillich's survey of epistemological relatedness and Its effect 
on the act of listening In communication was decisively shaped by the 
existential element In his philosophic outlook. Guided by his existen­
tial attitude Tillich evolved three basic epistemological relationships 
— detached, understanding, and participation. Communication's person- 
to-person character Insured the practical predominance of epistemolog­
ical principles most attune to maintaining and creating harmony In this 
communal relationship. Overshadowing all other considerations In this 
connection Is Tillich's unshakeable existential conviction that man's 
freedom and Individuality demand preservation In communication as they 
do everywhere. Because he called the acknowledgement of "every person 
as person" the "unconditional Imperative,Tillich affirmed that man 
must not be objectified; he must be known first and foremost as "man," 
a centered whole. Failure to maintain this imperative through abusing 
the other person results In abuse of one's self and a loss of self- 
dlgnlty.^®
^®Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel.”
®®Tllllch, My Search for Absolutes, p. 105.
70lbld.. p. 95.
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Implicit in Tillich's existential attitude were criticisms of 
modern methodologies which neglected the personal exchange in communi­
cation. Tillich thus joined with other concerned voices to warn . 
against dehumanizing trends in the speech field. In developing his own 
existential perception of listening as knowledge reception, Tillich 
stressed the idea of personal encounter, acceptance, dialogue, and 
sensitive response. Thus existential participation did not detail a 
technique for listening but prescribed a universal attitude which should 
accompany any method or technique: an attitude which asked why does
one listen and how does one look upon his partner in communication, and 
which answered with a declaration of his significance as a human being. 
Tillich's own biography further added to the meaning of existential 
participation. The power generated by "listening love" balanced by the 
reflection of "critical love" generated the dynamic"power of being" by 
strengthening community and by giving the involved participants a grasp 
of the symbolic world of the individual or situation which he entered.
Existential participation as a "formalized," practical communi­
cative methodology cannot always be fully implemented. Men must, for 
instance, sometimes write instead of meeting face-to-face, a fact 
Tillich knew and lamented.Similarly, men will invariably be known in 
the roles they fill and will at times engage in communication exchanges 
with a minimal level of existential force; regardless, however, the
^^Ibid., 46. Personally, however, Tillich once remarked, "I've 
never been capable of not answering letters. It's the agape in me." 
Cited by Mehta, "The New Theologians," p. 121. Tillich received more 
than twenty-five "fan" letters a day.
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existential potential of every encounter requires conscious recognition 
of the Importance of knowing man as man and of maximally encouraging 
his freedom, his self-affirmation, and self-centeredness.
Moreover, despite the practical roadblocks one can raise against 
Tillich's thinking, and there are many, he still enunciates a warning 
and a vision constantly needed In a discipline ever bordering on poten­
tial coercion. Tillich also performs the great service of carrying
;re profound level (the ontological
and then the epistemological) and of Involving them In the "passive" 
act of listening as well as the "action" of speaking.
Finally, this section reveals the Intensely personal concern 
for people which penetrated so deeply Into Tillich's being, a quality 
so many seem to have sensed Intuitively and responded to In him. In 
the end Tillich placed the "Individual" ahead of the "absolute," the 
"principle," or the "universal"; of course, he based the possibility 
for such an action on his exlstentlally Interpreted experience that the 
only real way to preserve communication was to preserve Individuality.
CHAPTER 6
EXISTENTIAL PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNICATION: SHAPING
Introduction
Shaping, as listening's complementary function* suggests the 
act of communicating from the standpoint of a speaker-encoder or 
message-source; shaping, as it describes person-to-person and idea-to- 
person relationships, connotes persuasion by implying an element of 
forming, constructing, changing or reforming, restructuring, and 
renewing within these relationships.^ As a specific communicator's 
activity, shaping seeks transition through some form of epistemological 
(message) production. If one assumes with Duhamel that the "rhetorical 
is determined by the epistemological,"^ then the participation-detached 
continuum which swells like a great river through all Tillich's work 
appearing as symbol-sign, connotation-denotation, existential-technical 
knowledge reduces traditional message classifications, regardless of 
media, into two principal categories: participatory (existential,
Tillich also uses the Greek term praxis as a synonym for 
shaping. On page sixty-five of the third volume of his Systematic, he 
defined praxis as "the whole of cultural acts of centered personalities 
who as members of social groups act upon each other and themselves. 
Praxis in this sense is the self-creation of life in the personal- 
communal realm."




messages requiring a high degree of audience and speaker involvement), 
and detached (objective or technical messages, requiring a minimal de­
gree of audience and speaker involvement).
Moreover, just as Tillich summarily dismissed detailed 
investigation of sign, denotation, and technical knowledge, so now he 
similarly devotes no consideration to detached message structures or 
concerns except to lament the effort of the Logical Positivists, blg- 
brothers to the General Semanticists, to reduce all language to a 
scientific ideal.^ Tillich dedicates his energies to the cause of 
existential communication, i.e., communication touching the deepest 
levels of human existence both as content and as a form, thereby 
achieving maximum participation.
Exploring existential communication leads in two directions. 
First, the search requires surveying the communication objectives asso­
ciated with existential participation; the ethical-communal motifs 
related to listening will reappear here in forms which suit speaking. 
Second, the search prompts an investigation of how existential communi­
cation can accomplish its message (epistemological) objectives without 
violating the boundaries imposed on it by those objectives. Tillich 
never treats, after the manner of a beginning speech text, the question 
of how to put together a particular message; instead, in keeping with 
his generalizing nature, he develops broad principles which can shape 
and inform the development of a particular message and which unite 
audience analysis and message context within the embracing whole of 
participation.
3see Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 20 and Theology of Cul­
ture. p. 53.
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Communicative Objectives and Existential Participation
Employing the word "genuine" like a saber, Tillich incisively 
distinguished his overt communication purposes from traditional and 
typical aims. Preferentially setting as his goal "genuine decision,"^ 
Tillich evolves a communication philosophy in which "genuine rejection" 
takes precedence over habitual or superficial agreement and "genuine 
acceptance" represents the summa cum laude.̂  Already a cleavage looms 
between Tillich’s restricted "genuine" ambition and sophistical rhe­
toric's "win-at-virtually-all-costs" strategy. The disparity raises 
again the vivid memory of Socratic choice, preference for rhetorical 
failure and death over Injustice, superficial absolution, or the vio­
lation of self or other integrity.
But exactly what does Tillich mean by “genuine decision?" 
Negatively, a genuine decision excludes many influences: (1) It cannot
grow from mere rote compliance (the straight party voter, the "yes" 
man, the traditional Christian); (2) nor does a genuine decision arise 
from ignorance or a conformity to social pressure; (3) finally, a gen­
uine decision cannot emerge from empty emotionalism or whatever is 
involved in the manipulation Tillich castigated as "mere persuasion." 
Positively, a genuine decision springs from a radically different moti­
vation centering not on issues but on the personalities involved in 
communicating; it shifts the value scale away from success defined as 
the decision sought by the communicator toward the whole personality of
^Taped Lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."
^Tillich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," pp. 12-13,
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the llstener(s), decision-maker(s), and the fulfillment of his or their 
humanity. A genuine decision arises from the "whole” or "center" of 
an individual's personality; in other words, no particular dimension of 
life should ideally outweigh any others ; thus, emotion should not momen­
tarily overpower reason, nor should socio-economic pressures displace 
moral conscience. Fundamentally, a genuine decision equals a "free" 
choice, with freedom defined as respect for man's integrity and individ­
uality. Only from this basis can true commitment emerge and with it a 
stronger, more capable human being.
By strengthening individuality, communication itself is pre­
served because it maintains the polarity of commonality-individuality. 
When this polarity breaks down as in autocratic-subservient relation­
ships, there is no real communication because there is no real choice, 
and man as man suffers. Since "meaningful" communication requires full 
individuality among the communicators, Tillich prefers a "genuine" re­
jection of his message to "acquiescence" to it.& "True communication," 
in Tillich's words, involves "making possible a decision for or against 
something."^
Concomitantly, Tillich does not dismiss communication as being 
unimportant; rather by refocusing communicative ends, by redefining suc­
cess to designate the nature or quality of the response ("genuine") and 
not its observable result or effect, Tillich opened the door to a new 
form of communication, which he regarded as extremely important.
Gibid.
^Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."
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Gedulne or existential communication as a first step aimed at "under­
standing," or "partial participation,"® or overcoming the communication 
barrier Tillich described as a "lack of existential participation."*
Genuine decisions are rare because communication and communica­
tors who seek to produce them are rare. Two opposing pressures threaten 
genuineness: overcommunlcatlon or "methods of mere persuasion" and
ineffectual communication or "our inability to communicate" or not to 
overcome the obstacles to communication.^® Major obstacles Include 
misinformation, supplying the wrong information either accidentally or 
intentionally, and above all. Inadequate statement of one's position.
To Tillich the adequacy of a statement relates to Its relevance for the 
meaning of the listener's life.
Otherwise expressed, "genuine decision" demands empathie parti­
cipation on the part of the communicator and the listener. Barring this 
possibility the communicator either falls or his communication falls 
under a different classification. Communicating so that real under-; 
standing transpires runs the high risk of degenerating Into "mere 
persuasion" because the communicator's ego-drlve easily loses sight of 
the necessity of retaining the "Individuality" and "freedom" of the lis­
tener. Thus, Tillich confronted the formidable task of articulating a 
method of communicating powerful enough to generate "existential
Bibld.
*Tllllch, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 14.
^®Wlth reference to educational attitudes Tillich called this 
former fault "self-imposltlon" and the latter, "self-restrlctlon." See 
Systematic Theology. Ill, 260-261.
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participation” and overcome barriers to achievement of "felt knowledge" 
and yet impotent enough to guarantee that the listener^chooser retains 
his freedom of genuine decision.
Moreover, intertwined with the epistemological goal of "shaping" 
defined as "genuine decision through partial participation" lie the 
larger but more implicit goals of reuniting man with himself, his fel- 
lowman, and conveying to him a sense of harmony with his world. Tillich 
never naively expected his view of communication automatically to pre^ 
vail over counter systems, nor did he believe it would resolve all 
problems, but he advocated it as the best and most noble communicative 
approach, effecting in the long run the greatest "good." In addition, 
he implied but did not systematically develop multicultural applications 
of his communicative philosophy, extensively broadening communicative 
concerns into such areas as education, missions, parent-child relation­
ships, and periods of cultural disintegration.
The Method of Correlation; Definition
The concept of correlation^^ summarized the epistemological 
theory around which Tillich develops his positive approach to message 
construction. The term correlation suggests the unnamed presence of 
participation ("the principle of relatedness") within correlation (co­
relation) and implies that Tillich projected a "method" for obtaining 
effective communication, however existential, its character might appear. 
A preliminary survey of his method of correlation or participation 
uncovers the congruence between its basic epistemological character and
l^See Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 34ff,
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the communication objectives of existential participation; the follow­
ing subheadings, independence and dependence, define the nature of 
correlation and express its congruity with these objectives. The final 
section examines more extensively the concept of correlation in actual 
operation.
As a method, correlation primarily identifies àn epistemic 
stance, but it also has counterparts on all levels of Tillich's thought. 
It expresses, for instance, the midpoint in the ontic polarity partici- 
pation-individuality, viz., the point where the polarities merge. 
Furthermore, all of the apologetic aims also find their epistemic for­
mulations in correlation— the union of past and present, voluntary 
community, symbolic equation, etc. In fact neither of the other systems 
of communication, tradition or revolutionary, seriously considers the 
"self" of the listener with the seriousness demanded by correlation. 
Correlation also shares at least two ties to existential listening; as 
the description of a message-listener relationship, it expresses the 
speaking counterpart of dialogue as Tillich's favorite metaphor for 
correlation, "question and answer," s u g g e s t s . I n  addition, the first 
step in the method of correlation, existential listening, implies the 
^  priori of empathy with those with whom one seeks correlative commun­
ication.
Independence
Rooted firmly in the concept of correlation is the participatory 
image of "co-relating" distinct but mutually related factors; with this
12gee for example Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 6-8, 18, 22, 
66-68; Theology of Culture, pp. 205, 208.
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concept Tillich hoped to preserve the integrity and freedom of each ele­
ment in communication. Penetratingly defined as "a unity of the 
dependence and independence of two factors,correlation designated 
more than a formula for outlining or organizing; it unveiled the criti­
cal cognitive balance so necessary for genuine decisions. By stressing 
independence, correlation protects the integrity of the listener and 
the ideational positions he represents, while its corresponding empha­
sis on dependence affirms a point of commonality, continuity, or contact 
where differences between two individuals, viewpoints, groups, or cul­
tures merge into essential oneness.
Through correlation Tillich endeavored not only to overcome 
ineffectual communication without resorting to overpersuasion but also 
to preserve individuality from the quagmire of unintelligibility yet 
without permitting commonality to destroy individuality. In this in­
stance, then, correlation describes Tillich's ideal epistemological 
relationship from the communicator's standpoint just as "listening love" 
depicted this ideal in the art of message reception. While correlation 
eventuates in a message aimed at a listener the message itself con-: 
sciously and consistently recognizes the listener's freedom of choice.
One source of everpresent tension in correlation is the diffi­
culty of balancing the ethical restraint of protecting individuality 
with the epistemic challenge of discerning sufficient commonality to 
make change possible. Only a person fully oriented to correlative
^^Duane Fordershee, "Tillich's Method of Correlation," (Unpub­
lished Seminar paper. Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma), 
p. 3.
thinking can balance this tension and not abuse the power Inherent I n . 
commonality for his own self advantage. Correlative thinking absolutely 
accepts the distinctness of the other person and then proceeds through 
a process which combines participation and detachment toward message 
preparation and presentation. This procedure raises a second threat to 
individuality, the danger that the element of detachment which analyti­
cally reflects on existential listening and on sources of commonality, 
and which searches for the best forms of expression will spread beyond 
these bounds and engulf the person-to-person character of the speaker- 
listening relationships. As a consequence, the speaker may objectify 
his listener and replace constructive dialogue with overpowering mono­
logue, ultimately destroying the capacity for genuine decision.
From the ethlcal-eplstemlc base of correlation, he then moves 
toward an analysis of those points where maximum commonality or depen­
dence occurs among speaker-llstener-message-reallty. Thus the method 
of correlation culminates In a search for the most effective means of 
extrapolating and stating these points of correlation In a single mes­
sage possessing existential veracity; to an examination of this side of 
correlation Is the next task.
Dependence
In the same motion with which correlation affirmed the Indepen­
dence and freedom of the llstener(s), decider(s), or audience It also 
affirmed the dependent connection of all parties In the communication 
act. Effective communication as reflected In a message relies on this 
commonality or dependence as the source for audience analysis and
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message adaptation. Tillich's correlative method of audience analysis 
and adaptation began on the ontological level with human finitude, the 
threat of non-being, and the implications derivative from these. All 
men, Tillich proclaimed as a basic principle of communication awareness, 
"participate in human existence. This is a very universal answer.
Therefore, Tillich did not begin his analysis and adaptation,
according to colleagues, by looking at a particular audience but with
man as man. Jerald Brauer contended:
He never thought of a particular audience. He thought of all men 
in similar conditions. Mankind fit into the structures of being 
as he understood them. He endeavored to relate this man to the 
problem which he was discussing. There was no conscientious effort 
to relate to a given group. He talked to mankind in general.15
Dr. Edward Steimle, Professor of Homiletics and Tillich's colleague at
Union Theological Seminary, shared this conviction.
As you know. Dr. Tillich gave his sermons to college and university 
students. There was no particular effort to show an adjustment to 
a local situation. He spoke to mankind and his problems. He 
spoke to man as he understood man to be.16
By beginning with man as man, a human being, and not man as part 
of a special audience or filling a given role Tillich's message perspec­
tive gained a greater universality as the international appeal of his 
own works implies. While this perspective admirably suits Tillich, who 
designed a message content structured to affect man's ultimate concern, 
his sense of being, we must ask whether this type of correlation has
l^Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."




relevance for more pragmatic concerns like politics or labor disputes. 
Although Tillich never faced a question phrased exactly this way an 
affirmative answer to it runs throughout his thought.
The eclectic, cosmopolitan career of Tillich, who attempted to 
demonstrate "the relation of religion to politics, art, philosophy, 
depth psychology, and sociology,affirms a unity inherent in human 
endeavors which makes it difficult to separate any aspect of life from 
its effect on such concerns as being. At the same time, Tillich recog­
nized that some questions and messages bore more directly and 
consciously on man's ontic needs than o t h e r s . A n y  message, Tillich 
would seem to counsel, has a more dynamic quality when it takes cogni^ 
zance of man's existential predicament and the forms man uses to resolve 
these problems. Tillich's theory of symbols and ultimate concern, or 
transcendent meaning vividly dramatizes this thought. Since the ''mean­
ing of life" or "the meaningfulness of the whole" affects every meaning, 
the connection between a given message and the symbolic frame which 
supports the whole must be determined.
Moreover, Tillich's philosophy of communication suggests that 
the form of communication, regardless of its content, can affect man's 
being. If the manner of communication, entirely apart from the content, 
restores or strengthens person-to-person relationships, it has had an 
ontic "healing power."
^^Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 41.
^®See Paul Tillich, "Art and Ultimate Reality," Cross Currents,
X (1960), 1-2.
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Messages should correlate with man's ontic needs, but they 
should also correlate with man's second major sphere of commonality or 
dependence, environment. Men share a common situation, although the 
situation may vary from culture to culture. Blocked in larger terms, 
environmental participation adds contemporaniety to universality. From 
a communication standpoint Tillich regarded language as "the basic and 
all-pervasive expression of every situ a t i o n . T h u s  the central task 
of correlation here becomes, "How can we find the proper language for 
communication?"^®
Any message, even a universal one, which does not reflect the 
contemporary Zeitgeist lacks relevancy and power. Coincident with this 
conclusion, Tillich borders on defining rhetoric as the adaptation of 
"ideas to people," although he projects the concept of ideas into a 
much broader framework than the immediate, pressing issue. In order to 
adapt successfully to the environment, Tillich urged a painstaking 
search of the contemporary cultural milieu and the mood which dominated 
it. Advocating as primary research areas "philosophy, poetry, drama, 
the novel, therapeutic psychology, and sociology,Tillich reached for 
a vocabulary which he projected as a prelude to understanding and speak­
ing to modern man.
Sharing or participating in another's situation opened the door 
to participating in the reality of his life and the meaning which filled
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 7.
2®Tillich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 12.
2lTillich, Systematic Theology, I, 63.
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the vacuum of his words. Conversely, as one grew more proficient in 
speaking the other’s language you could lead ^im to "participate in the 
reality" which your words— now his— can convey to him. Thus Tillich's 
messages ring with the terms, concepts, and images of twentieth century 
philosophy, psychology, and literature; examples are "Gestalt of Grace," 
"Accepting acceptance," "estrangement," "despair," "meaningless." In 
this way Tillich groped through the dense environmental fog to strike a 
sympathetic note of universal agreement about principles which he be­
lieved transcended any situation. Candidly Tillich acknowledged this 
goal:
Now take the term "estrangement." When I speak in any college 
about estrangement, everybody knows what I mean, because they all 
feel estranged from their true being, from life, from themselves 
especially. But if I spoke of their being sinners, they would not 
understand at all. . . . But estrangement is a reality for them.2%
Correlation means finding commonality in essential and environ­
mental participation. Tillich believed, moreover, that adaptation could 
occur only when ontological principles could support its application. 
Furthermore, correlation serves as a means to fundamental communication 
objectives; by protecting individuality it strengthened self-affirma­
tion, by revealing unity and not forcing decision it engendered 
community, and finally by demonstrating their situational relevance it 
reinforced symbolic value.
Method of Correlation: Application
While the preceding discussion has clarified the basic character 
of correlation, an even clearer insight into the method of correlation
Z^Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 98.
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comes from a translation of its principles into recurring characterise 
tics of messages built from its premises. Tillich's own metaphor, .. 
"question and answer," provides an exceptionally suitable skeletal .. 
framework for demonstrating the convergence between independence and de­
pendence in a single message.
Question and Answer
A correlated message draws its literary form from the image of 
a dialogue or conversation in which a dialectic exchange between two or 
more parties leads toward a common synthesis. Modeled after the classic 
Platonic pattern, a correlated message appears as a conceptual dialogue 
as opposed to a dramatic one; without characterization, it nonetheless 
seeks a full airing of viewpoints and a satisfactory resolution of dif­
ferences through an exchange of opinion. Theoretically in this manner 
the communicator who must address others from a monologue position can 
through a correlated message imitate the ideal of genuine dialogue by 
incorporating both the perspective of his listener and himself into a 
single communication act. Consequently, the first obligation of the 
communicator preparing a correlated message is a fair statement of the 
other's position, or a fair delineation of the issue, or a question 
which prompts the discussion. Only after this transpires can an appro­
priate response or rejoinder originate. As a result Tillich's typical 
message structure consists of two parts, problem and solution.
Question and answer also fill a function beyond that of form; 
they imply the ontological dimension shared by both speaker and listen­
er. Question implies the universal problem, the threat of non-being.
and answer constitutes the symbolic response to this ontic dilemma. A 
correlated message uniquely expresses both question and answer. Accord­
ing to Tillich many cultural message forms— art, literature, the 
theater, philosophy— simply express man's existential plight.23 Such 
messages have one primary value— their therapeutic effect on the for- 
mulator. Tillich once remarked of intellectuals, "they can express the 
despair of existence artistically and philosophically, and can create a 
meaning of meaninglessness."^^ A message has greater shaping power when 
in addition to reflecting the power of non-being it also stimulates the 
"courage to be."
Messages also err on the other extreme. Some messages affirm
answers but do not satisfactorily relate to the current questions;
Tillich placed fundamentalist religion in this camp^^ along with other
messages (Fascism) which destroyed the humanness they ostensibly af-
*)(\firmed in its symbols. A correlated message in contrast to these 
other types unites symbolic response and situational question to pro^ 
vide an existential message of timely import. The method of correlation 
describes the way question and answer join in a message to encourage 
genuine decision by the listener.
^3see Tillich, Theology of Culture, pp. 125-126; The Courage to 
Be, pp. 135-154; and "Existentialist Aspects of Modern Art," Christian­
ity and the Existentialist, ed. by Carl Michelson, pp. 128-147. .
24"Religion and the Intellectuals." Partisan Review, XVII 
(March, 1950), 254-257.
^^Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 3-4.
2®Tillich, "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols," 
Religious Experience and Truth, ed. by Sidney Hook, p. 5.
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Question
A correlative message always begins with the issue, the problem, 
the negative, or crisis as it exists in the mind of the listener, at 
least as the speaker discerns it. But correlation does not designate 
mere acceptance or statement of this problem; instead, it seeks to in­
tensify the question until it assumes existential reality to all hearing 
the message. By dramatizing the human predicament the communicator 
reinforces the tie between his message and man's need for being. Til­
lich referred to this when he spoke of jarring awake those "living in
27secure towers . . . covered by an assumed knowledge of all answers."
At this point, Tillich unwittingly became rhetorical in the classical 
sense; virtually all his messages (sermons, essays, and systematic) 
begin by dramatizing the plight, the contradictions of human existence, 
and the shock of non-being. Only after properly "awakening" his audi­
ence does he affirm a positive, symbolic answer.
Since Tillich believed the base of every issue always involves 
human existence, the best method to verify it was experiential. "We 
cannot use evidence to tell people that human nature is like this," .
OQTillich conjectured. Intensification, then, did not derive from 
authority, logic, or statistic but from the declaration of human expert 
ience. Human personality as it reflected on the meaning of its own 
existence best testified to the experience of being and non-^being. No
Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel." 
28lbld.
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wonder Tillich's sermons were so devoid of quotations or illustrations.^^
Tillich preferred direct appeal to human experience which opened up "the
30human mind so that it is ready for existential participation." Hence,
his classic appeal:
But there is a way of rediscovering their meaning, the same way 
that leads us down into the depth of our human existence. In that 
depth these words were conceived; and there they gained power for 
all ages; there they must be found again by each generation, and by
each of us for himself. let us therefore try to penetrate the
deeper levels of our life in order to see whether we can discover 
in them the realities of which our text speaks.
Obviously subjective human experience cannot substitute for 
valid areas where objectivity rightfully rules; but it claims a valid 
sphere of its own.^^ Moreover, even in many areas where the surface 
indicators of objectivity appear as evidence, frequently these formal 
qualities merely cloak already present existential conviction. Ques­
tion, therefore, as the expression of man's search for being and meaning 
penetrates into many message sources which indirectly reflect it. The 
successful communicator, alert to its presence, understands the ques­
tion, dramatizes it through personal experience, but also goes beyond
this, responding to it with an answer.
Answer
Answer, most simply conceived, represents the second and posi­
tive half of a particular message, that portion in which the
29gee J. Frederick McKirachan, "The Preaching of Paul Tillich," 
Princeton Seminary Bulletin, L I U  (January, 1960), 36.
^^Tillich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 13.
^^Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 154.
^^See Tillich. Systematic Theology. I. 100-105.
communicator supplies a resolution to the issues or questions raised by 
the former half. But answer involves much more than a "second half" 
or even a direct connection with a given issue; it also points toward 
the meaning of the whole and the strengthening of being. Hence, answer 
translates into symbol; correlation means bringing the symbolic power 
of a message into direct confrontation with the existential needs of the 
listener so that he accepts a given symbol as valid for all levels of 
his existence. Such a perspective amplifies Tillich's previous inter­
pretation of man, which pictured his ultimate concern in more concrete, 
immediately accessible forms, called s y m b o l s i n  this capacity sym­
bols supply the answers to man's threatened loss of being, his 
existential predicament.
Consequently, the key to "shaping" as message production lies 
in the subtleties of "symbolic correlation." Symbols penetrate, if 
situationally relevant, into the inner core of man's personality where 
values and basic attitudes germinate from existential anxiety and the 
quest for certainty; as a result, these "depth" forces undergird most 
pragmatic decisions reached by the listener in communication. If a 
sender, through "symbolic correlation," can reach this depth dimension, 
be taps the formative existential power of being, even when he does not 
consciously interpret his message content in these philosophical terms. 
Symbolic correlation reaches the "whole" of man beyond any one influ­
ence because it communicates directly and immediately, i.e., "intuitively" 
to man.
33see pp. 74ff.
Symbols, however, and messages built around them communicate .. 
meaning only when they are accepted or understood as symbols which .. 
answer one's existential questions. In Tillich's words, this means we 
must make "symbols understandable as s y m b o l s . W i t h o u t  the power to 
evoke the proper connotations in the mind of the listener, a symbol is 
dead, and the message associated with such a symbol suffers the same 
fate. Improper attitudes toward a given answer or symbol may result . 
from several causes: a total rejection of all symbols— the abyss of
meaninglessness; a wrong perception or interpretation of a symbol; a 
state of doubt or uncertainty about a symbol's authenticity.^^ Yet, 
regardless of the motivation which produces the disparity between the 
listener's ultimate concern and a given symbol, no message can overcome 
this gap which does not establish itself as an answer. To accomplish 
this, a communicator needs a clear grasp of symbol groupings and the 
relationship between them.
Tillich's messages imply three major symbol groupings. First, 
symbols are grouped into formalized classifications such as art, liter­
ature, history, religion, etc. The most powerful group, however, and . 
the basis for evaluating all the others is the category which most di- . 
rectly embodies an individual's ultimate concern, for Tillich this would 
be the ontic-religious dimension. Secondary symbol categories then 
relate to the category of ultimate concern according to a hierarchical 
arrangement, in which the language and mood associated with one category
S^Tiiiich, "How We Communicate the Christian Message," p. 13.
S^Tillich, Ultimate Concern, pp. 189-192.
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shares greater or less affinity with another category. Thus, symbols . 
from an area closely associated with the category of one's ultimate con­
cern may strengthen symbols in the ultimate concern group or vice-;versa. 
Tillich personally found a close connection between religion and aesthe­
tics.Subsequently, he built his sermons around poetic imagery which 
also embodied his thesis that personal experience was the strongest 
source of appeal. He described his sermons as "a little mystical and a 
little poetical."37 He also discerned a close tie between the nature 
of philosophy, psychology, and theology which he utilized in developing 
his Systematic Theology.38
A correlative message not only develops the relationships 
between formal symbol categories; it also explores the situational rele­
vance of symbols. Every period, according to Tillich, would have 
certain terms, words, figures, or other symbolic forms which possess 
greater evocative power in a given situation than other forms. Tillich, 
for example, urged a total ban on the word "original sin,"^^ but he 
found powerful situational relevance in "estrangement"^® and discerned 
a unity in the reality they pointed toward. Tillich typically examined 
symbolic areas in relation to ultimate concern, in order to decipher 
situationally relevant terms which he could appropriate to build strong­
er connotations for the symbols he held up. Tillich concludes his
36Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interro­
gations . ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 407.
37Mehta, "The New Theologians," p. 123.
3®Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 4.
3®Tillich, Ultimate Concern, p. 89.
40lbid.. p. 98.
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lectures on communication with examples of this type of symbolic .corre­
lation. He equates religion and medicine to define salvation and .grace 
or he substitutes estrangement for sin.^^ In this way he not.only 
merges the connotation of separate symbol categories, but he also re­
veals common areas of insight into human existence shared by the various 
categories.
Symbolic correlation in message also derives from the wise ap­
plication of what Tillich called "symbol s e t s ."42 Symbol sets suggest 
the idea of a hierarchy of connotative power in symbol categories, so 
that certain symbols possess greater power than others. Tillich detec­
ted three levels which he labeled transcendent, immanent, and sign- 
symbol.^^ As a message strategy this hierarchy had two uses in Tillich’s 
message. First, Tillich generally began his message with lower order, 
usually immanent symbols, because they aroused less resistance when the 
set with which they were associated was not fully accepted as an answer. 
At the same time immanent symbols also possessed the potential power to 
gain acceptance for the whole set so that if acceptance for a lower 
order symbol could be secured, acceptance of the entire set could follow. 
Second, Tillich would change symbol sets by taking symbols from one 
level into a different order. He frequently translated symbols from the 
immanent level into the transcendent level where he felt unnoticed areas 
of agreement could emerge. This seems to have been the procedure which
4^Taped lecture, "Communicating the Gospel."
4^Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interro­
gations , ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 390.
43see p. 76.
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prompted Tillich's previously cited advice to the young ministers of the 
religious-socialist movement when he told them not to preach religious 
socialism, per se. but the principles out of which it grew.**
The personality of the speaker also plays a role in symbolic 
correlation as answer, just as it did in vivifying the question. Til­
lich unequivocaj-ly contended that "the spoken word is effective not only 
through the meaning of the sentences formulated but also through the 
immediate impact of the personality behind these sentences."*^ His 
later interpretation of this as a reflection of "existential truth" 
indicated that the person as a symbol activated the quality implied by 
"immediate perceptibility." The communicator functions as a living sym­
bol who vividly brings the abstract immediately to mind. Thus, the 
"personality" brings an additional "cognitive dimension" to communica­
tion, a dimension after a model which compares to "intuition" or a "felt 
knowledge" perceived below the level of the rational.*& The person thus 
aids the process of symbolic correlation by the dynamic cognitive sup­
port which his personality lends to his position. His living presence 
projects the quality of existential participation into his message, add­
ing new depth and force to his words.
The relationship between these various symbol factors, including 
the "living symbol," grows extremely complex in actual practice. For 
a message to comprehend successfully these complexities, the
**See pp. 7-8.
*^Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 45. 
*®Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 23.
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communicator must existentlally participate (listen) in the symbolic 
world of his listeners until he grasps internally its character. Then 
through experiential reflection, he can develop a symbolic strategy 
which reveals the symbolic unity between the world of the listener and 
speaker.
Symbolic correlation as the communicator's method of answering 
the question of his listener is more than a pairing of words, themes, 
or slogans, although these may become involved in the process. It is 
a process of revealing congruent spheres of meaningful "reality" and 
of relying on the ontological dimension as the ultimate source of that 
congruency when necessary. Cognitively, the end result of symbolic 
correlation should assume the form of new or renewed attachment to lin­
guistic forms which affirm the "depth" meaning of life. Success in 
demonstrating congruency is a message's shaping power.
Summary
The epistemological tone and restraint which framed Tillich's 
approach to listening also permeates his view of shaping; in both in­
stances Tillich's overriding concern lay with the moral and ontological 
welfare of his listener, whether one or many. When discussing the act 
of message formulation, Tillich sought to protect his listener, first, 
through the form of communication which does not seek or present "all 
the available means of persuasion." He wants the listener to make a 
genuine decision, as opposed to an unwanted or uninformed one. Only 
genuine freedom in decision making can encourage the full development 
of the listener's humanity and individuality. Not all decisions will
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be of sufficient magnitude or proper type to suit this goal but all po­
tentially are. Furthermore, without constant restraint and awareness 
of this objective the listener easily becomes an object subjected to 
manipulation. Correlation expresses Tillich's communication concern 
for the listener and his attempt to do justice to his attitudes and 
individuality.
Yet, the existential communicator not only cares for his listen­
er as a decider who receives certain correlative messages. He also 
cares for him as a man. Thus he sees his listener as a human being . 
threatened by the vicissitudes of life. Consequently, he wants his 
message to create community by uncovering differences and similarities. 
Correlation itself expresses the desire to secure unity within diver­
gence, true community within conceptual dialogue. Beyond this, the . 
existential communicator wants to strengthen the symbolic world of his 
listener as a man, because unless he identifies with symbols the whole 
world of the listener borders on meaninglessness. Consequently, the 
existential communicator wants to give an answer to the listener which 
will merit his ultimate concern most authentically and realistically.
For this reason the ontic level and its symbolic expression serve as 
the best foundation for the development of correlation; this dimension 
expresses and creates meaning in the sense of the meaning of the whole.
Shaping thus implies formal or stylistic communication quali­
ties, as well as community and symbolic variables; it reflects the full 
range of ontological or essential communication objectives. But shaping 
also says more. In assuming both the power to diagnose, even dramatize 
and prescribe, the existential communicator assumes the correctness of
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his stance; he believes his symbols possess the qualities needed by his 
listener. He cannot escape persuasion. Nor can he fully avoid the per­
suasive use of symbolic power. He can only add to his appeal for 
respect of individuality and freedom the insight that other-abuse is 
self-abuse and symbolic abuse threatens total meaninglessness.
CHAPTER 7 
TELOS: RETURN TO THE BOUNDARY
"A fZâgiuêat is s.n Implicit system) 
a system Is an Implicit fragment."
Between Philosophy and Communication
As an exile from Nazi Germany Tillich disembarked In New York
City, on November 4, 1933, an "alien" and stranger adrift In a foreign
land without a knowledge of Its language or way of life.^ The mutual
affection which developed between Tillich and his adopted homeland In
the ensuing years was remarkable. In less than twenty years he "became
the most eloquent spokesman for religion In America."
His books were read by countless thousands, Impossible demands were 
made on him as a lecturer, his concepts were commonplace at cock- 
tall parties, he was quoted and interviewed constantly by all media 
of mass communication, and he was listened to gladly by students; 
which was for him a great source of joy. With no publicity to 
speak of, seven thousand students.turned out td hear him at the 
University of California, Berkeley, only a few months before his 
death.3
To these evidences of Tillich's popular acceptance might be added the
^Tillich, "Autobiographical Reflections," The Theology of Paul 
Tillich, ed. by Robert W. Bretall and Charles W. Kegley, p. 16. Tillich 
describes himself as an "alien" In On The Boundary, pp. 91-96.
^Brauer, "Paul Tillich's Impact on America," The Future of 




widespread dissemination of his thought into many disciplines.^ -
Introducing Tillich to yet another field, speech-communication 
theory, constitutes still another "unnatural" beginning, for the thought 
of the man, if not for the man himself. The end result of this migra­
tion is by no means certain. The strangeness of Tillich's unique 
vocabulary and perspective rings awkwardly in the ears of most rhetori­
cians. The conspicuousness of Tillich's presence begins with the 
bewildering announcement of his realistic philosophical premises.
These premises then culminate in the disconcerting ontological assertion 
that "communication is a matter of participation."
By placing communication within the embracing whole of related­
ness or relationships, Tillich formally laid the foundation for his 
methodological and conceptual uniqueness. Methodologically Tillich's 
definition implied that communication could not be understood without 
reference to the principles which govern all relationships. Hence, 
understanding its inner workings demands insight into the whole category 
of relatedness or participation itself. In taking this dramatic first 
step Tillich's thought permits a reversal of Walter's axiom that every 
"philosophical system has rhetorical implications"^ and allows the 
assertion that every rhetorical theory contains implicit assumptions 
about personal, conmunal, and cosmic relationships. Every communication 
theory thus suggests a philosophy of life. Subsequently, communication 
by Tillich's placement could not avoid statements, or attitudes, which
^See pp. 5-6.
Walter, "On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or Progres­
sive," p. 374.
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Influence ethical, social, and even cosmological relationships. While
a given theory may exclude or deny such responsibilities, if Tillich
is correct, no communication theory can disentangle itself from its
responsibilities so simply.
The word as the bearer of meaning has an impact on all sides of 
man's spiritual life, on the whole personality. It is addressed to 
the intellect; it informs man about his situation, his actual and 
ideal relation to God, the world, and himself.^
Through Ford the basic types of relationship Tillich named par­
ticipation grew clearer; amplified by Tillich's own thought, they formed 
a hierarchy capped by ontology, defined here as essential participation. 
In making ontology, rather than epistemology, the beginning place for 
his philosophy of communication, Tillich stretches the relationship be­
tween communication and philosophy to the breaking point and pushes the 
boundary between himself and past theorists to its limits. From this 
ontological frontier Tillich raises new insights and questions. But 
even more important than any single item is the total difference in per­
spective Tillich generates from ontology. Ontology examines not the 
act of communicating, per se, but the whole of reality, the experience, 
or structure of relatedness which supports the individual act of commun­
ication and gives it meaning. In other words, an ontological 
interpretation of communication stresses man speaking, as well as man 
speaking. Ontology, through Tillich, asks for an explication of com­
munication's role in man's existence.
A new emphasis in communication thus arises in the form of new 
objectives for communication. Ontologically evaluated, communication
p. 33.
^Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality,
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does not aim at the discovery of all the available means of persuasion 
nor the impersonal "adjustment of men to ideas and ideas to man" but 
instead seeks man's adjustment to himself, his fellowman, and worlds 
These aims, often implicit in other systems, become dominant in Tillich 
and permeate every phase of his emerging philosophy of communication.
The function of symbols in world harmonization is a major concern 
throughout Tillich's thought, capping all three objectives, appearing 
in all three communicative systems and culminating in the "answer" of 
the correlative message. The ethical relations arising from community 
shape his epistemology and his interpretation of existential listening 
and genuine decision. All these aims merge in the broad goal of 
ontology— the "courage to be." Such a goal implies the image of unity, 
wholeness, or peace; the ideal of man united with himself, his fellow­
man, and his world.^ On a personal level, the aims of communication 
compress into the concept of agape, which means the reunion of the sep­
arated; communication as a form of relatedness functions to draw man 
into the unity of community.®
Standing on this boundary, Tillich verbally lashes out at views 
of communication which stress neutrality, impersonality, or de-humaniza- 
tion. For Tillich the overwhelming significance of communication lay, 
not in its use as a tool or instrument for self-aggrandizement, but in 
its cosmological, sociological, and psychological power.
Tillich, however, in line with his interpretation, traces the
?See pp. 60, 71.
®See Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 28,
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most serious threats to communication and being to the dynamic thrust 
of creative time, "after-each-other-ness." In creating barriers to 
self-ldentlty, community, and symbolic authenticity, time produces the 
specter of meaninglessness. Three systems of communication combat non- 
being as It relates to Tillich’s pntlc communication objectives; but 
only one of these, the apologetic, consistently deals with the "situa­
tion” as Tillich understood It.
With this brief review of Tillich's ontological communication 
perspective, the boundary toward which Tillich's philosophy of communi­
cation moved reaches Its maximum extension. In turning to epistemology 
Tillich drew nearer In conception,,and occasionally In detail, to clas­
sical rhetoric. In several respects Tillich emphasized specific means 
for effective communication; he does this, for Instance, In his pre­
ference for dialogue. In his dramatization of man's existential plight. 
In his reliance on experiential proof. In his recognition of detachment, 
and In the strategy implicit In the method of correlation. Yet, on the 
whole, even In epistemology, everything changes. Tillich the essentlal- 
1st suddenly becomes an existentialist dedicated to the freedom and 
Integrity of the Individual. As a result, listening becomes an act of 
communion, not an art of hearing; audience analysis becdmes a highly 
charged personal encounter In which the Issues become existential accep­
tance of the "other" as person and Insight into his symbolic world, not 
the rational analysis of a "thing." Similarly, message production finds 
Its ultimate motivation In strengthening being by means of symbolic 
reinforcement. Tillich and conventional speech communication never seem 
quite to meet, even when they employ similar or Identical categories.
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Moreover, the traditional speech-communicationist must surely 
find something missing in Tillich's analysis— the resolution of the 
highly involving, pragmatically determined issue, whether the question 
concerns a political choice or religious doctrine. As Kenneth R. 
Mitchell observed about Tillich's advice to the pastoral counselor, 
"Tillich's ontological concerns . . . did not lend themselves to a con­
cern for process and work, a concern for which more transactional 
interests would have served be t t e r . M i t c h e l l  strives in this per­
ceptive article to distinguish the functional aspects of "doing" from 
"being." His general thesis is that Tillich provides rare insight into 
the stance and attitude which one needs, but that attitude and intention 
alone may not be sufficient; with this conclusion classical rhetoricians 
could well agree.
Tillich does not, however, go away so easily. Undoubtedly he 
raised questions which might not help a lawyer win a case or a business­
man to make a sale, yet his questions might help them to be happier 
human beings or evaluate the total worth of their communication attempts. 
Tillich's questions antedate the questions of traditional rhetoric. His 
questions are first or prior in the sense that they ask about purpose, 
ends, and values. They lead up to the concerns of classical rhetoric. 
While Tillich does not actually and literally cross the boundary to 
plunge into what Burke called "the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market 
Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the Human B a m  Yard" he subtly 
penetrates there.
^Kenneth R. Mitchell, "Paul Tillich's Contribution to.Pastoral 
Care and Counseling," Pastoral Psychology, XIX (February, 1968), 24.
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Tillich's relevance at this level derives from his insistance 
that every decision, every use of persuasion, every word which influ­
ences thought and behavior has effects which transcend its immediate 
environs. Furthermore, in their transcendence these acts and events 
become symbolic; by paying greater attention to the whole one might 
better weigh symbolic impact and so accept defeat before the violation 
of self, other, and "world" integrity. By stressing the need to look 
at the whole and then the parts, Tillich offers another defense of him­
self, viz., the consistency of a systematic thinker. Tillich believed 
he could interrelate all aspects of his thought, his life, his communi­
cation, and reality as a whole. Can those who oppose him on practical 
or other grounds do the same? Tillich knew the "essayist" or "critic" 
had the easier task, but he disdained it. In a "concluding statement" 
to his philosophical interrogation he commented:
Therefore, the systematic thinker must defend himself in all direc­
tions into which his system reaches; and he often is inferior in 
his defense to critics who are thoroughly expert in one or several 
fields. The systematic thinker, on the other hand, has the advan­
tage of envisaging his field as a whole and, consequently the 
interrelation of every problem with every other problem.^0
Tillich preferred the boundary.
Between Old and New
Tillich's movement coward an ontological interpretation of the 
whole of reality, including communication, marks the clarion distinction 
of his philosophy. In other respects Tillich frequently shares a common 
perspective with two other well-known names in communication circles:
^^Reese, "Interrogation of Paul Tillich," Philosophical Interro­
gations , ed. by Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 408.
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one "old," Plato, and one "new," Kenneth Burke. Like Tillich these men 
share a humanistic, multifaceted, and diversified cultural outlook which 
reaches out to include more and more. In addition, their works on com­
munication impart an attitude or perspective rather than a schematic 
program of techniques; with Tillich they are more men of intellectual 
pursuit than pragmatic activism.
Tillich had an intimate, life-long acquaintance with the thought 
of Plato. He generally pictured himself as more Platonic than Aristo­
telian^^ and once conjectured that no philosophy could afford to 
overlook the insights of Plato.1% Plato's influence on Tillich is evi­
dent and his influence in Tillich's linking of participation and
13communication has already been suggested. Tillich's inclusion of the 
Platonic notion of eros with participation and communion would also seem 
to confirm this hypothesis. On the other hand, a direct literary con­
nection between the two contemporaries, Tillich and Burke, appears 
non-existent. Tillich and Burke do share a common affinity in their 
knowledge of a wide number of philosophers; and one man in particular 
may have influenced them both— B e r g s on.Tillich and Burke
^^See Tillich's comment in this connection to J. Heywood Thomas, 
"Foreword," Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, ed. by Thomas A. O'Meara 
and Celestin K. Weisser, p. vii.
^^Tillich, "Art and Ultimate Reality," Cross Currents, X (1960),
13.
^^See p. 37.
^^See Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 32. Tillich says, 
"Concepts like participation and communion point to the eros quality in 
every philia relationship."
l^See Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 168, 179, 181, 232; and 
Kenneth Burke, Language and Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1966), pp. 9=10.
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specifically employ the Bergscnian concept of "unfulfilled expecta­
tion."
Regardless, however, of the cognizance or lack of it these men 
possess of each other, some remarkable points of general synthesis in 
their broad outlooks on communication merge. First, there exists a type 
of mystical unity in the ultimate objectives which they seek for man and 
toward which they point communication. Â number of terms from these men 
point toward this common vision in their thought— power of being, agape, 
(Tillich); eros, arete, (Plato); and hierarchy, consubstantiality and 
order, (Burke). All three men thus envision a point of unity, rest, 
and peace among men; typically at some point they dramatize this con­
ception through the image of love or courtship. .
Second and as a direct result of the preceding premise, the 
three jointly see communication and life as processes intrinsically 
bound together. Derivative from this interconnection are at least three 
additional insights. One of the most evident is their objection to the 
idea of a normative (as opposed to specialized) neutral, scientific lan­
guage or communication; logical positivism thus looms as their common 
foe. Tillich contended:
we are in a process in which a very important thing is being 
discovered: namely, that there are levels of reality of great
difference, and that these different levels demand different ap­
proaches and different languages: that not everything in reality
'can be grasped by the language which is most adequate for mathe­
matical sciences; the insight into this situation is the most 
positive side cf the fact that the problem of symbols is taken 
seriously again.16
^^Tillich, "Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God," p. 189. 
See also the anecdote Tillich relates in "Reply to Interpretation and 
Criticism," The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. by Charles W, Kegley and 
Robert We Bretall, p . 332.
10»
Burke likewise argued:
First, I would set "Dramatism" against "Scientism." In so 
doing, I do not necessarily imply a distrust of science.as such.
I mean simply that language in particular and human relations in 
general can be most directly approached in terms of action rather 
than in terms of knowledge.
In this view, "meaning" is not reduceable to "information 
theory," mechanical "interpretation" of "signals," and the like.l?
As a necessary extension of these views, Tillich and Burke 
develop a highly articulate, symbolic view of life and communication. 
Most "meaningful" acts become symbols charged with multiple connota­
tions , although Tillich interprets the nature of symbols as the ontic 
reflection of ultimate concern while Burke interprets it as a funda­
mental attribute of man and language. Quite strikingly, however, both 
scholars assign the negative or non-being ai formative role in the 
creation of languajge and, hence, man's humanity and symbolization. To 
Burke the negative expresses the "unnatural" birth of language as a
realm beyond the natural, physical world and his subsequent placement
18of language in the category of transcendent meanings. By way of con­
trast Tillich projected non-being as a philosophical absolute which he 
coordinated with man's power to abstract. From this capacity came man's 
subsequent realization of finitude.^^
^^Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1961), pp. 38, 40. Plato's views in this regard are discussed 
by Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1953), pp. 1-26.
^®See Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 9-13; 419-479.
19See pp. 59, 60, 67, 68.
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All three men view communication as a phenomenon intrinsically 
bound to the totality of human relatedness. Tillich and Burke carry 
this principle to the point of intra-self-relatedness. Plato’s Phaedrus 
vividly dramatizes the inter-human relationships implied in communica­
tion. The vivid irony underlined by the Phaedrus is the paradox that 
men could love discourse and not men whose "soul" it affected or that 
men could approach one another through language but remained "detached 
from each other." A careful application of Tillich's ontological prin­
ciples, particularly as contrast between controlling and existential 
knowledge, could result in a new interpretation of the relationship be­
tween rhetoric and love in the Phaedrus.
A final derivative from the uniting of life and communication is 
the unanimous declaration issued by this trio about the superiority of 
dialogue over all other communicative forms, though the three all some­
how manage a prolific literary output. Tillich and Plato expressly
voice their conviction that writing, for example, stifles the existen-
20tial reality of the experience it describes. Burke recognized the 
same disparity and through "dramatism" and the "pentad" endeavored to 
make communication more critically aware of the flexibility of language 
and the complexity of the human art of communicating.^^
A third broad principle which jointly characterized Tillich, 
Burke, and Plato was their realistic bias. This assumption implicitly
^^See Plato Phaedrus 277-278; and Tillich, My Search for Ab­
solutes : pp. 45-46.
^^See Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of 
Motives (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1962), pp. xvii-xxv.
colored Plato's method of searching for essential definitions of his
key terms like justice, virtue, love.^^ Tillich explicitly labeled
himself a "moderate r e a l i s t . B u r k e  could write:
The realist Grammar works the other way round: it begins with a
tribal concept, and treats individuals as participants in this 
common substance, or element (whereas Korzybski stresses above all 
the need for a "non-elemental" approach to language).
Against this realistic background, one of the more interesting 
comparisons arises— the relationship between Tillich's use of partici­
pation to describe communication and Burke's use of identification for 
a similar purpose. Obviously, both men rely on these terms partially 
as a result of their acceptance of the reality of substance and consub- 
stantiality (Burke) or relatedness and universality (Tillich). Yet, 
Tillich consistently displays an aversion for the term identification.^5 
His objection to it is rooted in his interpretation of identification 
as the impersonal designation of commonality. As a result he felt.it 
implied the loss.of individuality by suggesting an impersonal act in 
which involuntary or non-genuine acceptance of the "other" displaces a 
free acceptance (based on the polarity participation— individuality) 
which accepts the element of difference as well as commonality. Tillich 
fully accepts the presupposition that commonality or relatedness pre­
cedes communication (whether described by participation or
22see the Phaedrus 249; and Carre, Realists and Nominalists, 
pp. 32-37.
23see p. 13.
^^Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 248.
25gee Tillich, Morality and Beyond, pp. 39-42; and Tillich, "On 
the Boundary Line," p. 1436.
individuality), but feels that without its polar opposite it becomes a 
tool of exploitation.
Burke, on the other hand, stays close to the linguistic realism 
lying behind identification. He consequently interprets it as a lin­
guistic achievement made possible by the "signs of c o n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . " 2 6  
Identification thus does become a method, albeit resting on the theo­
retical ground of substance. Burke unquestionably develops a clearer 
grasp than does Tillich of how identification among the separated occurs; 
he does not exhibit the concern for individuality shown by Tillich who 
explains the process of participation ontologically as opposed to lin­
guistically.
In this latter observation we return full cycle to the unique­
ness of Tillich as contrasted to Burke and Plato, his ontological 
beginnings. Tillich's systematic procedures carried the implications 
of his ontology consistently into all phases of his thought; he trans­
lates everything into ontology. Burke, the linguistic philosopher, 
operates in precisely the opposite fashion; he transposes philosophy 
into dramatism. Thus substance or essence becomes the active "tribal 
family" or "identification." He discerns, not premises, but motives 
and consistently seems to shift his ground. Plato correlates the two, 
since he casts his philosophical premises into the drama of dialogue.
From a communication standpoint, once the hurdle of terminology 
is overcome, Tillich's consistency produces the greater clarity. More­
over, Tillich's existential attitude does provide a protection and
See Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives, 
pp. 544-552; 579-583.
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concern for the individual not so clearly evidenced by Burke or Plato^ 
Still more important the communication objectives spelled out by ontol­
ogy, self-affirmation, community, and symbolic harmonization have a 
pristine clarity uniting all facets of Tillich's discussion of commun­
ication.
Beyond the Boundary 
Anyone who examines Tillich's philosophy of communication ex­
pecting traditional questions and answers will receive the shock of 
living on the boundary. Tillich does not offer an easy list of new 
techniques or premises committable to memory. Instead he challenges 
with a total philosophy in which communication and life reciprocally 
interact to shape each other and to form a concept of "meaning" requir­
ing existential participation as an a priori to understanding.
Subsequently, one should not leave Tillich carrying a pad of 
hastily scribbled notes of "dos" and "don'ts," but rather, hopefully 
with a new ontological vision of what potentially transpires in every 
act of communication. Part of that vision should include a new appre­
ciation, if not awe, for the power of the word, a new grasp of the need 
for acceptance voiced in every word addressed to us, and a universal 
longing for authentic symbols. Charged with the potency of being, every 
act of communication becomes an act of risk fraught with the danger of 
non-being as well as the power of being.
Subsequently, a second part of our vision from Tillich consti­
tutes the inner, existential realization that our vision of what happens 
in communication remains at best, partial. The movement of creative
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time and the demand of existential participation require continual adap­
tation and involvement for effective communication. ■ .
In this second realization the task envisioned by this study 
draws near its ultimate conclusion, the formalization and explication 
of Tillich's implicit philosophy of communication. Yet having finished 
the projected study and having composed a statement of his philosophy 
of communication, we realize with Tillich our completed system is only 
a fragment. With reality, life, process, being, and after-each-other- 
ness continually driving forward, new challenges loom, old understand­
ings fade, and men do not understand each other.
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